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Abstract 
Infrastructure projects, based on the Build-Operate-Transfer, (BOT), method, have been of 
interest to governments of developed and developing countries for some time, resulting in 
their worldwide use.  Using the BOT method enables governments to reallocate risks and 
rewards to the private sector for larger infrastructure projects throughout the projects' 
operating life.  In order to implement a BOT infrastructure project successfully, one of the 
essential requirements is to carry out a thorough analysis of risks relating to the project 
including the social, economic, environmental, political, legal, and the financial aspects.  
Due to the fact that the type of risk study required for large-scale projects is so 
sophisticated, and therefore expensive and time consuming, the government, due to lack of 
expertise and time, often obtains a project viability study from the private sector.  This can 
cause problems in that the private sector may incur financial losses or even bankruptcy, 
unless the host government guarantees compensation to the losers of the bid. Because all 
parties have different targets which they wish to achieve from the project, a may conflict 
arise and cause lengthy negotiations, sometimes lasting for years which often result in the 
death of the project.  The greatest opportunity for a successful outcome for a BOT project is 
obtained when the extensive efforts and costs involved in the risk study process are shared 
by all parties. The responsibility of the decision maker is to identify, understand and 
analyze the many risk factors both, qualitative, (linguistic in nature) and quantitative, that 
will affect funding, procurement, developing, construction and operation, before proceeding 
with the build stage of the project.  Firstly, it is necessary to evaluate the quantitative Risk 
Factors subjectively, and list them in order of importance.  Secondly, conduct an evaluation 
of the qualitative factors and since the consideration of qualitative factors is subjective, the 
decision maker will often limit the number of factors being evaluated possibly resulting in 
inconsistent results.  This study proposes a decision framework, which would be useful in 
determining the influence of the qualitative Risk Factors on the project management of 
BOT infrastructure projects. A methodology is provided to enable the identification of 
interrelationships between the Risk Factors and their influence on the project.   
Using Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) techniques, which model the relationships 
between the Risk Factors, a validation of this approach will be sought using a decomposed 
evaluation method and also information obtained from three existing case studies, (the 
  
Channel Tunnel, Sulaibiya Wastewater Treatment and Reclamation Plant and Marsa Allam 
Airport).  The results of the decomposed approach were compared to experts' holistic 
evaluations for the same case studies mentioned above.  The findings indicate that the 
decomposed approach showed a strong correlation to the holistic approach.  An evaluation 
of the risks for the Sulaibiya Wastewater Treatment and Reclamation Plant study is 
provided and suggestions made to highlight risks attached to such a project before it is 
actually undertaken.  Using the decomposed approach enables the decision maker to see the 
contribution of each risk compared to all of the risks in the total project and will help to 
determine and subsequently minimize or preventing any risk factors and so considerably 
improving the risk management of the project. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
In recent years, the private sector has been increasingly involved in the provision of public 
infrastructure on a worldwide scale.  A lack of public resources, the political move towards 
infrastructure deregulation, and the growth in global capital markets have all driven this 
progress; and governments have looked towards the private sector to fund infrastructure as a 
direct result of these pressures.  This has been especially true in developing countries. 
Whilst governments over the last few hundred years have not completely relinquished their 
obligation of setting up and operating their infrastructure facilities, they have very often 
relied upon the private sector, both to construct, and operate some public projects.  In the 
1980's and 1990's, as a consequence of the‎ tightening‎ of‎ governments‟‎ budgets,‎ it‎ became‎
unrealistic for the same governments to finance such projects.  Globalization directly affected 
the international economy and many countries embraced privatization.  As a result, several 
countries had to adopt market economies, (Levy 1996). 
During‎the‎early‎1990's,‎the‎word‎“privatization”‎became‎commonplace,‎yet‎we‎must‎define‎
the meaning of this word in context.  The term is widely understood when used in relation to 
events taking place in Africa, Asia, the former Soviet bloc, and South America for example, 
where industries that were previously owned by the state are sold to private, investors, (Levy, 
1996).  There does exist, however, another form of privatization referred to as "limited term 
privatization" or even a "public/private partnership, (PPP)" occurring worldwide today.  This 
type of privatization invests risk capital in the design, financing and operation of a particular 
project or facility, which is to be used by the public.  The project is maintained, and operated, 
for a defined length of time, during which money is obtained from the users of the facility by 
a private investment consortium.  The project returns to the government, at no cost, when the 
consortium's time limit of ownership expires. It is expected that, by this time, the consortium 
will have collected sufficient revenue to recoup its' investment and to realize a profit.  For 
projects involving the supply of water, sanitation and sewage facilities and power plants, as 
well as roads, dams, canals, urban and interurban rail systems, ports, and airports, it has 
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become apparent to governments that these two types of  privatization are often more cost-
effective than public sector projects, (Levy, 1996). 
 The worldwide need for development projects is increasing continuously, especially 
regarding all forms infrastructure facilities.  A discrepancy in the requirement of 
infrastructure and the ability of countries to meet their development requirements has been 
caused by population growth and the immense, rapid expansion of global economics.  The 
movement towards privatization, both in developed and developing countries has 
increasingly involved the private sector in the improvement of the infrastructure as a more 
popular option. This gradually led to the demise of the monopoly held by the public sector 
with regards basic infrastructure facilities.  
Several significant construction projects were undertaken in various countries during the 
1980's when public infrastructure constructions were performed by the public sector only.  
The private sector has been very heavily involved in the design, funding, construction, and 
operation of these projects over the last ten years.  Therefore, this has led to a large variety of 
PPP being established; each designed‎ specifically‎ to‎ meet‎ the‎ individual‎ project‟s‎
requirements. 
As a result of the reduction in public funding, governments are relying more on the private 
sector to improve and develop their infrastructure, mostly because the latter will often be 
better equipped in the following ways:  mobilization of resources;  provision of technical and 
managerial expertise;  improved operating efficiency;  potential for large scale injection of 
capital;  greater efficiency in using the capital;  utilization of rationalization/cost base tariffs 
for services;  and better understanding of customer needs.  
According to information provided by the World Bank (1998) since 1990, developing 
countries with limited incomes have used private sector companies to improve their 
infrastructure.  Also, since 1990, the number of countries with at least one private 
infrastructure project increased from thirteen to fifty, which is a percentage increase from 
20% to more than 80%. In these limited-income countries, the number of private investment 
projects grew almost every year during the 1990s until in 1997, when it reached a level of 
$35.1 billion.  At the same time, according to Mateen (1999) more than 190 projects were 
auctioned by 20 companies, -a total investment of $23 billion.  The degree to which each 
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party shares the risks, obligations, and advantages of a project will determine the type of 
public/private partnership.  Amongst all of the most common approaches to the public/private 
partnership, the BOT concession model, together with its several variants, has become the 
most favoured for the concession of privatization of infrastructure projects.  However, the 
BOT model approach does present some challenges to the private sector in the development 
of infrastructure due to the complexity of BOT projects and the number of involved parties 
resulting and the corresponding interconnected contracts required.  
In a project such as this, each party has to rely on the performance of its counterpart, and is 
also dependent on the work of all parties involved in the project according to (Dey, 
etal.2004).‎‎Furthermore,‎the‎project‟s‎lead‎time‎is‎quite‎lengthy‎with‎high‎associated‎upfront‎
costs.     
The ownership and operation of infrastructure projects by the private sector has also been 
driven by enhanced efficiency and effectiveness.  However, some Governments have raised 
concerns that the interests of the private sector may conflict with public interests on certain 
issues.   Structuring private participation whilst safeguarding public interests and reaping the 
benefits of private investments, is the responsibility, in principle, of the respective host 
government. 
The Build Operate Transfer (BOT), scheme and other variations of it, has become the most 
widespread technique for encouraging investment from the private sector into infrastructure 
maintenance, operation and provision worldwide, with a particular emphasis on emerging 
markets.  According to the World Bank (2003) 43% of the $720 billion US invested in 
emerging market private infrastructure between 1990 and 2002 was channeled through the 
BOT model and its' variants but 55 projects with a total value of US$20.82 billion, were 
either cancelled or renegotiated during the same time period. 
As a result of large capital outlays and the long time scales required to generate returns for 
investors, BOT infrastructure projects carry an inherent risk.  There is an increased 
probability of problems arising when such long time scales are involved.  The relative 
amount of loss could potentially be huge, given the very large capital outlays required. 
Therefore the decision to invest in BOT projects is affected to a large extent by the perception 
of risk as (Walker and Smith 1995) discussed. 
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Even so, Worldwide, BOT schemes have proved to be a popular method of securing private 
sector‎finance.‎They‎are‎viewed‎as‎being‎“off‎balance‎sheet”‎financing‎ for‎governments,‎as‎
they‎ do‎ not‎ inhibit‎ the‎ government‟s‎ already‎ restricted‎ borrowing‎ capacity.‎ ‎ It‎ is‎ popular‎
belief that the private sector will carry the potential risks, which have been transferred from 
the public sector. 
The idea of using BOT is now well recognized, however, the challenge will differ depending 
the host government, the project type, and the skills required of the managerial and technical 
teams, (Syed et al.2010).  For example, building and operating a road based on toll income, 
or shadow pricing where the government pays the operator based on the actual traffic flows, 
involves a different type of risk to the construction and operation of a power plant for the 
concession period.  The intention of the government is to procure adequate infrastructure 
enabling‎economic‎activity‎to‎grow‎and‎thrive.‎‎Therefore,‎from‎the‎government‟s‎perspective‎
there is less concern with the acquisition of assets than with the purchasing of services.  
1.1 Problem Statement 
 
The majority of countries around the world are leaning towards funding infrastructure with 
private finance in one form or another.  The logic behind this is that the public sector no 
longer possesses sufficient public funds to afford the entire infrastructure required by a 
modern economy.  In addition, the private sector is considered to be more efficient in 
developing, constructing, operating and maintaining facilities than is the public sector. 
The development of‎ infrastructure‎facilities‎ in‎Kuwait‎has‎remained‎the‎government‟s‎most‎
important priority over the last twenty years.  There has been much discussion and evaluation 
of other methods to develop infrastructure but the government appears to be totally convinced 
that using public-private-partnerships (PPP), is the preferred method to enable fast and 
efficient development of its' infrastructure and, as a result, PPP  now holds a position of 
prime importance in the Kuwaiti Government's economic policy. 
In Kuwait,‎the‎government‟s‎move‎towards‎PPP‎includes‎reducing,‎their‎own‎involvement‎in‎
various public sector companies and also increasing the involvement of the private sector in 
essential industries, which were originally government-funded and government operated.  
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In September, 1992, the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), implemented a three-phase 
privatization‎programme,‎which‎aimed‎to‎reconstruct‎the‎economy‎and‎reduce‎the‎country‟s‎
dependence on oil for its' income.  The first phase drew in new capital to the Kuwait, 
provided new opportunities for investment and has been a resounding success.  It has helped 
to stimulate and revitalize the economy of Kuwait and government sector companies have 
been sold for $2.9 billion, (KD 906 million).  The second and third phases of the privatization 
programme seek to bring about the privatization of various services and utilities owned by the 
state.  These include the power, water and telecommunications industries, as well as the 
Kuwait Airways Corporation, the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company, and the Petrochemical 
Industries Company, (www.kuwait-info.org). 
Kuwait‟s‎ infrastructure‎and‎oil‎sectors‎are‎attracting‎remarkable‎levels‎of‎private‎investment‎
at a time of increased population growth and considerable expansion in the country‟s‎
economy.  In 2006, the Bank of Kuwait reported that GDP had increased by more than 6.5% 
in 2005, partly due to a record level in the price of oil coupled with low inflation. 
Simultaneously, the overall population of the country is increasing by 8%, and Kuwait is 
establishing the basic framework for economic diversification, enabling it to attain a 
competitive edge over the next few decades.  The majority of current real estate projects are 
concentrated on the building of facilities such as housing, hotels and office space and it has 
been predicted that the construction industry will receive more than $8 billion of private 
money (IPS 2006).  
Abdul-Aziz Al-Kulaib, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Public Works, has announced 
that as part of the infrastructure initiative, the Ministry is planning to undertake 500 large-
scale projects worth $3 billion over the next few years, ranging from hospitals, sports 
facilities, motorways and public housing.    
BOT projects which together are worth more than $40 billion have been initiated and include 
the Sabbiya Bridge as well as the Failaka and Bubiyan islands.  There is a plan to develop the 
Bubiyan Island into a free trade zone with an oil depot, a storage area and an area for 
recreation.  To progress the first phase of this project, Kuwait is considering bids for a 
container port on Bubiyan Island at a cost of $2 billion.  The plan to develop Failaka Island as 
a tourist attraction is a further major multi-billion-dollar project and a small number of 
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companies have pre-qualified to carry out the project using the BOT model.  It is estimated 
that the Sabbiya Bridge project will take a few years to reach completion and is currently still 
at the bidding stage according to (IPS 2006).   
According to IPS (2006) Mr Al-Kuliab, has stated that the number of projects currently being 
undertaken by the Kuwaiti government, is considered to be the largest ever in Kuwaiti 
history, both in terms of number of projects and monetary value.  However as Al Jawder 
mentioned in the Al-Raqaba Magazine, in January 2006, that there is currently no designated 
agency or relevant organization to deal with BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait.  This lack 
of organization can lead to a loss of control and follow up by the state, as well as proving a 
major risk in the management of project implementation.  Problems also exist in relation to 
the annulment of contracts for projects initiated in Kuwait on a BOT basis and subsequently, 
on the recommendations from the Audit Bureau, a number of contracts have been invalidated.  
For instance, one of the problems faced by BOT projects is the market's lack of long-term 
financial arrangements.  Some financial institutions require BOT projects to present 
guaranteed mortgages as security for providing the required capital.  However, land 
belonging to the state can never be identified as collateral for public funds.  The Kuwaiti 
State Audit Bureau report in 2006 stated that the lack of legislation and clarity in providing 
full transparency to companies interested in investing, leads to trepidation amongst some 
companies‎about‎the‎future,‎for‎example‎the‎Council‎of‎Minister‟s‎decision‎to‎renew‎or‎reject‎
the term for the concession after twenty years.  
According to Curran (2008) the Audit Bureau were concerned about the fairness and 
transparency of the award processes and possible irregularities in their implementation and 
for this reason, in 2006, they suspended several lucrative BOT projects which had been 
granted to the private sector by four government bodies, including the Public Authority for 
Industry, the Public Customs Department, the Touristic Enterprises Company, and the 
Finance Ministry.  The government then appointed a ministerial committee to carry out a 
review of these projects, and whilst the investigations were taking place, all work on any new 
Kuwaiti‎BOT‎projects‎stopped‎until‎2008‎when,‎in‎January,‎‎Law‎No.‎7‎“seeking‎to‎establish‎
and‎clarify‎a‎structure‎for‎the‎BOT‎model‎in‎Kuwait”‎was‎passed‎by‎parliament,‎Under‎this‎
new law, government bodies‎needed‎ to‎obtain‎ the‎approval‎of‎a‎new‎ „supreme‎committee‟,‎
without which it would be impossible to enter into a BOT agreement that involved state-
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owned land.  The committee consists of senior administrators, such as the head of the 
environmental authority, and is chaired by the Minister of Finance, and includes the Minister 
of Public Works, and the Minister of Municipality.  The purpose of the committee was to 
reach a legal agreement on BOT policy, to review and issue approvals and to administer a 
sub-committee with the remit of coordinating all technical aspects of the reviews.  Under the 
new law, the length of BOT projects would be limited to thirty years, after which they would 
be‎ returned‎ to‎ the‎ State‎ „without‎ any‎ consideration‎ and‎ compensation‟.‎ ‎ In some special 
cases, an extension to forty years may be granted by the committee, but this should be part of 
the original bid, rather than added later.  This law has gone a long way to restore the 
credibility‎of‎the‎Kuwait‟s‎government‎concerning‎the‎BOT policy.    
Certain social and political considerations can act as an obstacle to BOT projects being 
undertaken successfully, especially with regards to foreign investors; an example of this 
might be the development of Failaka Island.   
There are differences in the policies and procedures of the individual Kuwaiti governments 
Ministries responsible for granting licenses and approvals for BOT infrastructure projects 
funded by the private sector.  Walker and Smith (1995) suggested that all complex BOT 
projects should be individually analyzed in order to assess the aims of the public and private 
sectors, and the risks involved,.  
The most suitable solution to these problems could most likely vary depending on the country 
and project concerned.  When unexpected problems arise, the success of the BOT project can 
fall to the decision maker, whose overall judgment is needed in addition to the risk 
assessment already carried out. 
Dey et al. (2004) acknowledged that whilst it is important to have transparency in decision 
making, no set of standards yet exist to provide guidance on disclosure.  There are risks 
associated with all projects, and a high risk factor in a certain area, indicates the probability 
of a less than successful project outcome, (Ghosh and Jintanapakanont 2004).   
In the Gulf States and in Kuwait specifically, researchers and analysts have not considered 
risk management of BOT infrastructure projects, this is in spite of the huge projects which 
have been undertaken in the Gulf States.  It would be beneficial to carry out a detailed study 
and an in-depth risk analysis of Kuwaiti BOT infrastructure projects in order to consider the 
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different aspects of BOT infrastructure project risk management.  The types of questions 
which need to be asked are: What is the level of risk involved in the BOT project? And how 
can the effects of risk factors on BOT projects be avoided or decreased? 
Most‎ recently,‎ during‎ the‎ past‎ few‎ years‎ Kuwait‟s‎ economy‎ has‎ fallen‎ behind‎ other‎ Gulf‎
countries with a slower growth rate, despite its' strong fiscal balance, highlighting a need for 
a development plan as the primary source of income is oil and diversification a necessity. In 
2010,‎ Kuwait‟s‎ parliament‎ approved‎ a‎ new‎ development‎ plan,‎ and‎ upon‎ implementation,‎
Kuwait‟s‎ economy‎would showcase a positive growth supported by infrastructure projects. 
As promised by the government, the development plan will help transform Kuwait into a 
major financial hub and trade centre by the year 2035.  The initial stages of the plan are 
estimated to be completed by 2013/2014 with an estimated total cost of KWD 37.0 billion, 
(US $129.0 billion).   However, the implementation of the plan is being held back by political 
disputes between the government and the general assembly members which have succeeded 
in slowing down the implementation of the plan, even with the newly elected government in 
2011. Many projects, such as the Kuwait Health Assurance Project (KHAC), were supposed 
to begin in 2011 but were postponed.  The anticipated projects, if put into action, will push 
the economy to a new level.  A huge emphasis on investments is essential for Kuwait to 
become a financial hub in the region, according to Capital Standards, (2011). 
The above discussion indicates the lack of research concerned with the current status of 
Kuwaiti BOT infrastructure projects risk management and the difficulties being faced. These 
difficulties formulate the problem statement of this research and are summarized as follows:  
1. Law 7, 2008 is a legal framework to control BOT systems in Kuwait but it is 
unpopular with the private sector which makes commencing a BOT infrastructure process a 
long complicate tedious affair. 
2. There is a lack of experts in the BOT infrastructure field.  
3. The Government's plan to use public private partnerships for public facilities is 
unclear. 
4. Risks in BOT infrastructure projects are not defined. 
5. To date, the BOT infrastructure risk management in Kuwait have not been evaluated. 
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6. There is a need for the Kuwaiti government to provide a clear long term plan for 
financial security for the country so as to realize the ambition of Kuwait to become a 
financial hub in the Gulf region by 2035. 
The infrastructure of Kuwait has not kept pace with its' rapid economic growth, leading to a 
restriction in any further growth and development.  The Kuwaiti government's Plans, (2000-
2005; 2006-2010) have the development of the necessary infrastructure as a priority.  
Recently, the Kuwaiti government has put a series of five-year plans in place, which it hopes 
will solve many of the problems. The enormous amount of infrastructure required cannot all 
be provided from public funds and there has been some experimentation using overseas 
private finance.  However, various problems have arisen in that, although the state provides 
the infrastructure, the investors of private capital require adequate profit.  This, they often 
achieve, for example, by road tolls or ensuring a guaranteed return on investment for all 
power supplies. 
The benefits of using BOT, as discussed in Chapter 2, may well provide the necessary 
solution to the infrastructure projects problem in Kuwait and also the possibility of ensuring 
the efficiency of public projects.  Although the opportunities for BOT infrastructure projects 
are in existence, not all of these will provide a suitable return on investment.  The use of 
modeling to investigate the risks of each project would be a sensible way forward to consider 
the extent of possible BOT infrastructure projects and related opportunities for ancillary 
industries in Kuwait, 
It is inevitable that risks are a crucial part of BOT infrastructure projects.  These risks are 
quite complicated because of the high levels of investment, the length of each project and the 
complex nature of the setting up which is required when all of these risks are combined. The 
companies involved in the BOT infrastructure projects have responsibility for a wide range of 
risks during the life of the project, while responsibility for the finance, design, construction 
and operating risks is assumed by the public sector.  
This research will focus on examining the above points, discussing the risks faced in BOT 
infrastructure projects in Kuwait, prioritizing the risks, and suggesting a framework to 
manage these risks in the Kuwaiti environment. 
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1.2 Rationale for the study 
The timing of the study on BOT infrastructure projects risk management in Kuwait coincides 
with‎the‎Kuwaiti‎Government‟s‎ambition‎to‎encourage‎more‎private‎sector‎participation.‎The‎
current move towards privatization would support the growth of infrastructure developments, 
with less dependency on government funding.  
The Kuwaiti government's Five Year Development Plans outline the determination to 
continue‎strengthening‎the‎private‎sector‟s‎involvement‎in‎the‎development‎of‎infrastructure.  
For example, the three models known as: Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Build-Operate-Own 
(BOO); and Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) encourage economic activity, increasing 
opportunities for the private sector. This has the additional benefit of providing employment 
opportunities and attracting foreign capital. 
There is also a lack of information in the published literature of the risks involved in BOT 
infrastructure projects in Kuwait.  There exists a need for data, information, and insight into 
the opportunities and challenges involved in the risk management of BOT infrastructure 
projects due to the fact that only a limited amount of research has been carried out in Kuwait 
relating to risks involved with BOT infrastructure projects.  This study will be directed 
towards understanding the issues and success factors involved of the risks and in risk 
management of BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait. 
1.2.1 Scope of the study 
This thesis investigates the risk of BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait and considers risk 
factors which may have either a positive or negative impact.  There are currently no records 
of successfully applied risk allocation principles because both the private sector and the 
Government are still gaining the necessary experience.  Substantial effort, however, has been 
channelled into identifying the most important factors that affect how BOT is used in Kuwait. 
This study will concentrate on BOT infrastructure projects risk and will therefore be limited 
to projects that possess realistic demand projections and have accepted user tariffs.  
Consequently, the study will be limited to infrastructure-related projects; examples of these 
could include transport related projects such as roads and bridges, water and desalination, and 
power plants. 
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1.3 Research Questions  
1. What are the risks that should be considered for BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait? 
2. How can such risks be integrated into a framework that will assist decision makers to take 
these risks into account and to endeavour to decrease or prevent them? 
1.4 The aim of the study 
The research aim is to develop a framework that will enable decision makers in the private 
and public sectors decide how to deal with the risks that affect BOT infrastructure projects in 
Kuwait and allow decision makers to investigate ways to decrease or prevent them.  
1.4.1 Objectives of the Study 
1. To develop a better understanding of the basic and essential concepts involved in the 
BOT infrastructure projects and the characteristics of the risks involved.  
2. To identify the most important risk factors involved when implementing BOT 
infrastructure projects in Kuwait. 
3. To categorize and group the various risk factors facing the implementation of BOT 
infrastructure projects in Kuwait. 
4. Using expert opinion, to list each risk factor/group according to its' significance within 
the BOT infrastructure project. 
5. To consider and propose a risk-management framework for BOT projects having 
evaluated, validated and justified the results so that decision-makers and consultants are 
more easily able to overcome, or at least minimize, the impact of risk factors on BOT 
infrastructure projects in Kuwait. 
1.5 Guide to the structure of the thesis 
Chapter One: Introduction 
A comprehensive background to the research is provided and an explanation as to why it is 
being undertaken.  Aims and objectives are also presented.  A short summary of each chapter 
is also presented. 
Chapter Two: Review of the literature 
This chapter provides an overview of past and current practice relating to the methods used 
with regards to BOT Infrastructure projects.  The BOT model and its' variants are introduced.  
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It considers how the BOT model has been developed, describes the BOT concept, the reasons 
for its popularity, and what the challenges are for procurement. Many of the different types of 
risks relating to the BOT infrastructure project methods are introduced.  Examples of both 
successful and unsuccessful BOT infrastructure projects worldwide are presented.   There is 
an explanation of the economy of Kuwait in general, and the needs and objectives of public 
private partnerships are also covered.  Moreover, the chapter tackles Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in Kuwait, with particular focus on its' evaluation.  Finally, the chapter 
addresses the challenges facing BOT infrastructures projects in Kuwait, the effectiveness of 
these projects, and their impact on the economy. 
Chapter three: Risk Management Strategy of BOT 
This chapter analyses literature relating to risk management.  The objectives of this chapter 
are to provide information regarding Risk leading to risk management, common risk 
categories, the advantages of risk management, risk assessment, type of risk analysis 
techniques, the assessment and evaluation of BOT performance.  The chapter introduces the 
method of how to develop a "Risk Management Framework" for any risk in any organization.   
Chapter four: Research Methodology 
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of the research methods used academically.  
Following this, it describes the research methodology employed by the researcher and 
provides information on data collection techniques and data analysis.  It also discusses the 
procedures involved in the collection of data such as questionnaires and literature review.  
The research methodology is divided into two main stages:  "The Framing Stage", and the 
"BOT Risk Management Framework Stage".  The research methods and data collections 
tools used in each stage are described. 
Chapter five: the Framing Stage Questionnaire Result and Data Analysis 
This chapter will attempt to evaluate the results from the first questionnaire, identify, 
analyses and discuss the research findings.  A Risk Management Framework was developed 
using data collected from the expert participants and the same framework was applied to real 
life projects, i.e. Sulaibiya Waste Water Treatment and reclamation plant in Kuwait, the 
Channel Tunnel between UK and France, and the Marsa Allam Airport in Egypt. 
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Chapter Six: BOT Risk Management Framework Result and Discussion 
This chapter analyses and discusses the second questionnaire pairwise results and theresearch 
findings identified and analysed in Chapter five.  The chapter also proposes which of the risk 
factors are the most important and influential between each other within a BOT Risk 
Management Framework. 
Chapter Seven: Model Validation 
This chapter presents the evaluation strategy of the BOT Infrastructure project risk 
management framework so that the application of the BOT Infrastructure project risk 
management framework can be assessed and demonstrated in order to accomplish the 
research objectives.  This chapter also reports on the case studies carried out using BOT 
infrastructure projects in Kuwait.  The results of expert participants were used to assess the 
initial BOT Infrastructure project risk management framework and provide valuable 
information for any organization involved in BOT Infrastructure projects. 
Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Recommendations  
The conclusions of the research are covered in this chapter, starting with a general overview 
of the research work undertaken.  Then the added value of the research is considered and how 
the research contributes to existing body of knowledge.  Finally, suggestions for further 
research are given. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review of BOT 
 
The strengths and weaknesses of BOT Infrastructure project risks are now critically 
considered, as well as the literature relating to this research.  The purpose of this research is 
to consider BOT infrastructure Project Risk Management with the objective being to 
understand the different elements of risk and risk management. 
The intention is to develop a framework, which attempts to minimize, or prevent, these risks.  
This chapter will also introduce the Build Operate Transfer (BOT) its' history and 
procurement process.  The core objective of this chapter is to consider the manner in which 
the BOT project system has been developed, its' concept, popularity, the risks involved, 
contract agreements involved, as well as discussing and studying the challenges for its 
procurement.  Furthermore, BOT projects will be discussed in other countries and their 
successes will also be highlighted and explained and that will lead to the introduction of risk 
management framework in Kuwait.  The general economic state of the Kuwait economy will 
also be considered as well as the requirements of, and objectives for, using Private Public 
Partnership (PPP) which can be achieved by; deregulating monopolies, selling various assets 
or services to the private sector or increasing the competition for existing state monopolies.  
In addition, the chapter addresses the challenges of BOT projects in Kuwait, the effectiveness 
of BOT projects in Kuwait, and their impact on the community in Kuwait.  
2.1 Introduction 
The general idea behind BOT projects is that customers have ownership of the service, while 
the supplier or manager of the service   runs the facility for an agreed period of time before 
handing the facility over to the host government after a pre-agreed length of time.  This time 
period needs to be sufficiently long to pay off any debts that have accrued by the private 
company and to provide a reasonable profit to the private company operating the facility.  
Over recent years, an increasing number of countries have found themselves involved with 
the BOT approach due to the convenience of not having to raise large amounts of capital to 
fund the project.  
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Although‎the‎concept‎has‎been‎around‎for‎many‎years,‎the‎term‎„BOT‟‎is‎relatively‎new.‎The‎
main objective is for the private sector to be responsible for developing, operating the 
infrastructure projects and then transferring the facility, at no cost, back to the government 
when there concession period is over with a possibility of the same private company st ill 
being responsible for future operation of the facility. 
When the project is proposed, the government of the host country would define the main 
objectives and thereafter would see its' role as guarding the public interest. However, the 
contractor who designs, finances, builds and operates the project will be the private sector or 
a consortium.   The private company has responsibility for the success of the project and all 
the risks involved at each stage of progress.  Usually, the consortium would be given a 
concession period after which, the contract may either be renewed or its title changed or its' 
ownership transferred from the private company to the government.  
Under normal circumstances, the usual infrastructure services, such as the railway, water, 
sanitation and power supplies, are delivered as a public service by the government, which 
would be responsible for the finance, design, building, maintenance and operation of these 
utilities.  However, infrastructures are becoming increasingly expensive and so; many 
developing countries have difficulty in obtaining resources which will provide an adequate 
infrastructure service to help sustain a successful economy.  In addition to this, many public 
services are inefficient and, (may be), poorly managed. 
The BOT concept was therefore proposed, not simply as a means of releasing funds and thus 
releasing pressure on the government, but also as a way of improving the quality of 
service(s). The usual practice in BOT projects is for the private company to supply equity 
financing of approximately: 10% to 30% of the overall cost and then to seek finance for the 
balance of the investment.  The government usually assists the private company by providing 
land; and tax relief on the purchase of equipment and materials, as well as tax reduction in the 
profits from the project (Levy1996).  
Due to the very high demands for capital to fund infrastructure projects, conventional 
financing methods are no longer adequate. Over the last 75 years it has been public sector 
which has mainly financed infrastructure facilities, whereas previously it fell to the private 
sector.  
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One example of this was the railway network in the UK and also the Suez and Panama 
canals. The Suez Canal was increased by 195 km in 1869 and had a 99 year concession 
period, (Shirong 1998).  
Many governments have undergone a change in attitude over recent years, and have opted for 
the BOT approach to infrastructure. The first country to use the BOT technique for 
infrastructure projects was Turkey in 1984 in the construction of power stations;  The phrase 
BOT was introduced by Turkat Ozal, the Turkish prime minister at the time in 1984, (Tiong, 
1990; Walker and Smith, 1995; Wahdan, 1995). Ever since, the BOT approach has been 
greatly in demand worldwide. 
McLellan (1996) suggests that the requirements for the new BOT approach have increased 
extremely quickly and that the reasons for its; popularity should be considered and 
understood.   It is also important to develop theories, methodologies and tools which will 
ensure the successful increase in the implementation of BOT projects. This rapid worldwide 
development of the BOT approach is a major concern for many leading international 
construction companies due to the fact that many countries have different approaches to risk 
assessment meaning that there is no internationally agreed form of contract and each project 
is treated individually, (Walker and Smith 1995)  
There are many opportunities, and challenges due to the difficulty, involved in BOT 
infrastructure project procurement.  Its' complexity requires a special understanding of the 
underlying philosophy of BOT and in some countries in particular, special methodologies 
need to be developed for effective BOT implementation. 
2.2 The Evaluation of the BOT Approach 
The private sector first became involved in the provision of infrastructure in seventeenth 
century Europe. At this time there was an increasing demand for long distance travel and 
transport. The need for infrastructure facilities was very great including canals, and turnpikes, 
(toll roads), and a great amount of money was required to finance these projects. The 
governments‟‎tax‎systems‎at‎that‎time‎only‎serviced‎heads‎of‎state‎and‎any‎possible‎wars‎in‎
which they might be involved.  This resulted in infrastructure projects being left for 
individuals to finance and construct.  Fortunately, improvements in industrial output due to 
the industrial revolution, and the resulting revenues enabled governments to fund and support 
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their own infrastructure.  However, for special projects, franchises and concessions were 
adopted, (Shirong 1998).  
The BOT approach is particularly relevant for large projects, since the private sector finances, 
builds and operates a revenue-generating project, which would previously have been 
undertaken by the public sector.  
According to Walker and Smith (1995) there are two main stages for the emergence of the 
idea of using private finance to build infrastructure. The first of these stages began more than 
200 years ago when the concept of the BOT project was first used; and the second is the new 
wave development stage, which took place in the early 1980's.  
The French adopted the BOT concept in the mid-1800's when need for the distribution of 
water paved the way for the first concession,  granted in Paris to the Perrier Brothers in 1782 
(Monod 1982).  After 1830, the use of concessions spread throughout France and then other 
European countries such as; Belgium, Germany, Spain and Italy. At this time in Europe, once 
the infrastructure had been completed the use of concessions then declined in the 
industrialized countries.  
As mentioned previously, the Suez Canal was one of the better-known BOT projects in recent 
times when the Egyptian government awarded a 99-year concession in 1859 to the Universal 
Suez Ship Canal Company.   The canal was opened on 17th November 1869 and connected 
the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea.  The canal extended over 195km, and was overseen by 
Ferdinand de Lesseps who was tasked by the Universal Suez Ship Canal Company to build 
and operate the canal. The project was financed using European capital and with the support 
of Egypt in the form of land donated by the Egyptian government and tax relief on materials 
and equipment.  The agreement was that the consortium should underwrite the whole cost of 
the design and construction, but the government would receive 15% of the annual profits 
from the operation of the canal.  A further 10% of the profits would be paid annually to the 
initial shareholders, allowing 75% to accrue, which would then go to the company. The 
agreement was altered in 1858 to ensure that 80% of the workers were Egyptians.  Work 
began on the canal in 1859 and should have been completed by 1864, at a grossly 
underestimated cost of £8 million.  In 1863 Sir John Hawkshaw, a British engineer re-
estimated the cost as £10 million and the year of completion to be four years later in 1868.  
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By the year 1875, the interest costs to the Egyptian government on the financing of their 
portion of the project were higher than the gross income of the whole country. The company 
requested help from the British government who took the title and the responsibility for 
financing the project.  
A further example of BOT projects from the late 60s comes from Hong Kong where the 
private sector has been very much involved in infrastructure development. Using the BOT 
concept five tunnels was constructed. The first of these: the Cross Harbour Tunnel was 
privately financed and was actually the first BOT project in Asia. The project has since been 
transferred to the post transfer operation phase, (Zhang and Kumaraswamy, 2001; Tiong and 
Alum, 1997; Tam, 1999; Tiong, 1995).  As a result of these projects, experience was gained 
by the Hong Kong government, such as in adjusting tolls and producing a mechanism for 
resolving disputes, and resulted in well structured BOT projects. 
During the late 1970s and the early part of the 1980's, many major international contracting 
companies and developing countries considered promoting privately financed, built, owned 
and operated infrastructure projects using concession contracts. However, there was a 
downturn in the privatization of public facilities during the mid-twentieth century but, as a 
result of the popularity and development of infrastructure projects using private funds, more 
recently many countries have seen an increase in the public private partnership of 
infrastructure projects in the public sector and the BOT concept is vital to this process of 
public private partnership (levy, 1996; Walker and Smith, 1995).  
Between the late 1800s and the 1970s the industrialized countries tended to fund new 
infrastructure from fiscal resources or sovereign borrowing. The governments of these 
countries identified the needs, and implemented the policy using direct ownership or a well 
controlled franchise arrangement.  The developing countries today tend to issue government 
bonds or obtain direct loans from the International Monetary Fund and/or the Asian 
Development Bank and/or the World Bank. 
Public‎ private‎ partnerships‎ really‎ „took‎ off‟‎ worldwide‎ in‎ the‎ late‎ 1970's,‎ affecting‎ both‎
developed and developing countries.  It challenged the traditional approach of establishing 
infrastructure, encouraging a change to the current policies and setting up new rules.  There 
were two reasons behind the changes. 
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The first reason being that the additional infrastructure in existence was limited, and could 
not keep up with economic growth.  Walker and Smith (1995) stated that: “Between‎1970‎and‎
1991 Britain built an extra 9% of main roads and motorways. During the same period, 
passenger cars drove 116% more miles; vans and goods vehicles, 75% more. Crowded 
Britain is not unique. Between 1970 and 1990 America's vehicle miles almost doubled, while 
the‎amount‎of‎its‎urban‎roads‎rose‎by‎just‎4%”. 
This is also true for developing countries, often known as "Newly Industrialized Countries", 
which have a constantly moving GDP.  This also applies to the countries of Southeast Asia 
and Latin American which suffer from insufficient infrastructure to keep up with the speed of 
its vast economic expansion.  All of these countries face the same problem of their economic 
growth proceeding faster than the development of the necessary infrastructure, Walker and 
Smith (1995). 
The second reason is that the considerations of health and welfare have become increasingly 
important due to the increased longevity of the population resulting in a dramatic increase in 
medical‎ costs,‎ leaving‎ many‎ governments‎ heavily‎ in‎ debt‎ due‎ to‎ the‎ governments‟‎ fiscal‎
shortcomings in funding public infrastructure.  The idea of public private partnerships,  
giving the private sector the title to design, build, operate and maintain a particular 
infrastructure using its' own finance within a predetermined concession period, is an ideal 
solution to this problem.  However massive investment and changes in regulation are needed 
to initiate and control these major projects respectively. 
Privately built and operated toll roads were quite usual in the United States, but public private 
partnerships really took off there during the 1980's and 1990's when the prisons and schools 
began to be given concessions.  During the recession of the 1970's, companies in the 
construction industry saw an opportunity to obtain contracts using the BOT approach.  This 
relieved government budgets and since many of the projects were high risk, there were many 
agreements in which the government allowed the return on investment for the developer to 
exceed 25 percent.  The U.S. government today encourages BOT-related transportation 
projects, seeing these as a good way to ensure that U.S. companies are more competitive in 
the global market and actively implements and supports public private partnerships (Walker 
and Smith 1995). 
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2.2.1 Nature of Infrastructure Projects 
Recently, the attention given to urban regeneration projects has significantly increased. Such 
initiatives use redevelopment projects to resolve the social and economic problems caused by 
antiquated buildings and degraded infrastructure, (Kim 2010). However, common 
infrastructure projects such as power, water and sewerage, telecommunications and transport 
facilities possess a number of characteristics: they lack portability, are rarely convertible to 
other uses and it can be difficult to reverse any investment made in them. The majority of the 
infrastructure projects require large investment capital, are single-asset investments and 
develop over a long period of time; they also have long periods of payback.  However, they 
do provide important services, which would usually fall to the public sector and they 
generally operate as monopolies.  The nature of infrastructure projects makes them 
responsive to public opinion and political pressure.  Contrary to other types of foreign direct 
investment, most infrastructure projects only generate local currency, but the dividends and 
loan repayments are paid in foreign currency.  The process of building infrastructure facilities 
is also complex and very risky. 
2.3 Definition of BOT Approach  
 BOT should not be thought of as a legal term, but instead as an economic and a financial 
concept.  As defined by Tiong (1995a): "it is the granting of a concession by the Government 
to a private promoter, known as the concessionaire, who is responsible for financing, 
construction, operation and maintenance of a facility over the concession period before 
finally‎transferring‎the‎fully‎operational‎facility‎to‎the‎Government‎at‎no‎cost”. 
In any BOT scheme the concession company finances, designs, constructs, operates and 
maintains a particular project or facility for an agreed length of time.  This should be long 
enough to pay off all debts and provide a reasonable profit to the equity investors.  After the 
specified time, the facility passes, at no cost, to the public authority or to the government, 
(Walker and Smith, 1995; Wilburn and Thomas, 1994; Shen et al., 2002; Askar and Gab-
Allah, 2002). 
2.4 Variants of BOT Projects. 
There are various other formats of the BOT method, dependant on the ownership of the 
infrastructure facilities and equipment. There are also different type of business relationships 
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that can exist between the private and public sectors and also different levels of risk held by 
each party.   All the different BOT formats involve a type of a public/private partnership, and 
each of them will have specific roles and risks as far as the involved parties are concerned.  
For a well structured BOT project, the government, or local authority, will nominate the 
project and decide on the range of work and design requirements, performance and 
maintenance that may need to be adapted to the particular objectives of the country.  Next, 
the government will choose the private sponsor/contractor after some negotiation to arrive at 
a suitable price for both parties.  In this manner, the government either has strategic control 
over the operation of the project or gains control after the concession period, (which is not the 
case with full privatization).  
These variations on the design-and-build model offer differences that enable developers to 
address particular contractual needs of a certain project and tailor the approach accordingly, 
so the use of any of these models would be suitable for Kuwait under the appropriate 
circumstances.  It is the design-and-build model overall that is useful, and it is catching on 
quickly in the Middle East as it has elsewhere around the world.  It is becoming increasingly 
employed in Dubai, for example, where its' potential for reducing costs, a much quicker 
completion and occupation rate, and the removal of the usual liability gap by means of a 
straightforward method of procurement is gaining greater notice and favour, (Sell 2007).  
Dubai Festival City, for example, is being built by Al Futtaim Carillion entirely under a 
design-and-build contract, (Sell 2007).‎ ‎ Al‎ Futtaim‎ Carillion‟s‎ operations‎ director,‎ Simon‎
Buttery, has noted that in certain projects in which the client wishes to be sure of the cost and 
is also to pass risk on to the contractor at as an early stage as possible, then design and build 
would be the best choice because the intention is to take on responsibility for the design and 
then to manage it throughout the lifetime of the project (Sell 2007).  Buttery added that 
advantages include the ability to provide benefits much earlier to the client, (Sell 2007).  
Buttery‎ notes‎ that‎ 90%‎ of‎ the‎U.K‟s‎ projects‎ are‎ of‎ the‎ design-and-build type, which has 
become increasingly popular in Dubai.  However, there is an important caveat, as pointed out 
by (Sell 2007).  In a traditional contract, the client maintains more control over the designers, 
therefore for particular projects, such as the construction of a large mosque, for example, a 
traditional contract would be preferable.  Apart from projects such as this, which require 
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close control, any of the different variations of BOT projects would be a possible option.  
Description of different BOT models follows. 
2.4.1 Build/Operate/Transfer (BOT) Contracts 
The private company builds a facility to the specifications agreed with the host government; 
the private company then operates the facility for a specified amount of time under a 
concession agreement with the host government, and then transfers the facility over to the 
host government at the end of the concession period.  In most cases, the private company will 
also provide some, or all, of the finance, so the length of the concession must be sufficient to 
enable the private company to make profit on its investment.  At the end of the concession, 
the host government can take over operation of the facility, or allow the original private 
company to continue to operate the facility, or award a new contract private company.   The 
private company, during the concession, will have the right to operate the facility and gain 
profit from it and cover its cost. The ownership of this facility will be transferred to the 
government at a later stage, the facility should be maintained in a good operating conditions 
so it can function well after handing it to the government, (e.g. the Channel Tunnel, France 
and the UK) (levy 1996). 
2.4.2 Build/Operate/Own/Transfer (BOOT) 
BOOT, as a term, refers to Build/Operate/Own/Transfer, this is linked with projects that 
involve a private company being required to finance, build, operate and maintain an 
infrastructure facility based on terms agreed in a contract. This private company keeps the 
right to return all expenses that are paid by users and the ownership continues with the private 
company until specified period of concession and then transferred to the public sector.  
(Walker and Smith, 1995; UNIDO, 1996). 
2.4.3 Build/Own/Operate (BOO) 
The BOO term refers to Build/Own/Operate. In such projects, the government provides an 
infrastructure facility to the private company which is required to design, finance, build and 
operate a project. The Ownership of such facility will stay with the private company. 
Different to the BOOT projects, the BOO contractor is not required to transfer ownership of 
the project back to the government and, at the end of the concession period.  The concession 
is renewed if not, then the host government is compensated for its shares in the project. In 
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different versions the concession is granted to the private company; however the host 
government gains a share of the revenues of the project in return. In such position the host 
government keeps the right to supervise the manner in which the facility operates but the 
actual management operation stays in the hands of the private company, (e.g. Taweelah A2, 
Abu Dhabi), (Levy 1996). 
2.4.4 Build/Lease/Operate/Transfer (BLOT) 
Projects that involve‎BLOT‎allow‎the‎private‎contractor‎to‎lease‎the‎facility‟s‎tangible assets 
for a specific time (Walker and Smith 1995).  
2.4.5 Build/Lease/Transfer (BLT) 
When involved in BLT projects, a private company builds a facility and then transfers its' 
ownership to the host government.  At a later stage, the government hands back the facility to 
the private company in return for revenues for an agreed time period. Different from BOT 
projects, the host government is made the owner from the beginning instead of when the 
concession has ended (Walker and Smith, 1995; UNIDO, 1996).  
2.4.6 Design/Build/Finance/Operate (DBFO) Contracts 
Under a DBFO contract agreement with the host government, the private company sets up a 
project in line with the technical terms and specifications determined by the host government. 
The private company finances the facility and thereafter passes it with all the machinery and 
the required equipment to the government.   In a DBFO contract, the host government 
receives a specified percentage of the revenue, rather than ownership of the project at the end 
of the concession period, (Levy 1996). .  
2.4.7 Modernize/Own/Operate/Transfer (MOOT) Contracts 
 Contracts that involve MOOT require the private company to construct a "state of the art" 
facility using the most advanced and up to date international standards.  In return, the private 
company owns, manages and operates the project and all revenues are kept by the investor 
until the end of the concession period when the ownership of the facility transfers to the host 
government, (Walker and Smith, 1995; UNIDO, 1996).  
2.4.8 Rehabilitate/Own/Operate (ROO) Contracts 
After agreement with the host government the private company finances renovation and 
rehabilitation of a facility. This process could consider either the renovation of high-tech 
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equipment and machines or a building.  In this project the private company undertakes, 
manages and operates the project, however the private company in return takes over 
ownership of the project and receives operation revenues but the private company has to pay 
the government a certain amount of money for the privilege.   This is a popular contract with 
host governments who plan to renovate and redevelop facilities, (Walker and Smith, 1995; 
UNIDO, 1996).  
2.4.9 Buy/Build/Operate (BBO) 
This arrangement is applied when a public facility is handed to a private company which will 
work on renovating and expanding it.  The facility is then owned by the private company 
which‎may‎ choose‎ to‎ add‎new‎ facilities‎ and‎ upgrade‎ it,‎ the‎ host‎ government‟s role in this 
case is to supervise the project and defend the public interest by ensuring good quality 
service.  This is achieved by an agreement on certain terms by both parties, (Walker and 
Smith, 1995; UNIDO, 1996).  
2.4.10 Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) 
The BTO arrangement is made of two major stages.  In the First stage, the private company is 
required to finance and build a facility, and when it is completed the private company 
transfers ownership of the facility to the government.  These steps are taken mainly to control 
liability issues and in certain cases lessen public concerns.  After handing the facility to the 
host government, the private sector then leases it back for a long period during which time 
the private company has the right to operate and recover all costs and make reasonable profit, 
-an example of such operation was conducted by Telecom Asia Communication Network in 
Thailand, (Levy 1996). 
2.5 The Principal Participant in BOT Concession Projects 
The BOT projects that are undertaken by the private sector contain many risks and 
uncertainties, (Songer et al. 1997).  The BOT projects are generally large-scale projects of 
infrastructure facilities and the transaction costs on average come between 5 to 10% of the 
overall project cost, (Klein et al. 1996). Although BOT methods can be used in any sector of 
the economy the most prevalent use is in telecommunications, power plants and 
transportation, (Tam, 1999; Wang and Tiong, 2000). 
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There are no two BOT projects that could be considered identical, each one is unique, as 
projects in Australia are not treated the same as projects in Kuwait Contractors have to take 
into consideration environmental, cultural and governmental differences. The rules of 
procurement may be similar, but the process and the way of financing, designing and 
constructing the facilities may be completely different.  Many parties are involved in the 
BOT project,s e.g. the project sponsor, investor, financing bodies, engineering design 
consultants, construction contractor, specialist contractors as well as operating and 
maintenance companies.  In addition the BOT contractual structure could vary from other 
projects to fit the distinction and the uniqueness of a specific project, as detailed above. 
 In any BOT scheme the finance, design, construction, operation and maintenance of a public 
facility are agreed for a specific period of time, which should be adequate to return the debt 
and to offer a good return to the investors. After this time, ownership of the facility transfers 
back to the government or any public authority which was signatory to the agreement, 
without charge, (Walker and Smith, 1995; Wilburn and Thomas 1994).  
According to Wilburn and Thomas (1994), each BOT project could involve different parties 
and a different number of them, typically involved in BOT projects are: the host government, 
private company/consortium, the financiers and finally the project users. Generally, there are 
nine parties may have direct involvement in the project company these parties are the 
government, other public bodies, contractors, lenders, project sponsors, suppliers, equity 
investors, credit re-enforcers, and finally the customers (Rose 1997) Figure 2.1 shows the 
structure of a typical BOT project. 
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Figure ‎2-1 Generic Project set-up Source: Leiringer (2003)  
2.5.1 The Public Sector or the Host Government 
Pahlman (1996), stated in any BOT project, the most important party will be either the host 
government or the public sector because it requires the particular facility and will be the last 
owners of it.  The host government will have to authorize the project and ensure that it meets 
the suitable legislation, following on; the public sector will need to arrange a concession 
agreement with a private sector company. The terms and the expectations of the government 
will‎ need‎ to‎ be‎ highlighted‎ as‎well‎ as‎ the‎ private‎ sector‟s‎ demands‎which‎ both‎ need‎ to‎ be‎
agreed upon.  
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It is therefore apparent that the BOT approach requires the host government support, which 
depends how large and complex is the project under consideration, and also on the economic 
conditions within the country. Host government support is essential in developing countries 
and may involve legislative, regulatory, administrative and financial support.    
Pahlman (1996), stated that the private investors are very often hesitant in taking on a project 
unless the host government can meet all necessary guarantees, such as ensuring investment 
grants, land grants, low interest rates on loans, special tax exemption and responsibility for 
any public or environmental difficulties which might be encountered up to and after the 
completion of the project.  
2.5.2 Private Sponsors (Project Company) 
The private sponsors or the project company, (private sector), in a BOT project are the 
second most important party. If the BOT project is taken on by the private sector, it will 
normally be a complex organization that contains one or a number of large international 
construction or engineering companies, equipment suppliers, lending bodies, insurance 
companies, equity investors, as well as a firm that posses the experience of operating and 
maintaining the project in hand.  To control for all these parties a consortium may be formed 
which includes the various bodies mentioned above, (Augenblick and Custer 1990) as well as 
a major international engineering and construction company including one or more suppliers 
of the necessary equipments.  An example of this is the consortium which built the Channel 
Tunnel project; this consortium included ten major contractors from the UK and France, 
(Tiong 1995).  There are other parties that are involved in a BOT project, these parties are:  
  
2.5.3 Suppliers 
Normally the suppliers are private companies who have the job of supplying the materials 
and equipment that is needed for the project. A contract is signed to transfer the risk in 
supplying raw materials, (lack of it), to the supplier company, (Shirong 1998).  
2.5.4 Investors 
The investors are the party that may consist of suppliers, constructors, vendors, major 
financial institutions and individual shareholders. The private sector provides the finance of 
for the project and so the investors may include commercial banks, constructors, and 
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operators. Also, multilateral development banks as well as regional development banks offer 
funds for the BOT projects. The investors may provide equity in order to finance the project; 
the total amount is generally determined by the debt/equity required by lenders. Equity is the 
type of capital that ranks lowest in BOT projects therefore, according to (Estache and Strong 
2000) the claims of the investors are of secondary consideration to those who are financing 
the project. As a result the equity suppliers carry the highest risk of loss resulting from an 
unsuccessful project. However the debt financers protect their loans against the project assets.  
2.5.5 Users/Off-takers 
Organizations which use a facility are known as the users or off-takers. Often, when building 
a road, for example, income might be generated by means of tolls, which then go straight to 
the facility. It is unlikely that an Off-take Contract will apply in these circumstances. The 
profit produced by the particular facility depends on the economic situation prevailing in the 
country at the time. A problem could arise if the private sector infrastructure supplier intends 
to recover their initial investment from tariffs paid by people using the facility, and then 
finding that the lack of use results in reduced revenues and perhaps even termination of the 
project.  
 
2.5.6 Contractors 
Contractors are generally drawn from individual and private construction companies or from 
joint business enterprises specializing in construction.  Contractors often form a part of the 
project company and their involvement is generally welcomed by all parties concerned with 
the project.  The involvement of the contractors in any project at the initial stages is also 
intended to make sure that the project is executed effectively and efficiently. It is the 
responsibility of the contractor to hire subcontractors, consultants and suppliers, and the main 
contractor would usually have a share in the company project. 
2.5.7 Operators 
Operators are generally taken from specialized operating companies that are designed to 
provide maintenance and operation for a specific facility. The operator is considered one of 
the parties that form the concession; all operators offer maintenance and continuous services 
as well as managing the operational phases of the facility throughout the concession time.  
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The operators form an important part in running and operating the facility, this involves 
having knowledge in financing, designing and programming, all of which are crucial for a 
successful facility.  Often the operation companies are supported by the host government to 
ensure the effectiveness of the facilities, as the host government in many cases finally 
becomes the owner of the facility.  
2.5.8 Lenders 
 The debt/equity ratios for various projects will differ, but a popular strategy is to use as much 
debt as the available cash flow from the project will allow, in order providing good profit for 
the investors.  Of course, a low percentage of equity financing will lead to increased risk to 
the‎ project‎ and‎ also‎ to‎ the‎ investors‟‎ profits.‎ ‎ It‎ is‎ therefore‎ important‎ to‎maintain‎ a‎ good‎
balance between debt and equity, (Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut 2003).  The largest part 
of the finance for the project is usually provided by loans and the lenders will normally be 
credit agencies, syndicates of commercial banks or niche banks and pension providers.  It is 
usual practice for one lender to take the lead role for the lending consortium and reach an 
agreement with the promoter.  No contractual ties exist between the lenders and the 
construction itself.  The finance will usually be of the "limited resource" type where the 
banks option for repayment of the loan is restricted to the project company and the assets and 
contracts related to the specific project.  
Equity providers 
The BOT projects are generally funded using both debt and equity.  Usually, the equity 
finance is an injection of risk capital into the project and such equity/shareholders could 
consist of suppliers, constructors, major financial institutions, private shareholders and 
operators.  The equity suppliers are rewarded with profits when, and if, the project makes a 
profit or there is no return otherwise.  Only 10–30% of the complete project costs are funded 
by equity while debt financing covers the remaining 70–90%, (Levy 1996). The finances that 
are provided by equity is explained as an indication for the commitment of the promoter 
organization  to the project in demand, and it also forms the early cash inflow to the project 
and it normally recovered last when all debts are cleared.  
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2.6 Contractual agreements in BOT projects 
The BOT projects involve many complex and difficult contractual agreements.  According to 
Menheere and Pollalis (1996) there is the possibility of as many as 300 different contracting 
bodies involved in a BOT project, but there are six major contracts in the BOT project 
involving the main parties, i.e. the concession contract, financial agreements, construction 
contract in addition to the operation and maintenance service contract.  It could be a daunting 
task bringing all these parties together, it could consume time and on occasions other parties 
pass the risks on others. The main agreements in the BOT project are described below.  
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Figure ‎2-2 BOT Contractual Agreement Source: Ngee et al, (1997) 
 
2.6.1 Concession Agreement 
The concession agreement is between the concessionaire and the host and is considered to 
be the most important one in a BOT project because it establishes the feasibility and 
profitability of the project from a commercial point of view, (Ngee et al.1997).  When 
defining the concession contract, (Leiringer 2006) described it essentially as a business 
contract which also includes responsibility for construction.  This contract is concerned 
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with issues from the initial designing stage until the completion stage of the project.  
According to Levy (1996) this contract includes the expectation and needs of the host, sets 
the concession period and the manner in which the project is to be transferred to the host 
government at the end of the concession.  
2.6.2 Loan Agreement 
This agreement involves only the Bank or the lender and the concessionaire.  All the 
necessary finance is raised from commercial and international banks to the concessionaire, 
and is the main financial source for the BOT project.  Lenders provide finance based on 
equity, which indicates the level of commitment of the concession company. Lenders also 
finance BOT projects based on their estimated revenue generating capacity. 
2.6.3 Construction Contract 
According to Menheere and Pollalis (1996) a construction contract is agreed between the 
contractor and the project company, and may be either a fixed price turnkey or a design-
build contract; indicating the importance of the contractor in the construction of the project. 
BOT contractual arrangements include one main contract to include both the design and 
construction of the project.  
A number of risks are involved in BOT projects which include cost-related factors, (e.g. 
going over the construction cost), factors related to performance, (e.g. not meeting the 
quality criteria), as well as factors in relation to time, (e.g. the inability to complete the 
project on time). An individual point of responsibility within the fixed-price contract 
minimizes the risk elements presented in the BOT project. Furthermore, in certain types of 
projects, for example power plants usually require close design/construction coordination 
which result in shorter construction periods because the turnkey contract allow for a fast-
track approach for completion, therefore the fixed price turnkey contract reduces the risks 
that are associated with timing, cost and quantity of the project. 
2.6.4 Operation and Maintenance Contract  
This contract is between the operator and concession company. In fact the success of the 
BOT project is very dependent on the operation phase because its success is strongly related 
to‎the‎project‟s‎ability‎to‎generate‎revenue.‎The‎operation‎phase‎of‎BOT‎projects‎requires‎
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high attention and a big management challenge. This agreement normally covers the entire 
concession period because of the contribution that the operator has in the designing and 
constructing phases (Unido 1996).   
There is a higher level of interdependency between the contracts; they all are related with 
each other and together they shape the design, construction and operation of the BOT 
project as well as describing the risks and responsibilities involved. It is essential to make 
sure that there is transparency to show all the risks and responsibilities to all parties.  
2.6.5 USERS/Off-Take Agreement 
This type of agreement is made between the concessionaire and the host Government, in 
which services such as electricity and water are bought at a pre-determined price, thus 
enabling‎the‎concessionaire‎to‎generate‎a‎revenue,‎such‎as‎in‎the‎Chinese‎Shajio‎„B‟‎project,‎
where the Government bought the minimum quantity of electricity on the basis of take and 
pay, at a fixed price to be paid to Hopewell Holdings Inc which was the Concessionaire 
(Tiong 1990). 
2.7 BOT practice 
According to Neil Roger (1999) a study conducted by the World Bank, revealed that, for 
the developing countries in East Asia, the investment requirements ranged from 1.2 to 1.5 
trillion US dollars.  Between the years 1990 and 1997, investment in infrastructure projects 
using private participation, grew drastically from about 16 billion to 120 billion US dollars, 
but then declined to approximately 95 billion US dollars by 1998, following the financial 
downturn that hit Asia halfway through 1997. Therefore, due to the success of BOT 
projects worldwide, it appears that the BOT method will be suitable for use in Kuwait. 
Many countries worldwide have adopted the BOT method for the development of public 
facilities and infrastructure projects ever since its formal introduction by the Prime Minister 
of Turkey.  Both local government policy and financial organization policy have been 
developed‎ with‎ the‎ main‎ aim‎ of‎ encouraging‎ the‎ private‎ sector‟s‎ involvement‎ in‎ BOT‎
projects.  In fact, the Vietnamese government encouraged the private sector to adopt major 
BOT projects, according to (Curl 1994) and also the government of the Philippines 
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permitted the private sector to be involved in power development projects replacing the 
monopoly held by the National Power Corporation Hiroaki, (1995). 
Dias and Ioannou (1995) point out that, in the USA, budget shortages have limited the 
access to federal grants for public facility projects, while changes in the tax rate and laws 
and limits on debt capacity, enforced by law as well as political considerations, have 
restricted the ability of the states and governments to finance construction by means of 
bond issues.  Some of the major financial organizations led by the World Bank have 
encouraged the adoption of the BOT method by the private sector.  This is due to the fact 
that private finance reduces the need for government finance required for public projects. 
Since public facilities previously undertaken by the government have been constructed by 
the private sector, the IDB, (Inter-American Development Bank), has discovered that there 
is an urgent need for long-term finance to fund private-sector operations, which in turn has 
led to the creation of the Private Sector Development in 1994. 
The BOT method, although ideally suited for use in developing countries, has also been 
used for important projects in more prosperous countries.  Two examples of this, given by 
(Wilburn and Thomas, 1994) are the Channel Tunnel, linking England with France, and 
France's Orly Airport Transit Link.  
The government of the UK declared its' private finance plan in 1992 and following this in 
November 1994, Kenneth Clarke, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, made a declaration 
supporting and encouraging the use of private finance.  This helped to allay the suspicions 
of‎ investors‎and‎contractors‟‎concerning‎this‎new‎approach. As cited in Hornagold (1995) 
the chancellor stated that: "We need to take the private finance message to the heart of all 
decision making in government I am announcing today that in future the Treasury will not 
approve any capital projects unless private finance options have been explored".  
Private finance has been used is in various transportation projects such as the £2.7 billion 
Channel Tunnel Rail Link between England and France  and the rail connection to 
Heathrow airport costing £320 million..  
 Figure 2.4 indicates that the use of the BOT method spread quickly around the world 
between 1984 and 1995.  So and Shin (1995) stated that the total value of privatization 
came to 357 billion US dollars and the value for new investment projects exceeded 308 
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billion US dollars.  Private investment in infrastructure projects totaled about 60 billion US 
dollars per year. Table 2.2 gives the ten main infrastructure investment projects up to 
October 1995.  
 
 
Figure ‎2-3 - Private participation in infrastructure from 1984 – Sept. 1995 
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Location Project Type of 
contract 
Cost (US$ 
million) 
France/ UK The Channel Tunnel BOT, 65 years 19,000 
Taiwan Taipei mass rapid transit system BOT 17,000 
Japan Kansai International Airport BOT 15,000 
Europe Concert Pan-European Telecom Services BOO 5,300 
Argentina Buenos Aires water and sewer services BOT, 30 years 4,000 
Thailand Telecom Asia communication network BTO,25 years 4,000 
China Daya Bay nuclear power plant, phase 1 BOO 3,700 
Malaysia North-south toll Expressway BOT, 30 years 3,400 
Mexico Petacalco coal-fired power plant BOT 3,000 
Thailand Bangkok Elevated Road and Train System BOT, 30 Years 2,981 
Table ‎2-1 Source: So and Shin, 1995 
 
According to the World Bank (1997), in the financial year of 1997, private investors enjoyed 
a staggering US$ 8,899 million in lending from the World Bank. 
2.8 The Importance of BOT 
Although one of the fundamentals for the continuation and sustainability of economic growth 
is investment in infrastructure, BOT has acquired a reputation with governments 
internationally in recent years, and is perceived as an attractive mean of developing new 
infrastructure and other public facilities, World Bank has stated, that since 1990, the number 
of lower income countries encouraging the private sectors to participate in infrastructure is on 
the increase. 
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Between 1990 and 1999, the lower-income countries with a minimum of one private project 
for infrastructure has grown from 20% to over 80%, with fifty countries.  
The increase in private investment participation for the lower-income‎countries‟‎projects‎has‎
almost happened every year during the period from 1990 to 1997, when it has peaked with 
35.1 billion US Dollars (Houskamp and Tynan 2000). 
Many reasons were given by many researchers for the cause of BOT becoming quickly 
popular.  Augenblick and Custer (1990) gave four core reasons for the cause of the current 
popularity of BOT within the majority of the developing countries. The first reason given is 
the vast growth in infrastructure needs, secondly, the lower capacity for borrowing and the 
decline in budgetary resources, thirdly, the competitiveness of business internationally, and 
lastly‎the‎growth‎of‎the‎private‎sector‎and‎the‎it‟s‎social‎acceptance.   
The Concept of BOT has become highly adopted by both developed and the developing 
countries an has been supported by various international institutions world, (Shen et al., 
1996); Chen and Messner 2005; Ahadzi and Bowles 2004). In developing countries, i.e. Asia, 
BOT projects have become increasingly popular. These include the 1200MW Hab River 
project in Pakistan, the 700 MW Shajiao-B power station in China, and the 300MW coal-
fired project in the Philippines (Levy, 1996; Walker & Smith, 1995; Wang & Tiong, 2000; 
Xing & Wu, 2003). 
According to Treasury reports, exploring new opportunities leading to development of 
profitable ventures is the source of encouragement and motivation for the private sector 
innovation through research in new ideas, which will improve value service, and the 
achievement of better delivery flexibility to quality standards, HM Treasury, (2000). 
HM Treasury also reports on the performance of the projects procured under PFI as being 
satisfactory on the whole, while the delivery of the services follow or improve on the contract 
targets.  Therefore, Government policies favour the BOT type of projects because it attracts 
money, expertise and the technology of the private sector, and cuts down the financial burden 
on the government. 
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Haley (1992), further describes the importance of BOT by: 
• The 15-20 highest indebted countries in the developing world have missed out on the 
growth during the 1980s decade and many encountering inflation and debt burdens, which 
require them to adopt a tough approach when planning fiscal spending. 
 Both pragmatic and ideological powers  in developing countries have discovered that the 
state led development programs from 1960s and 1970s decades, have –in simple term- not 
worked, and a modern look at the role of the state has provided new options for private 
sector led development. 
 For some countries, the limitations on ownership and operations might only be overcome, 
(in the medium term), with BOT techniques, despite a higher willingness to tap the 
private sectors and seek new technologies abroad. 
 The debt crisis closed off capital flows to third world countries and has reduced spending 
on major public sector projects. This, together with higher competition in the construction 
sector of the industry to acquire large contracts, has usually forced the main contractors 
into the place of investor just to gain the business. 
 Even with the debt crisis aside, industry competition in construction has had a prominent 
role for the contractor in projects finance and arrangement of more complete services 
such as turnkey project with management contract.  
Financial institutions such as Banks and pension funds are on the search for new financial 
products and larger market share, which leads them towards infrastructure industry projects 
Chang and Chen, (2001). The BOT approach is very attractive to banks because of the higher 
margins which can be earned over more traditional projects Tiong, (1995). Three vital factors 
have been identified that will enhance the popularity of BOT worldwide  
• The need for industry of infrastructure. 
• The shortage of governmental funding. 
• The incompetence of government financed projects. 
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The core reason for BOT projects is to share the financial risks amongst different groups 
while, at the same time, protecting national interests of the host government and, at the same 
time, reducing its' role in the development or infrastructure, (Forouzbakhsh et al. 2007). What 
makes‎ the‎ BOT‎ approach‎ more‎ attractive‎ is‎ that‎ the‎ government‟s‎ investment‎ in‎
infrastructure projects is minimal but large sums of money can be invested over a long 
period.  
Therefore, BOT projects are the safest way to ensure that private sector investments are under 
the control of the host government. 
Furthermore, when BOT projects are conducted in developing countries, via foreign investors 
from developed countries, the shortage in advanced technology as well as availability of 
management skills in developing countries becomes another essential issue, (Walker and 
Smith, 1995).  
Government-led projects tend to have less technical capacity available and are less able to 
adopt the latest technologies than the private sector and this implies that the development of 
BOT‎projects‎would‎therefore‎be‎helpful‎for‎the‎development‎of‎Kuwait‟s‎infrastructure. 
One particular BOT developer of chemical, petroleum and power projects is Al-Kharafi 
National Company which is involved in the industrial and commercial sectors, including 
schools, hospitals, airports, water treatment and distribution networks, as well as operation 
and maintenance, and facilities management.  The production development director for the 
company, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Ghusain, outlined the advantages of public–private partnerships 
and‎ noted‎ that‎ “The‎ owner‎ gets‎ a‎ quality‎ service‎ while‎ the‎ private‎ sector‎ may‎ be‎ more‎
efficient and will provide better quality service and faster service”,‎ Al-Khaled,‎ „Karafi‎
National (2008).  Al-Ghusain further‎ stated‎ that‎ “people‎wonder‎ about‎ the‎ government‎ of‎
Kuwait, as the government can afford to finance and build infrastructure projects by itself and 
they‎ question‎ as‎ to‎ why‎ the‎ government‎ contracts‎ out‎ BOT‎ projects”‎ Al-Khaled,‎ „Karafi‎
National Company, (2008).  He reasoned that leaders of large-scale projects should rely on 
the experience and expertise of others since with BOT projects, the end-users will have a high 
quality service because of the competition, Al-Khaled, Karafi National Company (2008).   
The use of the BOT process in Kuwait to improve its various infrastructures should have a 
positive effect.  After the railways and road network has been improved, the transport of raw 
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materials and final products will be faster and better.  Increased speed of transport will 
provide a competitive advantage. After opening the Sulaibiya Water Waste Plant, water does 
not need to be imported from elsewhere, which was expensive, and this provides the country 
with more opportunities to manufacture goods which use water in the manufacturing process.  
Good roads links to the rail and ports are essential for a developing country to progress. 
2.8.1 The obligation for infrastructure 
The absence of suitable infrastructure can be a vast economic and social burden on a country 
as noted by Dunkerley (1995). The advantages of public investment in infrastructure are 
many, as this can play a critical role in business investment and contribution to economic 
growth, as well as providing employment and, in the long term, making the country 
internationally competitive.  During the first decade of this millennium, the world economy 
was expected to grow at a rate of 2.7% per annum. According to Fay and Yepes (2003) this 
growth has resulted in a greater demand for infrastructure services. The global economy is a 
very competitive environment and it is necessary to have more effective infrastructure 
facilities to promote success. The alternative effect will be the suppression of growth, 
increasing costs, a lack of competitiveness and a reduction in the quality of life for the 
population.  Harries (2003), suggested that a PPP programme will permit  buildings and 
provisions to be developed for particular services, which would not otherwise be possible 
since the public sector cannot pay for both development and operational costs over a long 
period of time. 
2.8.2 The shortage of government funding 
A BOT project can only be carried out successfully when sufficient finance is available, so 
acquiring capital is one of the most important concerns of the Build Operate Transfer project 
delivery method. When infrastructure projects were initiated, financed, and managed in a 
traditional way by the host government, the main concerns were based on political, social, 
and economic growth goals, and the rate of the financial or commercial return was not 
considered (Tiong, 1995; Chang and Chen, 2001).  
Finance was provided by the government who also underwrote the risk.  The supply and 
development of the project would be contracted out by the state agency or enterprise to the 
private sector.  The finance in this process was provided by host government tax revenues 
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and borrowings guaranteed by the state, such as official development loans or commercial 
financing.  
2.8.3 Inefficiency of projects financed by government  
Apart from a shortage of resources for funding, some governments understand that they are 
not always as effective in using resources, or as cost-aware as the private sector in running 
certain types of public facilities and infrastructure (Dias and Ioannou 1996). 
The governments of most developing countries finance own and run all infrastructure 
development. The success, or failure, of the infrastructure depends mainly on the host 
government performance and records indicate that performance has been below standard in 
most instances.  The World Bank, (1994), notes that infrastructure investment has often been 
wrongly allocated with insufficient being allotted to maintenance and more to new 
investment.  There has also been too little money allocated to vital services and too much to 
projects with a lower priority. Technical inefficiency and waste has hampered the delivery of 
services.  There has been only small investment and rescue plans have not attempted to meet 
the various demands of different user groups, or considered the environment effects. 
(Guster 1993) in extensive research, highlighted the low level of efficiency in the operation 
and performance of utilities in developing countries.  In developing countries, the average 
thermal efficiencies of utilities are 30% lower and the distribution and transmission losses are 
higher than those in industrial countries.  Qinlin (1994) noted that the total loses by state 
enterprises in Brazil in 1982 were valued at 17 billion US dollars. Dunkerley (1995) also 
cited the example‎of‎China,‎where‎about‎a‎third‎of‎the‎government‟s‎investment‎used‎during‎
the 1970's was lost as a result of inefficient performance. 
2.8.4 Transfer of Management and Advanced Technological Skills 
The transfer of technology involves the transfer of hardware and software technology as well 
as information, knowledge, experience or skills and also the education, training and 
development of these skills. To undertake BOT successfully, the transfer of advanced 
technological and management skills is required between the developing and developed 
countries.  Most developing countries lack the technology and experience in management 
skills, compared to developed countries.  They are required to introduce new technologies 
which support the development of small and medium sized enterprises, (SME), and to 
 42 
 
promote links between local institutions and international enterprises.  BOT projects offer the 
host country current technology and to have their labour force trained on its' use.  Local 
capability may be motivated further by long term agreements with the private sector, (Harries 
2003).  On one hand, developing countries are willing to acquire the advanced technology 
and management expertise from developed countries, and on the other hand, developed 
countries‎ are‎ eager‎ to‎ “trade”‎ their‎ sufficiently‎ advanced‎ technology‎ and‎ their‎ expertise‎ in‎
management skills to those developing countries.  This benefit may also excite technological 
progress in other sectors of the economy as a result of hands on experience. 
2.9 The challenges for BOT  
While BOT is creating opportunities in the developed and developing countries, the 
opportunities for revenue and profit are not easy.  Comparing BOT with the fully public 
approach, the responsibilities and the risks are high in a BOT project.  The problem becomes 
the abundance of projects that are now accessible to investors, but there is a lack of bankable 
projects that show adequate returns for the private sector.  It has been argued   
A barrier to success in BOT projects is their complexity, length of the negotiations and 
documentation, the cost of preparing the documents for the bid, the negotiators lack of skill 
and experience, and the need to organize the efforts of many different parties, (Drye 1994). 
2.9.1 The time, size and cost of BOT 
The scale of most BOT projects is large.  Basically, this is not because most infrastructure 
projects are inclined to be large, but that the BOT approach is mainly appropriate for large 
scale projects.  A key example is the US $19 billion investment in Channel Tunnel project. It 
is commonly acknowledged that the PFI initiative applied to miniature contracts is too, risky, 
costly, complex, and certainly too early (Shirong 1998). 
Financing and operating measures make BOT projects more expensive.  As well as the initial 
large investment required in infrastructure, private borrowers will be paying higher interest 
rates to their lenders and will require higher discount rates for equity.  Finance is not only 
necessary for the construction phase, but also through the pre-design phase and for the 
duration of operation phases when demands for cash flow may be considerable.  The cost of 
unsuccessful effort can also be high where legal, design, and site investigation fees have to be 
paid, even when the bid does not succeed, (Shirong 1998).  The cost of success in winning 
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projects can be high, for instance, Kumagai Gumi has been reported to spend the equivalent 
of about US $5 million in pre-design costs for a Thailand toll road project, (Augenblick and 
Custer 1990). Johnson (1996) has suggested that BOT is only suited to high value projects, 
and the minimum possible value is within the region of eight and ten million pounds sterling. 
BOT projects run through a reasonably long duration, within which the private sector 
undertakes all the responsibilities of planning, finance, design, development and 
management. The causes for the long duration include the scale of projects, the variety of its 
phases, the length of the operation phase, the political measures and procedures, and the 
associated problems of ever extended planning timetables. Most BOT infrastructure projects 
have a concession time period of twenty to thirty years or at times more, such as the Channel 
Tunnel which lasted 65 years.  
It should be noted that the length of the pre-construction stage tends to be longer. It is 
approximated that in the USA, large public facility projects now take up to 15 years, 
compared to about 2-3 years a generation ago.  Also in the UK, the present trunk-road 
procedures take an average of 13 years before the work starts on the site.  In Frankfurt, 
Germany, long delays were experienced in planning and constructing a new runway. 
Approval for this project took 17 years, (Stevens 1993).  
2.9.2 The complexity of BOT procurement 
The complexity of procuring‎ BOT‎ can‎ be‎ demonstrated‎ by‎ comparing‎ it‎ with‎ the‎ “fully-
public”‎approach.‎The‎public‎sector,‎through‎the‎last‎100‎years,‎has‎been‎very‎traditional‎and‎
all its measures and procedures have been formed to cope with accountability and 
transparency from the public.  This was the main type of procurement for government to 
accomplish public projects with separating design from implementation.  The finance was 
supplied from the public fund and the contractors were required to bid on a design and 
specification.  The work was measured again upon completion and the contractors were paid 
either on a fluctuating fee or value fluctuations were added in the tender price.  The approach 
has worked well, but the separation of design from implementation, has proven inefficient for 
the procurement process, (Shirong 1998). 
The concept of BOT is primarily different in  the private sector who takes the responsibility 
of financing, designing, constructing, and operating risks, however there are changes in 
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responsibilities, contractual relationship, working and organizational relationships and project 
management methods. Also the adversarial approach to solve problems is not appropriate 
anymore as all the parties have to live with the long term consequences of their actions. 
According to Shirong (1998), the private sector needs to share all the responsibilities that 
were normally taken by the public sector.  The private sector also has acted in a number of 
roles throughout the project and can be more sensitive to normal risks. An example of this is 
shown during the early stages of the project where the private sector will act as a promoter to 
achieve approval for the project amongst shareholders and the general public as well as 
acquiring the finances.  The private sector will act in the role of a general contractor, in the 
implementation phase, in order to arrange the design and the construction work, the private 
sector acts also as the main leader in operating and maintaining the facility.  
Furthermore, one key difference between the fully-public approach and BOT is in the 
relationships between the parties involved in the contract.  In the conventional approach, the 
public sector, which acts as both the client and the implementation body of the project, 
directly signs contracts with two kinds of parties; one is the financial bodies which lend to the 
public sector, like banks or other financial institutions; the other is the service provider bodies 
which constructs the facility or service to the public sector, such as project designers, 
construction contractors and material suppliers (Haley, 1992; Shirong, 1998).  The most 
important economic aim of the financial bodies is to achieve their economic return by the 
interest charged, while the service supplying bodies make their profits through providing the 
services, primarily through design and construction.  The public sector runs the facility 
following its completion. Under the arrangement of BOT, the public sector has one 
contractual relationship with the private sector (project contractor), and reassigns the 
traditional responsibilities and risks to the private sector (project contractor). This project 
contractor forms an extra contractual level. Under the conventional approach the capital 
expenses are partly financed by the government budget allocation and lending, whereas the 
BOT approach is usually financed by a mixture of debt and equity. There is another 
contractual relationship, often called the off-take contract. This is one of two approaches used 
practically for revenues, i.e., for collecting revenue from the end users. The two types of 
revenue can be either contract-tied (i.e. the off-take contract), or market-tied, that is revenue 
for services which are directly delivered to the consumer, i.e. tolls from roads. Contract-tied 
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revenues are fees for services which are not directly delivered to a particular customer, but by 
an agency which operates a service network. The last will have to underwrite a minimum 
level of delivery, i.e., supplying electricity to a distributor group. In comparison with 
contract-tied revenues the market-tied revenues involve higher risk on the project contracting 
company, (Haley 1992).  
 
2.10 Risk in BOT projects 
Projects involving the building of infrastructure have a higher risk element because the 
capital costs are usually high, there is often a long lead time and the resulting assets do not 
usually have an alternative use. Therefore, when evaluating infrastructure projects, which are 
privately promoted, it is necessary to identify, analyze, and allocate the different risks. The 
risks involved in BOT projects are two-fold. First, there are risks involved with the start-up 
procedure, (financial and technical studies), and also construction and operational risks due to 
the nature of BOT approach; and secondly, being large-scale projects, there are also 
regulatory, political and economical risks involved, (Ebrahimnejad, et al. 2010).  According 
to Tiong (1995, 1997) there are high risk levels associated with BOT projects for the 
negotiators and decision makers in both the private and public sectors who will need to carry 
out a careful analysis and then manage these risks.  However, as pointed out by Ozdogann 
and Birgonul (2000) the private sector and the government do not share the same set of 
principles covering the risks associated with BOT projects, and so, according to Tiong, 
(1995c) the promoter who wins the concession is more likely to be the one who carries the 
risk and offers suitable guarantees.  
According to Gunn (2005) risks and ambiguity will be present in all construction projects and 
tend to involve the three main project management restrictions of time, quality and budget. 
Risks have been classified into three categories by (Lessard and Miller 2001). These are: 1) 
risks originating from revenue and financial‎markets,‎ classed‎ as‎ „Market-related‟‎ risks;‎ 2).‎
„Completion‟‎ risks,‎ involving‎ the‎ technical‎ designs‎ and/or‎ technology‎ used,‎ the‎ cost‎ of‎
construction‎and‎time‎delays,‎and‎any‎other‎operational‎problems;‎3)‎the‎„institutional‎risks‟‎
which come from legislation and regulations, or possibly local environmental groups opposed 
to the project, or even government bodies themselves, leading to renegotiation of contracts. 
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The many risks involved in construction are increased considerably in BOT projects, due to 
the complex combination of various issues, such as design, construction, operation and 
finance. The risks themselves are more complex than for conventional projects because of the 
higher number of parties and agreements concerned. The working environment is so different 
in BOT projects, that a change of attitude is needed in both the private and public sectors 
regarding the risks involved.  While the private sector is informed that risks inherent to the 
project are assigned to the appropriate party, in fact governments often try to transfer as much 
risk as possible to them.  In a BOT project, throughout the development stages of planning, 
design, construction and operation, the risks will change. 
 There are two types of risk, according to Merna and Smith (1996), which are either 
„elemental‟‎ or‎ „global‟.‎ "Elemental‎ Risks"‎ are‎ connected‎ with‎ the‎ finance,‎ construction,‎
operation and revenue generation sections of the project, while "Global Risks" include 
commercial, political, legal and environmental risks and are usually assigned through the 
project contract.   The main categories of risk in BOT projects have been identified by 
(Marcus et al. 2002; Tarek & Luh-Maan 2002 and Dey et al. 2002), as economic, political, 
legal, construction, financial and operating risks. According to Baloi and Price (2003), the 
risks also need to be categorized as static / dynamic, individual / corporate, internal / external, 
positive / negative, acceptable / objectionable and insurable/uninsurable.  For this reason 
government assurance is extremely important in BOT projects. The more easily observed 
risks are: economic, political, financial and related risks. Various examples are given below. 
 
2.10.1 Country or General Risks (Regulatory and Political Risk) 
Every country has a different set of general risks, which are those associated with the macro-
environmental aspects of the particular country. These would include the legal system, the 
prevailing economic conditions, the political environment, taxation, the legal system, or 
changes in the currency exchange rate.  Because these risks may severely affect the 
concession agreement and the cash flow throughout the lifetime of the project, it is crucial to 
that they should be identified before the development of the project and this is particularly 
important in the developing countries. 
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 As noted by Schaufelberger (2005), the risks can be broken down into financial risks, 
political risks, and legal risks. It was Wells (1998),‎who‎defined‎political‎risk‎as‎a‎„threat‎to‎
profitability due to forces external to a project, which involves some sort of governmental 
action‎or‎inaction‟.‎‎‎Since‎many‎economic‎and‎political‎phenomena‎are‎interdependent,‎it‎is‎
quite difficult to determine exactly what form political risk will take.  (Moran, 1998), 
differentiates political risk from commercial doubts resulting from changes in the economic 
conditions.  He felt however, that this difference may be tenuous due to government action or 
inaction.  The definition of political risk by (Wells 1998) given above, can cause changes to 
the economic conditions.  In view of this, Howell (1998) thought that insurance might give a 
good indication of the events covered by political risk.  According to Tinsley (2000) most 
insurance companies covering political risk will include the following events: currency 
convertibility and transfer; war and insurrection/civil disturbance; nationalization and 
expropriation; terrorism and vandalism; or wilful violation of contract.  Country risks are 
very dependent on the political and macro-economic stability, which include political, 
regulatory and legal risks.  Political risk involves the possibility of government actions, 
which may jeopardize a project and this can occur at the local, central or provincial levels of 
government.  Some of the key political risks, according to (Wang et al. 1999) include 
amendments to the law, a delay in approval, expropriation and corruption.  Failure to 
maintain law and order may also lead to the damage of privately owned infrastructure.  In 
developing countries, one of the main risks to investors, according to (Wells 1999) is 
expropriation, where the government may decide to nationalize the assets?  Country risk also 
involves the possibility of business loss incurred by the lender and promoter of the private 
infrastructure project due to factors controlled by the government, rather than by the lender 
and promoter themselves.  Country risks, both of the political and regulatory type can 
adversely affect private infrastructure projects because they can change the local economic, 
political and social conditions, resulting in a situation in which the promoters are unable to 
construct and operate the project and are therefore unable to retain their investment.  The 
various risks are summarized below. 
 Instability of the government; 
 Low level of commitment to public private partnerships or concession contracts;   
 Expropriation by the government; 
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 Nationalisation;  
 Hostile outbreaks, (riots, wars or terrorist activity); 
 Government interference in the management and operation of the facility (including 
tariff levels);  
 No regulatory or legal system which would insure contracts or provide a method of 
solving disputes; 
 Changes in the policy, (royalties and tax law); 
 Changes to the laws affecting standard use of technology required in the development 
of the project and also its operation and maintenance;  
 Failure of the government to provide the necessary project permits required for 
development, operation and maintenance. 
 Changes  to the legislation regarding the policy affecting the repatriation of funds;  
 Amendments to the general legislation (such as regional or national law, corporate 
law, or commercial law). 
In developing countries, the political risk is quite high for BOT projects.  It is greater in 
developing countries because of the possibility of a sudden change in government, which 
could end the project altogether or cause companies to declare bankruptcy resulting from a 
political decision.  
Political risks are affected by the political environment which exists in the particular country.  
The risks fall into two categories: instability risks and sovereign risks.  The former relates to 
the revision or abandonment of contracts and also any damage or harm occurring to property 
or injury of human resources from riots or terrorism.  According to Lang (1998) sovereign 
risks cover several different areas of government interference, including restrictions on the 
freedom to operate, increase in taxes or other fines, assets being expropriated by the 
government and prevention of profits being transferred internationally. 
Tam (1999) suggests that companies in the private sector operating in developing countries, 
which are particularly prone to these risks, should ensure that they are protected. It may be 
difficult to invest in any project due to the lack of rules which regulate competition in the 
market place or which ensure that investments are protected.   
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2.10.2 Economic risks 
When a country may be unable to generate enough foreign exchange to meet the main 
interest payments on its external debt is known as its economic risk.  It depends on the total 
amount‎of‎ the‎external‎debt,‎the‎debt‎repayment‎plan,‎and‎the‎country‟s‎ financial‎risk.‎ ‎The‎
interest payments are determined by the interest rate and the extent of the debt, the loan 
repayment plan will determine the amount and timing of the principal repayments.  However, 
it‎is‎the‎overall‎performance‎of‎the‎economy‎that‎determines‎the‎country‟s‎ability‎to‎meet all 
of its debt obligations. 
The financial stability of a country is therefore a key factor in determining the associated 
risks.   If the economy is stable, this will help to reduce changes to the market demand and 
also the supply of raw materials, which would affect the development and operation, and 
therefore the profitability, of the projects.  The private sector carries a very high risk as it 
needs to obtain the necessary equipment and materials on time and also to ensure that the 
facilities are operating effectively and efficiently and providing sufficient revenue.  The BOT 
approach usually ensures that there is a precise agreement concerning rates of return and 
user‟s‎fees‎before‎the‎project‎has‎even‎been‎developed.‎‎This‎is‎difficult‎for‎the‎private sector, 
since it might not be viable to accept the risks linked with an extended development process 
in a continuously changing economic environment Dias and Ioannou, (1995). 
Since BOT projects have to repay debt by means of their operating revenue, and lenders have 
no other guarantee, (off-sheet financing), a costly private sector bankruptcy becomes much 
more likely.  
2.10.3 Financial Risk  
Wang et al. (2000) describe financial risk as the difficulty in obtaining finance, the high cost 
of financing or being unable to obtain finance in time.  Since BOT projects depend to a very 
large extent on financial support from private or public investment and lenders during the 
development stage, their success depends heavily on the concessionaire having a strong 
financial capability, (Zhang 2005).  Lam and Chow (1999) suggest that the level of support 
provided relies on an accurate assessment of the concession company's capacity for 
repayment over a long period.   
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There are other risk classifications and these were listed by (Charoenpornpatiana, 1998), as: 
static or dynamic, fundamental or particular, speculative or pure, private source or 
government source, non-financial or financial, measurable or non-measurable. (Tiong, 1990), 
considered the BOT project financial risks to be market, evaluation, input, ownership, 
currency and return. 
The largest of all these risks is obviously fluctuations in currency value, as pointed out by 
Moran (1990). It is often the case that providers involved in private infrastructure invest their 
capital at the very beginning of the project, with the intention of recovering the investment 
later, either by revenue obtained from the facility, or by selling the facility to the government.  
However, if currency rates are falling during the construction of the project, an occurrence 
which is all too frequent in developing countries, the facility may be devalued quickly and the 
foreign private constructors will lose their capital investment Moran (1990). 
Most of the revenues will be in the currency of the country where the facility is being 
developed, while finance is mainly obtained in foreign currencies. Any minor fluctuations in 
the exchange rate may have to be borne by the firm undertaking the project, however, costs 
arising from larger fluctuations can be dealt with either by government agreements or by 
privileged pricing arrangements for the use of the infrastructure utility Hoffman, (1989).  
 The capability of a country to create sufficient foreign exchange to cover the external debt 
interest and principal repayments is known as its financial risk.  The whole amount of the 
external debt needs to be taken into account including, the debt repayment plan and also the 
country‟s‎economic‎and‎ financial‎ risk.‎ ‎The‎size‎ of‎ the‎debt‎and‎ the‎ interest‎payments‎will 
determine the size of the interest payments, and the amount and timing of the principal 
repayments will depend on the debt repayment plan.  The country cannot meet its debt 
commitments unless the overall macroeconomic performance is good. 
2.10.4 Social/ Environmental Risk 
Problems have arisen due to the fact that investment decisions in private sector infrastructure 
have previously been taken based on finance or the economic situation prevailing at the time. 
However, there are other issues to consider involving social justice and the environment. The 
development of the project may lead to displacement of habitats, job losses, or possible 
effects on environment health due to air pollution.  Taking the power sector as an example, 
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the construction of dams to generate power, which would increase economic growth and 
productivity within the local community can also lead to inundation or destruction of farming 
and fishing ecosystems, forcing the local people from their homes which might be affected by 
flooding Dias and Ioannou, (1995). 
2.10.5 Technological Risk 
The main technological risks concerned with the building, operation, and maintenance of a 
particular project are a shortage of local technical expertise, especially in the area of safety 
and quality testing.  There might also be a lack of expertise in the legal and financial aspects 
of a convoluted contract structure which could cause problems. 
There may also be further problems caused to private firms by a lack of knowledge regarding 
work practices, procurement project systems, and access to building materials and cultural 
values and customs.  Insufficient local knowledge may result in the design of a project for 
which no local materials are available and the cost of importing them may be very expensive. 
Foreign investors may also find it difficult to employ reliable local subcontractors and 
partners in the local environment.  A particular form of technology may also be economically 
unfeasible or the regulations and standards regarding its use may be changed.  
This type of risk occurs mainly with projects where new technologies have not been deemed 
appropriate or economically viable during the development stage.  This risk is held by project 
investors through their capital involvement Tiong (1990). 
2.10.6 Operating Risk  
Operating risk arises from costs in operating the facility being higher than anticipated during 
the planning of the project and inadequate revenue being received after its completion.  
There are two elements to revenue risk: price risk and demand risk.  The price risk is the 
realistic amount that can be charged for the services, and this may be decided by other 
competing projects or the granting authorities.  The demand risk is doubt concerning the 
actual demand for the products or services on completion of the project. 
Several risks which might be encountered during the operating phase of BOT project have 
been discussed by Tiong (1990) and he lists these as: the supply of raw material, performance 
/ technical, market, maintenance / operational and foreign exchange.   
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However, (Beidleman 1990) sees the risks connected with a BOT project operating phase as: 
performance, liability, cost overrun, off-take and equity resale. (Woodward, 1992), on the 
other hand, thought that demand, toll / tariff, training and development were the important 
risk attributes for a BOT project operating phase.  
The Operating Risk is the possible inability of the project to meet the expected performance 
targets.  These might include a failure to supply the minimum service quality or quantity, 
such as water or electricity, for a fixed period.  As Taylor (1998), points out, the operation 
stage of BOT projects demands a great deal of management and requires detailed attention. 
2.10.7 Construction risks  
These risks involve going over budget and delays possible delays to the completion plans. 
Construction problems may be caused by poor management, technical difficulties, or a 
mixture of both.  If income from a completed project is needed to recover investment, then 
any delays in the completion deadlines will delay the realization of this income.  Cost 
overruns will also affect the profitability of the project. Tiong (1990) suggests that cost 
overrun, completion delay, force majeure, infrastructure and political risks are the main BOT 
project risk attributes at the construction stage.   However Beidleman (1990) identifies these 
as: cost overrun, completion delays, political and performance risks.  
 
2.10.8 Force Majeure Risk 
Dias and Ioannou, (1995) stated that, some risks are outside the control of the Government 
and project investors.  Events such as natural disasters and wars are known as Force Majeure 
risk.  Besides the force majeure, or Acts of God, those risks are related to physical damage or 
bodily harm as a result of natural calamities such as earthquake, landslide, tornado, hurricane, 
fire and flood are random and are out of the control of project investors.  They can be 
classified as having low chance of happening however with significant consequences.  The 
investing companies should find ways to limit this risk.  The Governments and private 
companies should include fair clauses to provide a relief against this type of risk in the 
Concession Agreement. 
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2.10.9 Market Risk 
This risk occurs during the operation of the project as it hard to estimate the level of users, for 
example, projects in road transport face the uncertainty or risk that the traffic level or users of 
the road are not high enough to earn the expected revenue.  The BOT projects rely on a 
constant revenue flow from the operation stage of the project.  The answer for the market risk 
is to adjust the identification of the project and the need for the public facility. A sufficient 
traffic forecast should be done to examine the future traffic levels.  In other cases, power 
plants, the Government offers guarantees of minimum revenues to private sector through the 
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) for example in the Shajio Power Plant, the Chinese 
Government accepted to buy a minimum quantity of electricity, (Tiong 1990). 
 
2.10.10 Cost Overrun/Delay Risk 
The BOT projects are highly vulnerable to cost overruns and long delays.  To avoid this risk 
the private sector enters with the contractor in a fixed turnkey contract that addresses this risk 
and then the risk goes to the contractor who should be in a position to control Dias and 
Ioannou, (1995).  
2.10.11Legal risks 
This‎risk‎ is‎related‎to‎the‎host‎country‟s‎amendments‎ in‎the‎ legal‎system‎during‎the‎project‎
period.  The BOT project success is dependent on finance arrangements and contract 
agreements undertaken to support the project.  Therefore any host country legislation changes 
on environment regulations, tax codes, import restrictions, corporate regulations, and labor 
regulations might challenge the long-term feasibility of a BOT project Dias and Ioannou, 
(1995). 
2.10.12Revenue Risks 
It signifies the exposure faced by investors and lenders caused by the future economic 
conditions, uncertainties of the host country and the realistic demands for the project that 
affect its viability. There are several factors contributing to this exposure according to Dias 
and Ioannou, (1995). Include: 
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Economic 
 Economic policies changes 
 Fluctuations in exchange rate  
 Foreign currency convertibility 
 Interest rate variation 
 Inflation 
Demand 
 Error in prediction of demands for service 
 Variation in demand of the facility or product over concession period due to economic 
recessions, competing facilities, etc. 
 Accurateness of demand with the existing products or facilities 
 Growth forecasts and demand reliability 
 Competing facilities battling for tariff 
 Social suitability of user pay policy 
 Low historical service pricing 
 Failure to earn revenues from principal (end user) 
2.10.13 Promoting Risks 
 Lack of expertise 
 Shortage of independent management 
 Lack of experienced labour 
 Negotiation skills 
 Weak financing 
 Failure to allocate risks to suitable management 
 Failure to  specify effective functions for the promoting team members 
2.10.14 Procurement Risks 
Several‎ projects‎ proposed‎during‎ the‎ 1980‟s‎ by‎many‎governments‎ did‎ not‎ advance to the 
procurement phase leaving many potential promoters concerned about the true advantages of 
pursuing infrastructure projects. Promoters risks of these types of projects 
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 Long tendering and expensive process 
 Changes to the project specifications 
 Lack of information reliability during the tendering process 
 Impracticable expectations of the principal due to lack of experience and experts 
 Concession granting delays 
 Innovative ideas not being adopted by the principal 
 Protection of intellectual rights 
2.10.15 Development Risks 
 Inadequate standards and specifications 
 Incompatible existing services and facilities 
 Incomplete scope of the design  
 Delays approving the design  
 Short design period 
 Change in design during construction 
 Excessive cost of development  
 Use of technology unfit for the economy or structure of host country. 
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2.11 Important factors for the success of BOT projects 
Rockart (1982), defined critical success factors, (CSF's), as "those few key areas of activity 
wherein favorable results are necessary for a particular manager to achieve their own goals, 
in‎ that‎ limited‎ number‎ of‎ areas‎ where‎ 'things‎ must‎ go‎ right'”.‎ Rowlison (1999) cited in 
Jefferies et al. (2002) recognizes that critical success factors require constant attention and 
operate‎ during‎ the‎ life‎ of‎ the‎ project‟.‎ They‎ consist‎ of‎ specific‎ issues‎ which‎ must‎ be‎
maintained for cooperation to occur in an effective and efficient way.  
BOT projects have been considered by many authors, who have suggested particular factors 
which they believe to be vital to their success. Tam (1999) researched the reasons for 
successes and failures behind application of BOT in Asia.  Tam concluded that in the case a 
BOT project is property managed, this results in a win-win scenario and both parties can 
benefit.  However, a failure of a BOT project will cause losses and discourage investors from 
investing in any similar projects and eventually from investing in the country itself. Tam 
credited failure to the factors of the shortage of competition and lack of transparency in the 
process‎of‎selecting‎the‎concessionaire,‎and‎by‎the‎government‎generously‎allowing‎“safety‎
nets”‎ to‎the‎concessionaire, low equity to debt ratio, inefficient processes and management 
mistakes of the concessionaire, repeated strong public opposition and change of ownership of 
the concession company during short period. 
Change in the ownership of the concession company is not an uncommon problem; majority 
of members of the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) are not investment companies, but trading 
companies who use the BOT framework as a means to create projects and workload, instead 
of a long term investment vehicle.  Therefore, when long term financing replaces short term 
loans, it gives opportunity to set investments at a profit to the secondary market.  Likewise, 
when the project has reached a stable income cash flow state, it offers a prospect for selling 
the investment in the project at a profit and increases gains. It is crucial that project sponsors 
are aware of this when selecting a bidder, as now the project sponsors will be dealing with 
new investors during the life of the project.  Many BOT projects have contract clauses which 
stipulate that the SPV members cannot put up their own investment for sale before a specific 
period after project completion, and the facility enters the occupancy phase.  The World Bank 
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has presented reasons for delays in many partnered infrastructure projects ; unclear 
government objectives and commitment, broad gap between private and public sector 
expectations, complexity of decision making, inadequately defined sector policies, poor 
regulatory/legal structure, bad risk management, inadequate local capital markets, low 
integrity of government policies, inadequate mechanisms to attract private sources for long-
term finance at reasonable rates, poor competition, and lack of transparency .  
(Tiong, 1996), specified six critical success factors, CSFs, (valid project identification  
through entrepreneurship and leadership, of advantages technical solution, strength of 
consortium, differentiation of the financial package, and differentiation on guarantees), 
which, if given continued and special attention by the promoters, will increase probability of 
a successful outcome. 
Research was carried out by Jefferies et al. (2002) on the way in which public clients can 
obtain and successfully run Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) projects. Jefferies has used 
a case study of an Australian sports stadium project and specified the critical success factors, 
CSFs as: wealth of experience; strong consortium with a considerable expertise; good 
reputation and high profile; an effective process of approval to help stakeholders by 
providing an agreed time frame; and finally the methods of finance and innovation achieved 
by the consortium 
Qiao et al. (2001) considered eight independent critical success factors, CSFs, in BOT 
projects which had been conducted in China, these critical success factors,‎CSF‟s consist of: 
accurate identification of the product, a stable economic and political situation, acceptable 
toll tariff levels attractive financial package, reasonable risk allocation, management control, 
a good choice of appropriate subcontractors, and the necessary transfer of technology. On the 
other hand, (Li et al. 2004), showed three factors to be of greatest importance when 
developing successful UK PFI/PPP projects. These are: a strong private consortium, a good 
financial market and appropriate allocation of the risks. 
The next section will present some of the successful and unsuccessful BOT projects in a 
number of countries, this will show why and how these projects worked and the problems 
occurred in the process: 
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2.12 BOT Projects Worldwide. 
Successful BOT projects will be discussed, together with unsuccessful projects, identifying 
good practice and the major causes of failure.  The BOT projects that have been successful 
had a keen focus on the BOT programme goals by all parties concerned, with clearly defined 
and agreed responsibilities. 
2.12.1 Unsuccessful BOT Projects  
Unfortunately, many projects in Asia have not achieved their aims. This may be due to 
governments taking on project expenses and risks, or projects being abandoned altogether. 
There are usually four main categories of problem: an initial lack of agreement between the 
government and society concerning the use of Public Private Partnerships in projects within 
the public sector; the inability of the government to identify basic aims and reasons for  the 
use‎of‎ ‎Public‎Private‎Partnerships‎in‎the‎projects;‎the‎‎government‟s‎ inclination‎to‎obtain‎a‎
consensus with investors, while failing to carry out the necessary detailed research or 
identifying a clear, competitive process for project bidding; and finally the willingness of 
governments to share costs and risks usually borne by the sponsors within the private sector.  
2.12.1.1  Pakistan's Hub Power Project 
In 1985, the first BOT project undertaken in Pakistan commenced was the construction of a 
1,300 megawatt oil-fired power generation project costing 1.8 billion US dollars. It was 
encouraged by strong support from the World Bank.  However, the environment was hardly 
conducive for such a large project since the country suffered from constant political 
instability, and was very weak financially.  There was also an inadequate legal system to 
resolve problems and disputes.  According to Handley (1997) the continuous conflicts were 
symptomatic of the lack of consensus regarding the project's objectives, and the way in which 
these were to be achieved, resulted in a nine-year delay before the start of the concession.  
Consequently, the first of the four power generation units were not put into operation until the 
middle of 1996. 
Over the last twenty-five years, the political climate in Pakistan has remained a hurdle to 
initiating BOT infrastructure projects.  Difficulties include, as well as Political instability, a 
long tendering process, law and order enforcement and terrorism. 
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Due to long delays and the high environmental risks involved, the government of Pakistan 
absorbed most of the risk from the Hub Power BOT project.  The government had taken out a 
$582 million US loan from the World Bank to finance the project and also had to take 
considerable participation equity as well as guaranteeing power off-take agreements and fuel 
supplies, and also providing protection against the risk of any fluctuations in the foreign 
exchange rates.  The Pakistani government was also directly accountable to the World Bank 
and‎ to‎ the‎ foreign‎ government‎ agency‟s‎ financial‎ obligations‎ to‎ the‎ project.‎ According‎ to‎
Handley (1997) these together comprised 70% of the total cost of the project, while the total 
investments from the private sector were very limited.  
A question often asked about the Hub Power Project is whether, had it been smaller, it would 
have been developed more rapidly. The best answer that can be given is: probably -so long as 
there was an associated reduction in the complexity as this, after all, was Pakistan's first BOT 
infrastructure project. 
2.12.1.2 Malaysia's Power Project 
A similar problem existed for Malaysia BOT projects, where power generation projects were 
also constructed within a weak industrial framework. In 1992 the government gave a number 
of concessions to various sponsors, and the monopoly power of the state, Tenaga Negara 
Bhd., signed power purchase contracts with each of them. Although this considerably sped up 
the construction of the power generation facility, the government had instructed Tenaga to 
pay private plant-gate producers prices that were about the same as Tenaga's sales to the 
public. This meant that the profitable Tenaga Company was providing private power to 
customers free of charge, yet had to pay the private concessionaires for more than Tenaga's 
own costs of production. When the capacity to produce national power far outran 
requirements in 1995, this became a major problem, due to growth by both Tenaga and the 
producers. As noted by Walker and Smith (1995) Tenaga had an excess power supply and 
also‎an‎obligation‎to‎buy‎the‎independent‎producers‟‎supplies‎of‎the‎power,‎so‎had‎to‎lessen‎
the supply of power from its plants, which further reduced its own profits and caused serious 
conflicts.  
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2.12.1.3 Indonesia's Toll Road Project 
In 1995 in Jakarta, Indonesia, a number of urban toll roads were constructed using the BOT 
concept. The government offered nineteen sections of proposed toll roads across Java. 
However,‎ the‎ government‟s‎ failure‎ to‎ address‎ two‎main‎ issues‎ has‎made‎ the‎ deals‎ and‎ the‎
projects‟‎environment‎commercially‎unattractive. 
The main obstacle to success was the government's inability to enforce the user-pays basis on 
which the agreement was based. The setting of the tolls and any increases were the legal right 
of the Indonesian President, and the government was of the opinion that, although an increase 
might be pledged in principle, it could not be guaranteed by the contract. This did not cause a 
problem for private Jakarta toll roads, since they were constructed by companies managed 
and‎owned‎by‎President‎Suharto‟s‎children‎who‎easily‎obtained‎approval‎for‎increases‎in‎the‎
toll whenever they requested them, with the exception of one request in 1995, which was 
countered by a very rare public attack on the Indonesian parliament, resulting in a long delay 
before the increase was finally approved. This is a very good example of the political nature 
of the setting of toll rates. 
For this reason, the British company, Trafalgar House, spent the six years, (1988 to 1994), 
negotiating‎ a‎ concession‎ contract‎ for‎ a‎ Java‎ country‎ toll‎ road.‎ This‎ resulted‎ in‎ Trafalgar‟s‎
acceptance‎ of‎ the‎ President‟s‎ record‎ of‎ support for existing concessions, and enabled the 
financing of the project. However, the six years spent on negotiation was more than the time 
it would have taken to construct the road. 
As noted by Handley (1997) a further issue challenging the ability of the government to 
create commercially feasible concessions for sections of the cross-Java highway is their 
insistence that all land acquisitions should be funded by the sponsors, but that the acquired 
land will belong to the state. Since land acquisition is a lengthy and somewhat unpredictable 
process, potential private investors in Jakarta considered the risks to be much too high for 
their involvement. 
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2.12.1.4 India's Power Project 
In 1996, negotiations for construction of the 1,000 megawatt Cogentrix, power project 
costing 1.1 billion US dollars, in Mangalore were delayed by four years, partly due to public 
resistance‎ and‎ bureaucratic‎ infighting,‎ and‎ also‎ to‎ the‎ government‟s‎ constant‎ efforts‎ to‎
renegotiate the price and other specifications. Having initially defined the price and 
specifications,‎ and‎ acquired‎ agreement‎ from‎ the‎ sponsors,‎ the‎ government‎ „moved‎ the‎
goalposts‟‎by‎creating‎tougher‎requirements.‎It‎continually‎gave,‎and‎then‎withdrew,‎the‎offer‎
of crucial guarantees regarding payments for the sale of power. This problem illustrates a 
lack of agreement within the government regarding the aim of a BOT project, which was to 
simply obtain power generation capacity, privately financed and at a sensible price. Further 
negotiations revealed a new concern regarding the acceptable profitability level for 
concession holders. As Handley (1997) points out, this was a deviation from the main 
purpose of the use of the BOT model in the production of a power supply. 
 
2.12.1.5 Malaysia's North-South Highway Project 
In Malaysia, the first successfully completed BOT privatization project was the 1,000 km 
North to South Highway, which runs down the western side of the Malay peninsula from the 
Thai border in the north to Singapore in the south and links many of the country's newly 
industrialized areas.  The primary reasons were an apparently viable and growing revenue 
stream together with a government willing for development which made this project ideal for 
BOT.  Three hundred and fifty kilometers had already been constructed by the government 
by 1985, but the project had come to a standstill due to the downturn in the economy, with 
some fifty five kilometers still under construction.  After considerable negotiation, 
complicated by political bickering, meant that the concession agreement was not signed until 
1988 for which the managing company was Projek Lebuhraya Utara Selatan PLUS was 
selected. 
However, despite the successful construction of the highway, the government finally picked 
up much of the costs. The BOT contractor was to complete the road, after almost half the had 
been completed by a state-owned company at a cost of three billion ringgit, ($1 billion US).  
Although there was open bidding for the project in 1985, it was granted to the third placed 
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bidder rather than the highest bidder, because this company had connections with the ruling 
political party, even though the two higher bidders had provided better terms for the total cost 
of construction, the requirements for finance from government and also the required 
concession period and toll rate, ensuring that the original terms of reference focused on the 
primary aims of the BOT process. 
The resulting legal dispute mentioned above delayed the final signing of the contract by two 
years, until March 1988, within which time it would have been possible for the government 
itself to have made significant progress in the development of the road. Another serious 
problem was arranging finance, which took extra time since international banks were 
reluctant to fund a limited-recourse BOT company. The government therefore supplied a 
subsided loan of 1,650 million ringgit, ($522 million US) which amounted to about half of 
the predicted costs. The road was finally completed in 1993, at a cost of 6,000 million ringgit, 
($1.9 billion US), for the part constructed by PLUS, far higher than estimated.  Therefore 
according to Handley (1997) the government had established the need to continue its' 
involvement in the finance and subsidy for PLUS, including an unplanned toll increase in 
order to assist the financing of the project. 
 
2.12.1.6 Indonesia's Power Project 
The 1988 power project in Indonesia began on a private basis involving secret negotiations 
that produced a number of false starts. This was because the companies involved in the 
negotiations at the outset were changed for commercial and political reasons.  The name of 
the power project was the Paiton project and the sponsors were changed twice, until, in 1992, 
there were serious negotiations with the Mission Energy Corporation, Paiton's major sponsor. 
The Paiton project experienced a very long gestation phase but also contracted at a high 
power price. As Tiong (1995) states the main result was a seven-year delay before the 
commencement of an urgently needed power plant. The Paiton power BOT project proved 
very costly and involved high risk, so it was not considered by Indonesian private sponsors or 
by Indonesian commercial banks. For this reason the project was considered by foreign 
government institutions. The total financial package was $1.9 billion US and, of this, $900 
million US were provided by the Export-Import Bank, and a further $200 million US were 
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received from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in the USA. The commercial 
banks actually provided only $274 million US of the total and the foreign governmental 
institutions covered the insurance loan. This high level of involvement by foreign 
governments put the onus for success on the Indonesian government. 
According to Walker and Smith (1995) short-term equity risks were taken out on the project 
by the sponsors, and it was apparently agreed that Mission Energy of the United States, the 
main investor, would recover most of its equity by means of fees which it would charge for 
project management, including a large payment at the commissioning of the plant.  A further 
main stakeholder, the provider of the power plant itself, was sponsored by United States 
Exim Bank credits, ensuring a low risk on equipment sales. The main fuel provider to Paiton, 
a relative of the President, was in fact the key Indonesian partner, (the third main 
shareholder). When the plant was commissioned, the plan was to float the company on the 
stock exchange in order to reduce the sponsor's risk.  The result of this was that, by the time 
the plant was operational, the main sponsors would have almost covered all their equity 
exposure risk.  Also, the main burden of risk would be on local governments and foreign 
financial institutions which, in the event of default, would be forced to rely on the Indonesian 
government to meet the losses.   
The Indonesian government failed to remain focused on the goal of the project which was to 
obtain the cheapest and most efficient supply of electric power for the country.  The 
Indonesian government insisted that Paiton built additional facilities not in the original 
contract, use specific contractors and to purchase equipment from certain designated 
companies.  In meeting these requirements Paiton was prevented from pursuing the most 
efficient development/construction of the plant thus forcing it to increase capital costs by an 
estimated $200 million US.   The result was that to make the project commercially viable, for 
a BOT, project, the electricity prices had to be set at an uncompetitively high level, further 
making the concessions and financing negotiations more difficult. 
2.12.1.7 The Channel Tunnel 
In 1984, France & England, decided to commence the construction of the Channel Tunnel 
with each country being responsible for the section of the project located on its' own land 
according to their geographical terminals.  The contracting organization, Transmanche Link, 
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(TML), (made up of five French contractors and five British contractors), won the contract 
and Eurotunnel was declared the owner of the 55-year concession in 1986. 
 The basic problems that contributed to the delay in starting construction of the Channel 
Tunnel were that the lending institutions had a general distrust of contractors, which was not 
aided by the contractors lack of strong representation in the initial stages of the project and 
led to a "gap" in communication and understanding between the construction group and the 
financial bankers. 
The construction companies did not acquire sufficient design criteria on which to base a 
realistic budget due to the exclusion of qualified experts in some disciplines and the lack of 
cooperation from both the English and French governments, when strong direction was 
required, just compounded the problems. 
The funding for the project was: $2.3 Billion (TML $71.58 million, 40 Banks $313.74 
million, French Bank $663 million, another investors $1.252 billion) with a debt of $12.6 
Billion, giving a Total cost of $ 14.9 billion). 
The two governments accepted only the legal risks and will pay for the overrun in operating 
costs due to the changes in legislations whereas TML had taken on all the other types of 
project risks 
Regarding management disputes, only three large claims were presented by the contractor. 
The first claim involved unforeseen subsurface conditions, the second claim dealt with a 
request for an increase in the lump sum portion of the contract related to the U.K terminal 
building and other surface structures, and the third claim involved the cost of fixed 
equipment-such as the ventilation and electrical work. 
The first and second claims were settled. But in the third claim, the contractors wanted to 
increase the fixed equipment budget by $1.071 billion US. The Disputes Resolution board, 
(DRB), determined that the owner, (Eurotunnel), is to advance $85 million per month to 
TML. 
The Channel Tunnel was opened for traffic on 6th May, 1994 and it was not until April 2008 
that the first profit, ($1.6 million US), was recorded for the whole of 2007, after debt 
restructuring‎from‎€9.2‎billion‎Euros‎to‎€4.2‎billion.‎(Ahmed, 2003; BBC, 2008). 
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2.12.2 Successful BOT projects 
2.12.2.1 Eastern Harbor Crossing – Hong Kong 
Handley (1997) reports on a successful BOT project, which was the second tunnel under the 
eastern harbor in Hong Kong. It was built by a BOT project method with a concession period 
of 30 years duration and was similar to other BOT projects in that the contract did not include 
a return on investment target. The government had already acquired experience of managing 
BOT projects previously and equity was decreased to 7.5% for the project. The Executive 
council, which considers the average rate of return on investment in the region, was to decide 
the toll rates and any future increases.  However, with the advance of democracy, decisions 
on the toll increase were often delayed by elected members of the legislative council, whose 
main concern was their constituents' interests. After the tunnel had been officially opened in 
1989, it was decided to postpone requests for toll rises until 1997 because Hong Kong would 
be handed over to the People's Republic of China. Fortunately, there was an arbitration 
statement included within the BOT agreement and after referring it to arbitration in 1998, a 
toll increase for the franchisee was successfully obtained. This emphasizes the need for an 
equitable and established legal system for BOT projects. Despite this, toll rates have still 
proved to be problematic for this project. Although the design and development of the project 
were carried out on time and within budget, the traffic predictions were overestimated and the 
suggestion of increasing the toll rates was not approved by government legislation. There was 
also unwillingness for increases because of the political effect. 
2.12.2.2 Western Harbor crossing – Hong Kong 
This Hong Kong project began in 1993 and ended in 1997.  The tunnel was finished early and 
within the specified budget.  However, for this BOT project, a new contract condition was 
included and the government, not being a shareholder, was unable to supervise operations.  It 
had been the practice in previous BOT arrangements for the toll rates, the periods of toll 
adjustment, and their level to be agreed between the government and the sponsors and to be 
authorized by the legislative council.  The only factor taken into consideration for each toll 
rise should be the rate of return on investment.  However, the problem with this is that the 
legislative council is mainly concerned with serving the public, but the tunnel shareholders 
are motivated solely by profit resulting in a lack of agreement between them on many 
occasions.  An example of this concern are the negotiations of the toll rise on the Tate's Cairn 
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Tunnel, (Hong Kong), and the Eastern Harbour Crossing, (Hong Kong),  which dragged on 
for several years and therefore placed investors at risk.  When Hong Kong regained its 
sovereignty‎ in‎ 1997,‎ the‎ government‟s‎ negotiating‎ power‎ was‎ undermined‎ and‎ it‎ was‎
compelled to agree to an arrangement of an alternative toll rise.  The new BOT agreement 
defines the maximum and minimum annual income, as well as the amount of toll rise and the 
time periods of toll adjustment. In order to collect the excess annual income which can then 
be fed back into the project and thus delay or prevent a toll rise, a government-operated toll 
stabilizing fund was created.  The advantage of which is that, if the annual income falls 
within the range between the maximum and minimum, any toll rise would be based on an 
automatic toll modification mechanism thus preventing any influence of government on 
business decisions. 
It is therefore possible, as noted by (Walker and Smith, 1995), for a practical agreement to 
protect‎ investors‟‎ interests‎while‎also‎providing‎a‎competitive‎rate‎when‎the‎ facility‎ is‎used‎
under appropriate tendering procedures. It can also, perhaps most importantly, protect against 
the secret influence of politicians in the running of the business. 
2.12.2.3 Dartford Bridge, Kent UK. 
It became apparent to the UK government that an additional crossing over the River Thames 
was needed in the early eighties.  The route through the existing Dartford Tunnel was 
straining to maintain a smooth flow of traffic, as it was originally designed for 65,000 
vehicles per day and by 1991, over a 100,000 vehicles were using the tunnel per day with 
queues of over 5 kilometers in both directions.  By 1986, a deal was signed between the 
Department of Transport and a consortium led by Trafalgar House for a bridge with an 
estimated cost of £184 million Sterling.  The deal followed an extensive period of discussion 
and indecision.  From the original eight contract companies, three were short-listed, 
(Trafalgar House, Mowlem and Balfour Beatty), all three proposed a tunnel solution, 
however, Trafalgar house also proposed an alternative cable stayed bridge option and it was 
this option which eventually won the day.  There were allegations by one of the unsuccessful 
bidders that the Department of Transport had changed the rules a week, or so, before the 
deadline to make the bridge option more feasible.   
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The new bridge will double the capacity of the existing crossing to 130,000 vehicles per day.  
[This project was particularly important as is set the scene for further BOT infrastructure 
projects in the UK, i.e. The second River Severn Crossing and the Birmingham North Relief 
Road].  Construction started in August 1988, and the bridge was opened to traffic in October 
1991, on time and within budget. 
The concession was unique in that not only did the private company operate the bridge but 
also the existing tunnels for the period of the concession, including paying off the debt of £55 
million Sterling carried by the Kent and Essex County Councils.  The agreement also has a 
provision for a variable concession period for the bridge with the maximum set at twenty 
years but the tunnels will be handed back to the government as soon as the debt charges and 
costs have been recovered.  However, the costs for construction and maintenance had been 
recovered by 2003 but the government has not yet stated any intentions to remove the tolls 
and has in fact been increasing the tolls regularly over the last few years in the present 
economic climate. The Dartford Bridge must represent one of the best potential BOT 
infrastructure successes. 
2.13  Discussion of Successful and "Unsuccessful" projects 
The "unsuccessful" projects are considered to be "unsuccessful" not because the project was 
not built and completed but because of the difficulties encountered during the different 
project stages which resulted in delays, (in years) and cost over runs, (in $ billions). 
Unsuccessful‎BOT‎projects‎ have‎ a‎ high‎ impact‎ on‎ the‎ host‎ country‟s‎ credibility,‎ economy‎
and development.  Hence, a transparent legal framework, attentive to risk management, 
should be developed to manage all stages of the BOT project cycle.       
Comparing successful BOT against unsuccessful projects clearly shows the importance of the 
realization of an agreement between all involved parties that leading to a clear and stable 
legal structure.  Therefore, a well prepared project assessment bid that provides sensible 
equity to debt ratios and reasonable cost estimates is crucial for the project and to maintain 
confidence with all parties concerned; -otherwise the private investors may consider the BOT 
infrastructure project to be unduly risky.    
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BOT Projects in Kuwait have had many of the difficulties described in the above projects 
with some investors submitting high offers without realistically considering the risks.  The 
main obstacles facing any new BOT Infrastructure project is the stability of the Kuwaiti 
government and transparency in the financial and tendering processes and Law 7 of 2008 was 
introduced to address the need for transparency during the tendering process and awarding 
stages of the project, and was to ensure that companies complied fully with the Law, (Alduaij 
2010).  This indicates the serious intention of the Kuwaiti government to implement 
privatization policy and to involve the private sector in the implementation and development 
of projects and services. 
Other possible delays, including the change in design, are due to the workforce going on 
strike because of the onerous working conditions, low wages and long working hours. 
 
2.14 Public Private Partnerships and the Kuwaiti Government Approach 
towards B. O. T Projects 
In the West, it seems that private sector organizations  perform more efficiently than those in 
the public sector  Most countries count amongst their objectives, less government control 
over the economy, the need to attract foreign technology and expertise and more efficiency 
and greater competition. This also applies to Kuwait, but there is a pressing need to 
encourage an increase in activity in the economy and to attract local capital. This would 
hopefully result in greater efficiency in the provision of services in Kuwait, and would also 
benefit all of Kuwait since government spending would be used more effectively. 
Kuwait's government's first official step towards public private partnerships began shortly 
after the liberation of the country from Saddam Hussein's regime‟.‎ ‎ Although‎ this‎ was‎
Government's first official step, the Kuwait Investment Authority, (KIA), had already 
commenced a huge sale of Government shareholdings of 48 companies in 1986 on the behalf 
of the Kuwaiti Government.  On 1st September 1991, the Government decided during a 
cabinet meeting to encourage the private sector to participate in constructional development 
Kuwaiti Government Cabinet meeting No 25/1991 hence, the Government sent out general 
directions to carry out this goa1 Kuwaiti Government Cabinet decision No. 5/17.  
Subsequently, in October, 1991, the cabinet decided to form a special committee to prepare a 
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general study on public private partnerships; Kuwaiti Government Cabinet decision No. 4 on 
20th Oct 1991.  The Government was very keen to set and implement a public private 
partnership plan as soon as possible.  The objective of this plan was to achieve essential 
improvements in the performance of the public service sector.  Some of the improvements 
fundamentally needed as proclaimed by the Government were the reduction of the financial 
and administrative burden, enhancement of the performance and productivity of manpower, 
creating new sources of income and the implementation of new technology Al-Otaibi,( 2008).  
. 
2.14.1 Economic Overview 
The economy of Kuwait is a free and open economy, based mainly on crude oil production 
and is one of the most prosperous in the world. 
According to Al-Ghunaim (2007), although today oil and oil products are the main economic 
source,‎at‎one‎time‎Kuwait‟s‎economy depended upon nomadic farming, fishing, seafaring, 
boat-building and, in particular, pearl diving. 
Once the huge oil reserves in Kuwait was discovered, oil and the industry connected with it, 
became its main source of revenue.  These large reserves of crude oil make Kuwait one of the 
richest countries in the world with the highest annual per capita income.  Its gross domestic 
product, (GDP), is about $43.7 billion, which grows at a rate of 5% per annum and the 
economy is based on petroleum, which makes up 90% of its total exports.  
Almost‎7.8%‎of‎the‎world‟s‎crude‎oil‎reserves,‎about‎104‎billion‎barrels,‎are‎in‎Kuwait‎and‎it‎
also has 21.2% of the GCC crude oil reserves.  This is the next largest to Saudi Arabia, 
among the GCC countries.  If the current rate of production, about 2.613 million barrels per 
day, continues, the oil stocks should last for about 109 years.  Petroleum accounts for 95% of 
export earnings, 50% of GDP and provides 80% of government revenue.  Due to the climate, 
agricultural development is limited and so, apart from fish, most food is imported Almost 
75% of the drinking water has to be imported.  
During the years 2003–2008 the global demand for oil enabled the economy of Kuwait to 
move forward and build budget and trade surpluses, as well as foreign reserves. A decline 
followed in 2009 as oil prices fell and production was reduced.  
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2.14.2 Overview of the Macro economy 
Growth 
Between 2007 and 2008 the nominal GDP of Kuwait increased by 41.5% from US $111.76 
billion to US$158.09 billion.  This was due mainly to strong oil prices and the high volume of 
oil exports as well as increased foreign investment. 
It was predicted that the GDP would decline by -32.8% to $106.21 billion in 2009 and then 
increase again by 14.1% to $121.2 billion in 2010.  In fact the GDP increased by 6.3% in 
2008 compared with 2.5% growth in 2007. There was then a predicted decrease of -1.1% in 
2009.  However further growth of 2.4% was predicted for 2010. 
 
Figure ‎2-4 Inflation 
 
During the years 2000– 2004, the inflation rate within the Kuwait economy remained low 
within the range 0.8% – 1.6%. However, this was followed by an increase.  As the result of a 
salary increase for employees in Kuwait as well as a fluctuation in currency and an increasing 
demand for food and housing, consumer price inflation increased to 10.5% in 2008 an 
increase of 5% over 2007. In May 2007, it was decided to de-peg the Kuwaiti Dinar from the 
US Dollar and re-peg it to a group of currencies. A decline in inflation to 6% in 2009 and 
4.8% in 2010 was predicted. 
2.14.3 Fiscal Position 
Following a global boom in the oil industry, the fiscal surplus stood at 32% of GDP in 2008 
compared to a surplus of 29.3% of GDP in 2007.  This, coupled with strong oil resulted in 
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large budget surpluses.  The surplus was predicted to plunge sharply to 2.3% in 2009 and to 
3.5% of GDP in 2010.  In order to provide funds in the future when oil revenue will not be 
available, there is a law which states that 10% of the Kuwait income must be placed in a 
special reserve fund. 
 
To understand the reasoning behind the Kuwaiti Government's decision to enter into private 
public partnerships, it is necessary to review the history of the public sector in Kuwait.  This 
will reveal people‟s‎ increasing‎ dependency‎ on‎ Government,‎ (especially‎ in‎ the‎ field‎ of‎
providing public services), since the discovery of oil.  However, first it is necessary to define 
"privatization" as a proper definition of privatization would help to better develop an 
understanding about the discussion carried out on the course of this study.  
Most recently, the rise in world oil prices in 2011 is reviving the country's economic growth.   
The budget revenue has increased by 20%, which has led to higher budget expenditures, 
particularly wage increases for many public sector employees.  Little has been done to 
diversify the economy, partly due to this positive fiscal situation, and also because of the poor 
business climate and the acrimonious relationship that presently exists between the National 
Assembly and the executive branch, which has obstructed economic reforms.  In 2010, 
Kuwait passed an economic development plan that pledges to spend up to $130 billion over 
five years to diversify the economy away from oil, attract more investment, and boost private 
sector participation in the economy. 
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2.14.4 Defining Privatization 
Privatization became a familiar term during the early 1990's, but its' meaning can be more 
easily understood with reference to events taking place in the former Soviet bloc, South 
America, Africa, and/or Asia, where previously state-owned industries were sold to private 
investors.  However, there is a type of privatization, known as limited term privatization or a 
public/private partnership (PPP).  This kind of privatization involves the investment of risk 
capital, which is used in the operation and maintenance, as well as the design and finance, of 
a particular project that can be used by the public for an agreed period of time.  During this 
time, a consortium from the private sector collects revenue from the members of the public 
who use the facility.  At the end of the time of ownership, the consortium returns the facility 
to the host government, having collected enough funds to realize a profit on their original 
investment.  Host governments agree that it is usually the private sector which produces a 
more cost-effective product than can be achieved by the public sector .This is particularly 
noticeable in projects such as power plants, piped water supplies, sanitation and sewage 
works, rail systems, roads, dams, canals, ports, and airports, (Levy 1996). 
In addition, privatization has become a global phenomenon, but the meaning of this term is 
not always fully understood.  It is worth noting that privatization has different meanings in 
terms of what privatization programs can and have been used to do, nonetheless, privatization 
can be defined by illustrating both a narrow and a broader meaning of the term. The more 
restricted sense, privatization suggests that the transfer of control is permanent perhaps 
resulting from the transfer of ownership from a public agency to one or more private parties 
or, perhaps from a capital increase where the public-sector shareholders have waived their 
subscription rights.  The broader definition of enterprise-level privatization however, refers to 
measures resulting in a short-term   transfer to the private sector of activities which had 
previously been managed by a public agency, (Guislain 1998).  Accordingly, privatization 
could therefore mean any of the following: 
1. The provision of services or facilities by the private sector which would usually be 
seen as the responsibility of the public sector.  
2. Moving the production of goods and services from the public to the private sector. 
3. Moving the delivery of Government management and services or transferring 
governmental roles or assets, to the private sector. 
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4. To improve the lack of incentive and initiative in public organizations and to make 
them more efficient by exposing them to private market incentives. 
5. Involving the private sector in the delivery of public services and in the management 
of Government (Higgins 2008). 
Privatization is the transfer to the private sector of tasks and responsibilities including the 
control of costs and revenues. Menheere and Pottatis (1996) refer to privatization as a process 
in which the delivery of goods and service, usually administrated by the government, is 
shifted to the private sector. Privatization is divided into three areas: the setting of 
government services, the subcontracting of government services to private undertakers, and 
the subcontracting of financing and developing public facilities.  
From these definitions, it can be seen that, as well as transferring ownership from the public 
to the private sector, privatization includes a number of additional operations such as: 
subcontracting (in which a private company is contracted to deliver public services such as 
waste collection) or meter reading and billing (e.g., water or electricity).  
Depending on whether management contracts are performance-based there may be no 
transfer or ownership or control, but just a temporary transfer of management responsibility. 
In the case when there is an option to buy included within the lease of state owned 
equipment, assets or enterprises, then the operation may be considered as a divesture.  
This would include lease-and operate contracts within the infrastructure. Lastly, BOT, (Build, 
Operate, and Transfer), contracts, as a new way of concession, are one means of privatization 
but have the effect of a monopoly.   Thus, as seen above in a broader sense, privatization 
could involve any permanent or temporary transfer to a private party of the ownership or 
management of some public agency.  Naturally, each of these actions has to follow a unique 
legal procedure.  For example, transferring the ownership of a public agency in general 
requires a superior procedure where the consent of both the Government and Parliament is 
required.  This would involve the passing of a law as in Kuwait, the UK and France.  
Replacing Government management with a private one requires a less restrictive procedure. 
The usual procedure in this case is that the Government contracts out.  However, in some 
cases like Kuwait, for example, concessions and monopolies, require Parliament consent, 
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hence, a special law must be approve. Whatever was the case may be, it is vital to emphasize 
that any procedures of transference should be legally feasible. 
 Some parts of the public sector such as: the police, the armed forces, and public `powers', (i. 
e. statuary, judiciary and executive powers in some legal systems), could not practicably be 
privatized either because of the vital role it represents. For example, (John Vickers and 
George Yarrow, 1985), argued that: "the net benefit of transferring the ownership of a 
company from public to private hands is often ambiguous, and is unlikely to be very great. 
Although private ownership may result in more dynamic energetic management, there is a 
danger that those energies will not be directed in the public interest when market powers can 
be exploited".  
The danger is greater still when economies of scale are considerable and when barriers for 
entry are high. However, one might disagree and argue that there may be a room for 
privatizing nearly all state functions. In conclusion it seems that, (Bob Watt, 2008) is correct 
when he proposes that: 
The determination of whether an industry is to be `privatized' or `nationalized' is not simple.  
It has to be determined against a range of factors. These include the consideration of several 
aspects which consist of: the resource itself, the method of production, the amount of control 
over how the resource is to be exploited,  the type of working conditions in the industry, 
(health and safety, labour standards, environmental standards); and, the level of Government 
control of strategic management. 
2.14.5 History of the Public Sector 
In Kuwait, the public sector consist of more than fifty ministries, corporations and public 
authorities which all of the Government's affairs.  It is important to note that since the 
discovery of oil in Kuwait in 1934, and subsequent oil production from the Burgan field from 
the 1940s, the Government controlled the primary means of providing people with all of their 
fundamental needs. This included: free health-care, housing, free education, power, 
transportation, marriage bonuses, and employment, and pensions. In fact, nearly all the public 
services were supplied and provided by Government's state owned utilities. It is vital to 
understand that many of these services were either free or provided at a lower rate than the 
actual cost.  Additionally, there is no real taxation system that applies to the citizens of 
 75 
 
Kuwait.  The prosperity that everyone assumed could be seen as a reallocation of wealth,  
(i.e. the oil wealth), however, this situation created an ethos of total reliance and necessitated 
some trust in the Government. Moreover, there was consensus that the Government was the 
guardian of the public interest and therefore obliged to provide all the public's needs. This 
raises the question of how long a Government can sustain this process and how efficient the 
public service sector can be? 
2.14.6 Funding and Maintaining the Public Sector. 
Although, within the Middle East, Kuwait has become one of the richest countries, over time 
it country has faced many crises which have prevented it from accomplishing many 
promising developments.  Two of these crises were the Financial Crises of 1976 and 1982. 
These crises were brought about by illegal transactions in the Financial Market, (Souq Al-
Manakh or Kuwaiti Bourse), which led to a major collapse of the Kuwaiti stock market.  In 
fact, the Government had to intervene and hundreds of millions of dollars were spent 
recovering the market Al-Sultan, (1989). In the autumn of 1979, Kuwait's neighbors Iran and 
Iraq began an aggressive eight-year war.  During that critical time there were fears that Iran 
was planning to conquer the whole region, therefore, Kuwait and some other Gulf countries' 
felt necessary to support Iraq.  The Kuwaiti Government's financial contribution during the 
conflict was at least one billion dollars. Ironically, in August 1990, Iraqi troops invaded 
Kuwait destroying much of its infrastructure, stealing public and private properties and 
burning over 700 oil wells, Al-Ghunaim, (1995).  
Iraqi forces caused extensive damage to the environment as well.  After the conflict, Kuwait 
was in total chaos and reconstruction of Kuwait's infrastructure and recovery of the 
environment was challenging, Al-Faqeer, (1992).  In addition to these crises, there are some 
alarming facts concerning the Government's increases in manpower and Government 
subsidies.  For example, each year the Government pays more than 51% of its income from 
oil in labour costs.  Secondly, the Government subsidizes many Kuwaiti goods and services. 
For‎instance,‎ in‎1994‎the‎Government‎subsidized‎89%‎of‎Kuwait‟s‎electricity,‎and‎71‎%‎of‎
local telephone services.  However, by far the greater part of the Government's subsidies are 
for the commodities of water and electricity, yet the Government pays 5.5 million KD ($16.5 
million US), annually to subsidize food and building infrastructure costs Privatisation Team 
Kuwait, (1996).  
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Generally speaking, the public sector in Kuwait is run by public management (i.e. public 
servants), and governed by traditional public measures.  There are of course, Government 
enterprises with a commercial nature that are governed by private law and subject to private 
law jurisdiction.  Although the public sector in Kuwait is three times the size of the private 
sector, it lacks efficiency and competence.  The reason behind this is the multiple goals 
pursued by the Government. These goals are as follows: 
1. Ensuring national security. promoting social security (i.e. via maximizing 
employment, providing public services at low cost), 
2. Promoting regional development (i.e. infrastructure, transportation, 
telecommunication, promoting the economy, (etc...)), 
3. Government's monopoly policy towards state owned enterprises associated with 
strong system of subsidization.  
With the absence of competitive incentives, the whole operation is measured by quantity and 
not by quality.  Moreover, since the Government subsidizes nearly all of Kuwait's goods and 
services, the entire process is generally unprofitable.  It seems fairly certain that the 
Government could not sustain this process for long which is why it was decided to adopt a 
privatization plan in order to hand some of the public services over to private ownership 
which would also have the capability to fulfil the government's obligations and promote the 
provisions of the public services Ghattas, (2005).  However, there are many methods of 
privatization some of which could be successfully applied to one country that may not 
necessarily work in another.  The success or failure of any particular privatization method is 
subject to the unique social, economic, legal and political composition of each country. 
Hence, each country should avoid a `one-size-fits-all' approach to privatization by assessing 
its' unique needs and by adopting a privatization programme that is most likely to succeed 
within that construct. Therefore, it is of great importance at this point to provide a proper 
definition of privatization in Kuwait. 
2.14.6.1 What can Privatization Offer the Kuwaiti Government? 
The Kuwaiti Government is planning to adopt privatization measures to solve a number of 
serious problems and to achieve a number of important benefits. The most important 
measures are as follows: 
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2.14.6.2 The reduction of the state financial and administrative burden: 
Much effort, time and money has been expended by the Kuwaiti Government in running and 
maintaining the whole of the public sector.  The Government argues that many of public 
services can be carried out privately and so intends to implement privatization in order to use 
the money saved to carry out other fundamental projects such as post-Iraqi invasion 
reconstruction, environmental restoration and more importantly, establishing social 
programmes to rehabilitate society from the devastating impact of the Iraqi invasion. 
Additionally, Government funds are required for economic and infrastructure development, 
Privatisation Directorate Kuwait, (2005). 
2.14.6.3 Creating new sources of income: 
The Government argues that it would be able to impose fees and taxes on companies in order 
to increase the national revenue.  Perhaps the Kuwaiti Government is looking at the high 
financial revenues obtained in different parts of the world after adopting privatization 
programmes, -especially in East Asia and in the Pacific.  For example, between (1990-1999) 
privatization led to a high level of redistribution of wealth primarily in Malaysia, (43%), and 
Indonesia, (26%).  It is worth noting that despite the slowdown in the pace of privatizat ion 
due to the 1997 Asian crises, the total revenue have increased remarkably from US$0.38 
billion in 1990 to US$2.55billion in 1999, Boubakri and Cosset,(2004). 
2.14.6.4 Enhancement of the performance and productivity of manpower: 
Privatization programs could also provide a good opportunity for improvement in the 
performance and productivity of manpower.  Due to the competitive environment that 
privatization may offer, national employees would have an opportunity to receive better 
training and supervision from multinational companies.  For example, in terms of 
performance a study conducted by Boubakri and Cosset (2011) showed significant 
performance improvements for seventy-nine newly privatized firms from twenty-one 
countries. The authors documented a higher increase in performance as measured by 
profitability, efficiency, output and investment.  
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2.14.6.5  Privatization would help to improve the quality of services and simplify the 
procedures for accessing services: 
New techniques can be implemented as technological and multidimensional capabilities can 
be used.  More importantly, Government routine, bureaucracy and complicated procedures 
could be eradicated.  Simpler procedures could be adopted allowing easy access to public 
services and facilities.  The experiences of the Mobile Telecommunication Company (MTC), 
(now known as Zain), was the Middle East's first mobile phone company. MTC was 
established in Kuwait in 1983 as a monopoly with Government holding shares of 24.8%. The 
company later expanded its' major operations to more than nineteen Middle Eastern and 
African countries, MTC Report Feb, (2006).  The Wataniva Telecommunication Company, 
(WTC), Kuwait's first privately owned Phone Company which was launched in December 
1999, are examples of the improvement in quality in telecommunication services in Kuwait 
as the competition between two major companies using advanced technology led to better 
service, lower prices and created more job opportunities.  
2.14.6.6 Investors 
A large amount of national capital has been invested outside Kuwait.  For example, 
approximately $50 billion US has been invested in different parts of the world, due mainly to 
the insecure investment environment in Kuwait.  Kuwait is not exporter of capital. 
Implementing privatization programs would create many generous and profitable 
opportunities which would attract many local and foreign investors providing more and better 
opportunities to participate in the Kuwaiti economy Privatisation Team Kuwait, (1996). 
2.14.6.7 International markets 
It is argued that privatization encourages national companies to compete in international 
markets in order to gain and obtain the required proficiency. In this respect national 
companies will be pushed to a higher level of efficiency in order compete with international 
companies Privatisation Team Kuwait, (1996).  
2.14.6.8 Helps to create new job opportunities 
It is also argued that privatization may attract national and international companies which 
could offer real job opportunities and lift off some of the burden from the Government side 
Privatisation Team Kuwait, (1996). These are some of the most important goals the Kuwaiti 
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Government is seeking to achieve through privatization. Nonetheless, although most 
technical assessments of the outcome of privatization are generally positive, public 
perceptions of privatization, especially in transitional and developing economics, are 
generally negative, Birdsall and Nellis, (2002).  Kuwait is no exception as the public 
perception of privatization is not encouraging.  The dominant role of the Kuwaiti 
Government over the public-service sector and the people's total reliance on Government to 
provide these services at subsidized prices tends to make people very reluctant to consider 
any other type of program that would take away these privileges from them. 
2.14.6.9 Status of the Private Sector 
Within Kuwait the private sector is mainly made up of finance, insurance, construction, 
fishing, agriculture, automobile and business equipment imports, hotels, restaurants and retail 
outlets.  In addition, the private sector has developed some BOT projects, including housing 
provision for the National Housing Authority, (NHA).  Other projects were carried out on the 
same basis for the Touristic Enterprises Company, (TEC) the Directorate General of Civil 
Aviation, a waste water treatment reclamation plant for Ministry of Public Works, and a 
petrochemical plant.  Some areas of the private sector have grown rapidly over recent years.  
These areas include Internet services and mobile phone companies.  Despite this growth, the 
public sector still dominates over the relatively small private sector. In fact the GDP of the 
private sector is about one-third that of the public sector. This dominance of the public sector, 
according to a survey by the Kuwait University and the World Bank is the main obstacle to 
the introduction of Small and Medium Enterprises, (SMEs), Webster, (2002).  
2.14.6.10 BOT Law in Kuwait 
The BOT method has been increasingly used in Kuwait to finance power, real estate and 
transport projects as well as for infrastructure.  The models on which it had already been 
tested were projects such as the Sharq and Marina Mall retail/marina developments, the 
Sulaibiya Waste Water Treatment and Reclamation Plant and the Salmiya Market.   
However, by the end of 2006, the government departments Audit Bureau had raised concerns 
about the fairness of methods of awarding BOT contracts and also concerning certain 
irregularities in the way they were implemented and so any further BOT projects were 
suspended. To resolve this problem, a ministerial committee, the Audit Bureau, was formed 
with the purpose of reviewing all BOT projects granted to the private sector by four of the 
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main government bodies: the Finance Ministry, the Public Customs Department, the Touristic 
Enterprises Company and the Public Authority for Industry. While the committee carried out 
their reviews, all work on new BOT projects was suspended. Resulting from   the problems 
that the State Audit Bureau identified in its report, Law No. 7 of 2008 was passed in January 
of‎that‎year.‎‎It‎was‎known‎as‎the‎„BOT‎and‎its‎purpose‎was‎to‎formulate‎a‎structure‎for‎the‎
Kuwait BOT model.  The law prevented any government body from entering into a BOT 
agreement involving state-owned land unless they had first obtained the prior approval of a 
„supreme‎committee‟‎which‎would‎be‎chaired‎by‎the‎Minister‎of‎Finance‎and‎would‎include‎
certain other ministers, including the Minister of Public Works and the Minister of 
Municipality as well as senior administrators, such as the head of the environmental 
authority.  The purpose of the committee was to establish BOT policy and then review and 
issue approvals.  It also was responsible for administering a technical sub-committee whose 
remit was to co-ordinate the technical aspects of all reviews.  Within the new law, BOT 
projects were to be limited to duration of 30 years, after which they would be handed back to 
the State "without any consideration and compensation".  For certain special cases, this 
lifespan may be extended to 40 years but this had to be planned in advance and contained in 
the original documentation rather than as an extension to the original plans during operation.  
A year before the return of the project to the government, bids for the management contract 
of the particular asset could be invited but would be limited to a period of up to 10 years.  
The project would be compelled to use a Kuwaiti joint stock company in which 40% of the 
shares would have to be offered in public auction either to companies approved by the 
supreme committee or listed on the securities market. A further 50% would be offered for 
public subscription to Kuwaiti citizens. The final 10% would be sold to the company 
implementing the project.  Further regulations supporting the new law have not yet been 
issued, but they will be concerned with the tendering and advertisement processes to be 
followed and also the method in which financial compensation would be provided to 
investors. 
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2.15 Mega Projects in Kuwait from 2010 to 2014 
2.15.1.1 Overview of the Five-Year Plan  
After the beginning of the recession, which began in 2008, there was a call to revive the 
economy of Kuwait and, in an historic event, the Kuwaiti national assembly approved their 
first plan since 1986 and this was a development plan up to the year 2013/14. Within the 
plan, 1,100 projects (including many Mega Projects) were approved with spending estimated 
at KD37bn, (US$125bn), and including both oil and non-oil projects. Some of these projects 
are shown in below:  
 82 
 
  
 Project Name Estimated Value (KD) 
Shadadiyah University Campus 1,597 B 
Silk City 25 B 
Khairan Residential City 1,828,863 
Kuwait International Airport Expansion Plan- New 
Passenger Terminal Two 
212 M 
Kuwait International Airport Expansion – 
Infrastructure 
150 M 
National Rail Network and a Metro system 4 M 
Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah Bridge 750 M 
Bubiyan Island Development 345 M 
Failaka Island Development 120 M 
Renovation and beautification of downtown Kuwait 20 M 
Develop and beautification of Sulaibikhat Beach 35 M 
Al-Zour south gas turbine power plant conversion 211 M 
Establishing combined cycle gas turbine power 
plant at Subiya 
684 M 
Shuaiba North Power & Desalination Plant 366 M 
North  Al Zour Desalination Plant in Kuwait 1.430 M 
Al-Zour south power plant conversion 170 M 
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For the year 2010/2011, spending in Kuwait has been announced to be about 16 billion 
Kuwaiti dinars, ($55.6 billion). The 2010/2011 budget was based on an oil price of $43 per 
barrel.  This amount included investment to increase natural gas and oil production, but also 
to decease the dependence on oil by turning Kuwait into a regional trade and financial 
hub through sustaining economic development, economic diversification and GDP growth.  
The involvement of the private sector would be through BOT projects, due to the Kuwaiti law 
regarding property development and the government support would encourage the banking 
sector to support the schemes.  This, together with the monetary policy, will have the effect 
of increasing liquidity. Although current BOT projects extend over 20 years. , the 
government plans to increase flexibility in this area by including many Mega Projects within 
the next five years.  These include: A major container harbour and a 25km causeway Railway 
and metro system, a new business hub (Silk City) at an estimated cost of US$77bn, increased 
spending on infrastructure, new cities and services, especially education and health. There are 
also plans to spend in the vicinity of KD25bn on oil sector investments. Many of these 
projects fall within the guidelines of the Kuwaiti Law No7/2008.  As previously stated the 
term is currently 30 years but can be increased to 40 years for specially approved cases as 
long as they do not exceed KD250 million in values. The project, as previously mentioned, 
then freely reverts to the government, the private company having benefited from the revenue 
during the period of operation.  The advantage to the government is that there will be no extra 
spending and also there is the benefit of using the greater skills of the private sector to plan 
and deliver projects which are profitable.  It differs from full nationalization or privatization, 
by ensuring that the government retains long-term control of large projects. 
On 15 February 2010, the  Deputy Prime Minister, Sheikh Ahmad Al-Fahd Al-Sabah put 
out to tender  $8.7 billion for new development projects  up to the following April including 
a port expansion, a bridge, three new housing communities, and a hospital . He had 
previously indicated that, due to the country's growing need for housing, 70,000 new homes 
were to be built by 2015.   This scheme would help in the recovery following on from the 
global financial crisis and will be carried out by Kuwait's Public Authority for Housing 
Care, (PAHC). 
It‎ is‎clear‎ that‎ the‎private‎ sector‎will‎ be‎ heavily‎ involved‎ in‎Kuwait‟s‎development‎plans,‎
due to the list of imminent multi-billion dollar projects which include a US $50 billion, 
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(KWD 13.6 billion), oil sector financial investment plan, the $75 billion City of Silk 
Development and an $8 billion rail system project.  In conclusion, it is apparent that, 
although the commercial principles behind certain aspects, (such as the shareholding split 
for the Special Purpose Vehicles), are not entirely clear, the BOT law provides an impetus 
to the stagnated Kuwaiti BOT industry. The market is eagerly awaiting the publication of 
the soon to be issued regulations which, with the new law, should give a real boost to the 
BOT market. 
2.16 Conclusion of the literature review 
The research objectives, (as presented in Section 1.5), were as follows: 
1. To develop a better understanding of the basic and essential concepts involved in the 
BOT infrastructure projects and the characteristics of the risks involved.  
2. To identify the most important risk factors involved when implementing BOT 
infrastructure projects in Kuwait. 
3. To categorize and group the various risk factors facing the implementation of BOT 
infrastructure projects in Kuwait. 
4. Using expert opinion, to list each risk factor/group according to its' significance 
within the BOT infrastructure project. 
5. To consider and propose a risk-management framework for BOT projects having 
evaluated, validated and justified the results so that decision-makers and consultants 
are more easily able to overcome, or at least minimize, the impact of risk factors on 
BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait. 
This chapter has reviewed the relevant literature relating to the research objectives.  It has 
also considered the reasons behind the behavior of BOT projects.  
However, in order to study the practices of BOT projects risk management and to develop a 
framework which would assist the public and private sectors to overcome, or at least 
minimize, the impact of risk factors on BOT projects in Kuwait, it is necessary to 
differentiate between them according to the different forms of uncertainty and to categorize 
them into clearly defined groups. Each of these research objectives will be investigated in 
the next chapter. The initial plan to accomplish the refined objectives will be achieved by 
constructing the framework model stages in order to cover the BOT Projects risk 
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management decision-making processes. Due to energy shortages, a poor transportation 
network and an insufficient water supply, the economic growth of Kuwait has been held 
back and the infrastructure sector has grown more slowly than in other developing 
countries.‎ ‎BOT‎systems‎are‎the‎way‎ forward‎to‎ensure‎Kuwait‟s‎ future‎economic‎growth 
and development.. Despite the great opportunities for private investors, the market 
conditions and differences in the legal systems for infrastructure business in Kuwait still 
involves a great many risks and problems.  Private investors therefore need to ensure that 
the‎critical‎risks‎are‎identified‎and‎managed‎when‎investing‎in‎Kuwait‟s‎BOT‎infrastructure‎
projects.  
BOT schemes are also very effective ways to raise money for future infrastructure projects. 
And to allow for the entry of new investors to new Kuwaiti markets. However, there is 
some reluctance to become involved in BOT projects due to their short history and in fact 
the principles of BOT may not be understood or well received by private investors or even 
by the Kuwait government representatives.  The culture, market and legal systems are 
different in Kuwait and so the traditional mechanisms for project risk allocation which are 
available in other countries, may not be suitable in Kuwait, even though the opportunities 
for investment are great.  For successful BOT schemes operation, both the private and 
public sectors need to identify and attempt to find solutions to avoid the potential risks.  
This research is intended to identify and evaluate the critical risks connected with the 
Kuwaiti BOT infrastructure scheme and to produce a framework with guidelines for 
avoiding, or at least minimizing, their impact on BOT projects in Kuwait, -to which all 
parties involved in BOT infrastructure projects can refer. 
The following are the main results obtained from the literature review: 
1. When financing infrastructure projects, the BOT method, as an alternative to the usual 
approach of using budgetary resources or sovereign borrowing has many potential 
advantages. 
2. To achieve a successful project outcome, various elements involved in BOT projects 
including: the Project Company, the government, suppliers, lenders, contractors, 
purchasers, etc all need to work together. 
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3. The two main risk categories for BOT projects are specific project risks, which can be 
controlled by the sponsors, and country risks which are associated with the economic, 
political and legal environment, which cannot be controlled by the project sponsors. 
4. Risk management is essential for the success of BOT projects and any specific risk 
should be carried by those best able to deal with  it regarding cost, influence  and 
control.  
The research objectives were refined as follows: 
1. To discover and explain the key problems connected with Kuwaiti BOT infrastructure 
projects.  
2. To categorise the risks in BOT infrastructure projects within Kuwait into clearly defined 
groups. 
3. To develop a clear technique for evaluating and scanning risks in BOT infrastructure 
projects within Kuwait.  
4. To propose a risk management framework for a BOT infrastructure project to evaluate, 
validate and justify the results in order to assist consultants and decision-makers in 
evaluating the possibility of overcoming, or at least minimising, the impact of risk factors 
on BOT projects in Kuwait. 
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2.17  Chapter Summary 
This literature review has placed the research in context in relation to the relevant fields in 
terms of theories, methods and tools. The research covers the area of BOT projects and, 
more specifically, BOT infrastructure projects. The review presented in this chapter has 
shown that in the literature on the BOT infrastructure project, many risk factors.  The BOT 
concept began during the 1700s and 1800s and has now been tailored for use in modern 
times. A number of different terms, which are associated with BOT, are also applied in 
practice with the common trait of PPP (public-private partnership).  
The private sector is the driving force behind the BOT scheme. The organizer of any BOT 
project, is a privately based company regardless of the type of organization involved, i.e., 
the investor, lender, contractor, supplier, consultant, etc.  The public sector, which will 
usually be the host government or its' agency, plays a vital role in the BOT project by 
behaving as the preliminary catalyst and designing the framework, which describes how the 
project will proceed.   
Although many factors could be defined, there are three main ones, which cause the public 
sector to favour the BOT approach.  These are: the lack of government funding, the need 
for infrastructure, and the inefficiency of projects financed by the government.  The 
shortage of advanced technology and management expertise in the developing countries 
offers‎a‎combination‎of‎“supply”‎and‎“demand”‎which‎is‎needed‎by‎both‎the‎public‎sector‎
of the developing countries and also the private investment sectors of the developed 
countries, respectively. While the popularity of BOT has provided great opportunities for 
the public and private sectors, the project is quite a challenge to implement successfully due 
to its complexity and the problem with procuring such projects, which are usually of large 
magnitude, long duration and high cost.  
The method of procurement involves a complex contractual relationship, increased 
responsibilities, and a closer relationship between participants and, compared with the 
traditional approach, higher management skills. One of the greatest challenges in a BOT 
project is the ability to deal with potential risks, which might sometimes be considerable 
due to the nature of the project including its' size, the high cost of bidding, it's long 
duration, and the complex and difficult methods of procurement.  Although some of the 
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potential risks can be controlled by using appropriate allocation procedures, the difficulty 
arises from the uncontrollable risks which must be monitored and carefully managed. The 
uncontrollable‎risks‎are‎related‎to‎a‎country‟s‎financial,‎economic‎and‎political‎situation‎as‎
well as the strength of the market. These types of risk are constantly present in developing 
countries.    
Unfortunately, the failure of BOT projects has a high impact on the development and 
economy of the host country.  For this reason, a clear legal framework which covers risk 
management must be planned in order to manage each stage of the BOT project. It is useful 
to compare "successful" BOT projects with "unsuccessful" to understand the importance of 
reaching an agreement with all parties involved, by means of a clear and stable legislative 
framework within the host country.  In order to maintain the confidence of all concerned 
parties, a well organized evaluation project bid is required, which offers sound debt to 
equity ratios, a suitable design, reasonable income, and realistic cost forecasts.  In addition, 
this chapter provides a general background concerning privatization and the political, 
economic, and legal climate which prevails in Kuwait. Therefore, in a broader sense, 
privatization might involve any permanent or temporary transfer of ownership or 
management of a public commodity or agency to the private sector. This would also include 
the following operations: a) subcontracting, (whereby a private company delivers public 
services, such as the collection of waste, reading and billing of water or electricity meters); 
b) management contracts; c) the lease of state-owned enterprises, equipment or assets, 
including lease- and-operate in the infrastructure sectors; and d) concessions, in addition to 
BOT contracts, (used for the privatization of an infrastructure project which is a monopoly).  
This chapter has also discussed the state of the public sector, which is quite large in size, the 
problems‎ associated‎ with‎ this‎ sector‎ and‎ the‎ reasoning‎ behind‎ the‎ government‟s‎
privatization plan.  It was illustrated that the public sector in Kuwait is the dominant sector 
and runs the government's affairs.  It comprises over 50 ministries, public authorities and 
corporations. It was apparent that the main objectives behind the privatization plan, as 
emphasized by the Kuwaiti Government, were the reduction of the state financial and 
administrative burden, enhancement of the performance and productivity of manpower, the 
creation of new sources of income, and the implementation of new technology.                
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The economic, political and legal climate within the state of Kuwait was also examined in 
depth in this chapter.  
Risk Management Strategy in BOT projects will be introduced and discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review of Risk Management Strategy in 
BOT 
The understanding and management of risks involved in projects, particularly large 
engineering initiatives, can be challenging.  According to Smith and Gavin (1998) risk 
occurs in all walks of life and one of the particular areas susceptible to risk is the 
construction industry.  The problem in this area is that the risks may be unpredictable, 
although some will be more easily identified than others.  The solutions required may be 
quite straightforward, while others often can prove to be controversial. 
This chapter looks at the risk management process in connection with the BOT 
infrastructure projects.  The process includes: risk identification, analysis and response.  A 
professional review of the importance of risk identification and its' context is then 
presented.  The types of risk involved and their definition are also reviewed and an 
explanation of the meaning of risk management systems, as well as the systematic steps 
involved in risk management, are given.  Also details of a logical tool which identifies, 
analyzes and models the risks involved in an appropriate way are included. 
3.1 Introduction 
This research is concerned with the identification and review of the main risk variables 
connected with BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait, it also evaluates these risks and 
investigates the mitigation measures required in order to develop a framework, which 
would be appropriate to use by all the parties involved in BOT projects. 
According to Gunn (2005), risk management is all-important to the success of BOT 
projects.  There are many different types of risk and uncertainty involved in every 
construction project, however small.  These may be: technical, economical, legal, etc., but 
all ultimately involve an organization in financial risk.  The risks pertaining to BOT 
projects are more complicated than when using traditional methods, where the design is 
separate from the construction, -and the client is responsible for the project.  
 This is not only due to the long duration, high investment and complicated methods of 
procurement, but also because all of these risks are combined.  The private companies 
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involved in the project assume responsibility for a whole range of risks during the life-cycle 
of the project and also the private companies take responsibility for financial, design, 
construction and operating risks.   
The three main areas of risk generally centre on the project management constraints 
of time, quality and budget.  
Dey and Ogunlana (2004) believe that one of the main reasons for the failure of BOT 
projects is poor risk management.  It is important to understand the background of BOT 
projects as well as the risk management tools and techniques which are available.  Applying 
these tools depends on a number of different factors and these include the policy 
requirements of the organization, the nature of the project itself, the resource availability 
and the project management strategy including the attitude of the project management team 
to risk taking.  Considering public infrastructure development in Asia, using BOT projects, 
as many as about 30% have resulted in unsatisfactory outcomes (Schaufelberger 2005).  
When undertaking these projects, the private sector incurs considerable risks, which must 
be understood and managed to realize a successful outcome. Ghosh and Jintanapakanont, 
(2004) emphasize the need for effective management of key risk factors for the successful 
implementation of large complex infrastructure projects.  
For particularly complex projects, such as BOT projects, Hall and Hulett (2002) suggest 
that the number of parties and different agreements involved constitutes an increased source 
of risk and the risks will change throughout the life of the project starting from the 
planning stage through to design, and operation.  
Harmon et al. (2001) noted that complex construction projects are all high-risk as they 
involving many parties, all with different priorities and interests, thereby producing a high 
potential for conflict. 
Thomas et al. (2006) observed that private infrastructure BOT projects have a risk profile 
which is quite complex and risk management plays a large part in the success or failure of 
the BOT project.  Therefore, during the analysis stage of the project, qualitative factors, 
which have a strong influence on the outcome of the project, must be considered.  This 
research will provide a risk management framework for BOT infrastructure projects.   
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3.2 Definition of Risk  
According to Raftery et al. (1994) risk means different things to different people depending 
on their viewpoint, attitudes and experience and therefore can be quite subjective.  Whilst 
designers, engineers and contractors view risk from a technological point of view, 
developers and lenders will consider the financial and economical risks.  However, 
environmentalists, chemical engineers and health professionals, will look at the risk from an 
environmental point of view and consider the safety aspects.  It is therefore difficult to 
measure risk due to its' abstract nature. 
The‎Chambers‎Dictionary‎definition‎of‎ „risk‟‎ is:‎ „hazard, danger, chance of loss or injury, 
the degree of probability of loss; to incur the chance of unfortunate outcomes".  This type of 
definition‎indicates‎the‎difficulty‎in‎using‎the‎term‎„risk‟‎as‎‎‎it‎also‎means‎the‎probability‎or‎
chance of a specific outcome or occurrence, the nature of an outcome, or its cause.  In his 
paper‎ „Against‎Risk‟,‎Dowie‎ (1999) argues‎ that‎ the‎ term‎ „risk‟‎ should‎ be‎ dispensed‎with‎
altogether.‎‎Dowie‎considers‎that‎the‎term‎„risk‟‎ is‎ itself‎a‎hindrance‎to‎improved‎decision‎
and policy making. The ambiguous use of the word persistently puts at risk the distinction 
between two important tasks: Firstly, to discover and process the appropriate value 
judgments, and secondly, to identify and evaluate the relevant evidence.  
In his article‎entitled:‎„Risk,‎Uncertainty,‎and‎Profit‟,‎Frank‎Knight‎outlined‎the‎distinction‎
between risk and uncertainty as follows. 
‘… Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of Risk, 
from which it has never been properly separated. … The essential fact is that "risk" means 
in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is something 
distinctly not of this character; and there are far-reaching and crucial differences in the 
bearings of the phenomena depending on which of the two is really present and operating. 
… It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or "risk", as we shall use the term, is so far 
different from an un-measurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all", (Frank 
Knight 1921). 
The‎Oxford‎Advanced‎Learners‎Dictionary‎states‎that‎risk‎ is‎ the:‎„chance‎of‎ failure‎or‎the‎
possibility‎of‎meeting‎danger‎or‎of‎suffering‎harm‎or‎loss‟.‎For‎construction projects, risk is 
the likelihood of a detrimental event affecting the project. 
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According to Merriam Webster, risk is: 
1. The possibility of injury or loss.  
2. A person or thing which causes or implies a hazard. 
3. The possibility of loss or perils to the content of a contract of insurance; also:  
a) the degree of probability of this type of loss;  b) a thing or person causing a 
specific hazard to an insurer;  c) an insurance hazard deriving from a particular 
source or cause.  
Harold Kerzner (2001) suggests that risk measures the probability and consequence of 
failing to achieve a specified goal for a particular project.  In general terms, risk is 
concerned with the idea of uncertainty.  For any given event there are two primary 
components of risk: 
 The probability, (or chance), of the occurrence of the event. 
 The impact of the occurrence of the event, (or the amount at stake). 
For any event, the risk is defined as a function of the likelihood and the impact; so 
Risk = f (Likelihood, Impact) 
Generally, risk increases as either the likelihood or impact increases.  Risk management 
requires the consideration of both the likelihood and impact. 
Future events, (or outcomes), which are positive are called opportunities, while risks are 
negative, (or unfavorable), events. 
A source of danger is the reason for the risk, which is termed the hazard.  Some hazards can 
be largely avoided by discovering them and taking action to overcome them.  So a further 
definition of risk can be denoted by: 
Risk= f (Hazard, safeguard) 
In this equation the risk decreases with safeguard but increases with hazard.  It is apparent, 
therefore, that the project should be well managed in order to endeavor to find all possible 
hazards and identify the safeguards which will overcome them, thus reducing the risk to an 
acceptable level, Harold Kerzner, (2001). 
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Risk involves a possible negative outcome affecting a value or an asset, arising from a 
current process or possibly a future event.  However, in professional risk assessments, the 
probability of a particular event occurring is considered together with the impact that the 
event would have under a variety of different circumstances. 
In some cases, the consideration of risk may not only to avoid adverse outcomes.  In 
finance and game theory, for example, risk measures a change in the possible outcomes.  
One example of an investment which reduces risk is insurance as, in this case, the person 
taking out insurance pays an agreed sum, which affords protection from a possible much 
greater loss.  However, an example of a risk-increasing investment is gambling as, in this 
case, money is risked for a potentially large return, or the possibility of total loss.  The 
lottery is therefore a very risky investment, involving as it does a small chance of a huge 
return, but a high chance of total loss.  However a low-risk course of action would be 
investing money in a bank with a stipulated interest rate, which provides a guaranteed small 
increase. 
Risk measurement can be a very difficult undertaking as it is related to the different losses 
expected due to the probability of the occurrence of a risky event.  There are different 
definitions relating to specific applications and contexts in which the risk occurs.  The 
greater the loss, and the greater the likelihood of the event occurring which would produce 
it, the greater the risk.  Some failure cannot be foreseen and loss of human life is the 
ultimate loss as it cannot be replaced. 
 In scenario analysis,‎ it‎ is‎ important‎ to‎ distinguish‎ „risk‟‎ from‎ „threat.‟‎ ‎ A‎ very‎ serious‎
event,‎ which‎ has‎ a‎ very‎ low‎ probability‎ of‎ occurring,‎ is‎ known‎ as‎ a‎ „threat‟.‎ If‎ the‎
threatened event has never occurred before, it can be assigned a probability during risk 
assessment as there may be no effective preventive measure available that would decrease 
the probability or impact of the possible future event.  In order to understand the difference 
between‎„risk‟‎and‎„threat‟,‎consider‎the‎principles of caution so that threats are reduced by 
fitting them in a collection of well-defined risks which are considered at the very beginning 
of any experiment or innovation.  
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The‎ obvious‎ question‎ now‎ arises:‎ „What‎ is‎ Risk?‟‎ and‎ understanding‎ it,‎ will‎ be‎ the‎ first‎
step.‎According‎to‎Webster‟s‎dictionary,‎risk‎is‎„the‎possibility‎of‎ loss.‟‎resulting‎from‎our‎
inability to know the future. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
The language of probability enables us to quantify risk. A risk profile is a probability 
distribution, which illustrates risks by envisaging a whole series of possible outcomes and 
the probability with which they might occur; 
 
 
Figure ‎3-1 Risk probability versus percentage of expected outcome Kerzner, H., (1995). 
During the mid 17
th
 century‎ the‎ word‎ „risk‟ entered into the English language.  This 
dictionary definition may satisfy the notion scientists have when considering risk, but is too 
narrow for the general consideration of risk taking.  Risk and risk taking, which together 
form the basis of risk management, need to be seen from a multidisciplinary perspective.  
Yates and Stone (1992) have considered the different elements which form the building 
blocks of risk construction and Kogan and Wallach (1964) explain how psychologists have 
examined the way in which there is a correlation between personality and risk.  Various 
researchers have examined the risks relating to specific areas, such as in: economics 
(Knight 1921) sociology (Heimer 1988) and management (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992).  
There are many areas of risk associated with different disciplines, as there is uncertainty 
involved in some, or all, aspects relating to the available knowledge. The different areas 
may be: technological, which will include issues associated with construction, design and 
performance of the project; socio-political, which can involve market uncertainties, both 
 96 
 
political and country-related according to Kennedy (1991) and environmental, which 
involve issues relating to the possible influence on the ecosystems or surroundings.  There 
are also organizational issues, which are related to internal structures and relationships 
within the project and may also involve the stakeholder's uncertainty in identifying risk 
measures and thresholds and the change in these over time.  Financial issues are related to 
the financing of the project and other costs and revenue.  Economic issues include a wide 
range of uncertainties including influences on a global scale, such as changes in inflation 
and the exchange rate. 
Despite the many definitions of uncertainty and risk, in most of the literature these are both 
recognized as a major consideration in all areas within large engineering. This study 
reiterates the advantages of considering risk by namely involving technological, socio-
political, environmental, organizational, economic and financial uncertainties.  
When considering the risks involved in engineering projects, various authors have given 
their own perspectives. Perry and Hayes (1985b) felt that distinctions between risk and 
uncertainty, and between pure risk and speculative risk, may not really be necessary and 
could, in fact, be unhelpful, while Erikson and O‟Connor (1979) considered risk to be an 
exposure to possible economic loss or gain as a consequence of involvement in the 
construction process. Cooper and Chapman (1987) defined risk as exposure to the 
possibility of financial or economic loss or gain, physical damage or injury, or delay, 
resulting from the uncertainty connected with the pursuit of a particular course of action. 
However, Wideman (1986) thought that project risk was the chance of the objectives of the 
project being adversely affected by certain occurrences. However, Jaafari and Schub, 
(1990), defined risk as the presence of actual or potential constraints which might obstruct 
the performance of the project, and cause its complete or partial failure during construction, 
commissioning or operation. Bunni, (1990), endorsed the definition of risk given by British 
Standard No. 4778, which defines it as the combined effect of the probability of occurrence 
of an undesirable event, and the magnitude of that event.  
Al-Bahar and Crandall, (1990), felt that there was no consistent use of the‎word‎„risk‟‎and‎
noted that most definitions focused only on the downside of the risks, such as loss or 
damage, rather than the upside, such as profits or gains. They suggested instead that 
uncertainty would better represent the probability that an event would occur (as a certain 
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event has no uncertainty) and they considered risk as the chance occurrence of events which 
could either favorably or adversely affect  the project objectives resulting from uncertainty.  
In two publications, Lopes, (1981, 1983), described risk as a situation where a decision is 
taken, which has consequences dependent on the results of possible future events which 
themselves have known probabilities. When these probabilities are inexact or unknown, the 
decisions are considered to involve uncertainty.  
Fraser, (1979), thought that due to our familiarity with risk in everyday life, many people 
believe that they know what it means. However, a big risk may mean quite different things 
to different people. It could mean that existing plans might be upset by an unforeseen event, 
or there is a high degree of uncertainty as to whether or not an adverse event will occur, or 
perhaps that the event is very likely to occur, or that a large amount of money may be 
involved in the adverse outcome. For this reason, some feel that considering risk only in 
terms of probabilities and outcomes is inadequate and may lead to misunderstanding.  
A distinction was made between hazard and risk by Hohenemser et al. (1985), where 
hazards are defined as threats to human beings and the things which they value and risks are 
defined as quantitative measures of the consequences of a hazard expressed as conditional 
probabilities of experiencing harm.     
Rayner, (1987), proposed that the concept of risk would be a method of classification for a 
series of complex relationships and interactions between man and nature and also between 
different people.  He felt that we have become unaware of the complicated and multifaceted 
phenomenon that constitutes risk. Although there may be agreement that, for engineering 
and similar projects, risk consists of the probability of an adverse event and the magnitude 
of its' consequences, but this may be insufficient for the broader, more intractable, level of 
risk management. Hence, Rayner, (1987), pointed out the need for a widely encompassing 
definition which includes purely societal concerns about equity from the risk-management 
perspective, (i.e. allocation amongst stakeholders), on the one hand, and purely 
engineering-type concerns about probability and magnitude from a technical perspective, on 
the other.    
Regarding risk from a managerial point of view, MacCrimmon and Wehrung, (1986), 
considered risk as having three components: the chance of a loss, the size of the loss, and 
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the exposure to the loss, where the degree of risk was seen as directly proportional to the 
chances and size of the loss, and to the degree of exposure. Shogren, (1990), defined risk 
more simply based on two elements: probability and severity. Boodman, (1987), however, 
claimed that most senior corporate managers have little understanding of the basic 
components of risk, and most are unable to define the term adequately.  
March and Shapira, (1987), noted that in classical decision theory, risk is often perceived as 
reflecting a change in the distribution of various possible outcomes, their likelihoods, and 
their subjective values but they commented that finding a satisfactory empirical definition 
of risk within this framework has proved rather difficult.  They suggested that a theoretical 
definition of risk may considerably differ from the ways defined by human decision-
makers, since the risk in the same situation can be seen by different individuals in very 
different ways (Kahneman and Tversky 1982a).    
It can be seen from (Al-Bahar and Crandall 1990) that in the field of construction, it has 
been quite common practice to consider risk in terms of consequences and probabilities and 
to think of uncertainty only in terms of probabilities.  However, such a restricted 
perspective may result in some project participants having difficulty in perceiving the 
broader, qualitative context of many important project risks.  If the project is particularly 
large-scale, for example, the risk may be considered as mainly financial, which can be 
quantitatively easily understood.  There will be some stakeholders, however, who regard 
risk as resulting in adverse social or environmental effects, and this can be very difficult to 
quantify and also difficult to represent with a clear perspective.  The definition employed in 
this thesis recognizes the various meanings of risk and its' relative importance to the various 
participant perspectives.  For this reason, the thesis mainly focuses on the application of 
risk in BOT Infrastructure projects. 
3.3 Strategy Definitions and Meanings 
As there are several similarities between strategy in the military and in business, it has been 
quite easy to adapt the concept as used in the military, to the business context.  In business, 
as in the military, strategy is needed to bridge the gap between policy and tactics.  Fred 
Nickols, (2006), suggested that strategy and tactics together bridge the gap between ends 
and means.   
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Porter, (1996), put forward that strategy is about competitive position, and the need to 
differentiate yourself from other competitors, in the eyes of your customers.  It is important 
to use a mixture of various activities which differ from the ones used by competitors in 
order to produce better value.  
To summarise, Henry Mintzberg, (1994), listed four of the most common ways in which 
people define "strategy": 
1.  Strategy is a plan, a means of getting from here to there.  
2. Strategy is a pattern of actions over time; for example, a company that regularly 
markets very expensive products is using a "high end" strategy.  
3. Strategy is position; that is, it reflects decisions to offer particular products or 
services in particular markets. 
4. Strategy is perspective, that is, vision and direction.  
Kenneth Andrews (1980) provided the following definition of strategy:   
„Corporate strategy is the pattern of decisions in a company that determines and reveals its' 
objectives, purposes, or goals, produces the principal policies and plans for achieving those 
goals, and defines the range of business the company is to pursue, the kind of economic and 
human organization it is or intends to be, and the nature of the economic and non-economic 
contribution it intends to make to its shareholders, employees, customers, and 
communities.‟ 
3.4 Understanding risk management 
To ensure good performance, it is essential to consider risk. This is true whether it affects 
the management of a company, or a project or the provision of service for a customer.  The 
main concern for risk management is the way in which the risk is quantified and dealt with.  
There are many techniques, which have been developed in response to this requirement.  
However, as science and technology have developed, the business environment in certain 
areas has become considerably more complex, requiring decision-makers to pay more 
attention to risks.  Almost all kinds of human decision-making activities contain risk 
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elements, requiring decision makers to devise ways of dealing with the risks, resulting in a 
risk- management plan. 
Risk management has been around in some form for a considerable time and is a system 
which has the aim of identifying and quantifying every potential risk affecting a project so 
that good decisions can be made to manage them.  Risk management is not the same as 
insurance and all risks cannot be removed from the project.  Its' whole aim is the efficient 
management of risks.  The client will carry certain risks himself and this fact should be 
acknowledged by both the project manager and the client himself.  When estimating the 
time and cost of the project, this residual risk must be considered.  The system of risk 
management can be quite effective and may need large amounts of data, but it should be 
practical, reasonable and cost-effective.  It requires good judgment, common sense, 
analysis, and experience and the willingness to recognize the risk.  To manage risky 
projects effectively will require a quick, realistic prediction concerning future expectations 
and positive decision-making for alternative courses of action.  The lack of an appropriate 
risk management system coupled with inflexible attitudes and improper procedures has led 
to many public projects being unsuccessful. 
Thomson and Perry, (1992), noted that risk management occurs most often in private sector 
projects.  However, it is important that the public sector also carry out risk management.  In 
particular, it is essential that politicians and governments consider the issue, and examine 
the procedures currently used when planning and implementing projects.  This is to avoid 
unnecessary delay, poor performance and possible cost overrun.  
3.5 Theories of Risk management 
Raz and Michael, (2001), commented that risk management has been a main topic of 
interest for researchers and practitioners who are involved in project management.  
According to Flanagan and Norman (1993) risk management is defined as a system where 
all those risks to which a project or business is subject are identified and quantified so that a 
clear decision can be taken on the management of those risks.  Risk management 
acknowledges the possibility that future events may produce negative or adverse effects and 
employs the design and implementation of systems or procedures which will control these 
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risks.  This definition also states the purpose of risk management, which is to manage 
systems in order to control risks. 
Although risk management need not be very complicated, or involve data collection on a 
large scale, it should be cost effective, practical and, of course, realistic.  Often, in addition 
to analysis, judgment and experience, it is based on common sense, intuition and gut feeling 
but, most of all, there needs to be a willingness to adopt a disciplined approach.  Depending 
on the circumstances involved in each project, there will be different degrees of analysis. It 
is therefore important to formulate a structured risk-analysis system. 
Experience shows that to identify and classify risks is more difficult than actually 
controlling them.  Decision-makers therefore need to identify the risks and plan a risk-
management system, otherwise they will lose control of the system and fail to find solutions 
to the risk or solve any problems within the system.  
Toakley (1989) suggested that risk management is a procedure in which the level of risk is 
controlled and its effects mitigated and Ghosh et al. (2004) pointed out that risk 
management is an effective project management tool for the lifetime of the project.  
Another definition, given by Chapman and Ward  (1997) states that project risk implies that 
there is considerable uncertainty concerning the achievable level of project performance, 
while Turner (1993) suggested that risk management  reduces the likelihood of risk 
occurring and lessens its impact on the project. Another consideration by Kezsbom and 
Edward (2001), was that risk management was an integral and important element of project 
management.  Burke (1999) gave a more detailed description and suggested that project risk 
management involves the need to identify analyses and respond to uncertainty during the 
whole lifetime of the project with the aim of maximizing the positive outcomes of events 
and minimizing the effects of adverse events.  Burchett (1999) thought all construction 
companies should include risk management within their decision-making processes because 
risk and uncertainty can have potential devastating effects, with extremely damaging 
consequences for some construction projects.  Although risk cannot be entirely eliminated, 
but it can be contained, transferred or minimized and this is important due to the adverse 
effects it can have on quality, performance and productivity, and consequently on the cost 
of the project.  Chapman (1998) notes that risks may arise during the lifetime of a project 
and so it is important that project managers understand and deal with them appropriately to 
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avoid major disasters.  This process is known as Project Risk Analysis and Management 
(PRAM). 
 Once risks have arisen within a project, risk management involves understanding the effect 
that the particular risk has had on the project and introducing measures which will reduce 
its' effect and restore the project to its pre-risk state as quickly as possible and cost-
effectively. 
Due to the uncertain nature of risks, decision makers need to consider which specific risks 
need to be analyzed and devise strategies to deal with them.  Although risk management 
cannot prevent all risks to the project, it should identify them early so that their relative 
importance can be assessed and recommendations made on how to control them in order to 
provide the best outcome for the project.  
3.5.1 Key Issues of Risk Management  
A report on an Intelligent Risk Identification System was given by Ashley and Perng 
(1987).  This is an expert system designed to identify construction problems and also their 
likely impact on the project.  Possible courses of action, based on previous experience are 
then considered.  This system helps users to analyze risk and potential problems very early 
in the life of the project using influence diagrams. The influence diagrams illustrate 
problems, causes and effects and can show the potential impact of the risk on the cost, 
schedule and actual construction.  
Kangari and Boyer (1987) described Expert-Risk, which is a knowledge-based construction 
risk-management system. The system is designed to work as an intelligent risk 
questionnaire for the guidance of owners, designers and contractors. It considers financial 
implications and cost databases and aids the identification of risk management and risk 
evaluation. 
Mustafa and Al-Bahars (1991) outlined a risk management system which focused on the 
analysis and assessment of risks considered during the bidding stage of a project, using an 
analytical hierarchy process. 
Much work has been carried out in risk management and one example is a risk model 
known as a Construction Risk Management System, developed by (Al-Bahar and Crandall 
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1990) which permits contractors to identify and classify all the project risks that might 
include so-called‎ „acts‎ of‎ God‟‎ as‎ well‎ as‎ design,‎ construction,‎ financial,‎ economic,‎
political and environmental risks which are to be found in any typical construction 
programme.  The five strategies which they suggested to deal with risks are: risk avoidance, 
risk prevention, loss reduction, risk retention, risk transfer, and insurance.  
The main five actions, involved in risk management, were given by Flanagan and Norman 
(1993) as: 
 Risk identification, which identifies the source and type of risks. 
 Risk classification, which considers the type of risk and its effect on the person or 
organization. 
 Risk analysis, which considers the consequences associated with the particular type 
of risk, or combination of risks, by using analytical techniques and then assessing 
the impact of risk using different risk-measurement techniques. 
 Risk attitude, which affects the decision taken regarding the risk.  
 Risk treatment, (or response), which considers how to manage the risk either by 
retaining it or transferring it to another party.  
 
Five stages of risk management were suggested by Turner (1993): 
1) to identify the source of risk; 
2) to determine the impact of each individual risk; 
3) to assess the overall impact of all the risks;  
4) to determine whether the risk can be reduced; 
5) to control the risk which has been identified. 
 
Raftery, (1994), summed this up by noting that risk management concerns the main steps 
of: risk-management planning, risk identification, risk assessment, risk analysis, risk 
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response, risk monitoring and risk communication.  However, Jafaari and Anderson (1995) 
reduced risk management to three stages, consisting of: risk identification, risk analysis and 
risk response.  
Thomas et al. (2006) mentioned three similar main steps concerned with risk management 
and these are: identification of risks, the measurement/assessment of risks, and 
prioritization and response to the risks. 
According to Bajaj (1997) unidentified risks cannot be controlled or managed in any way, 
so risk identification is an essential first step and the management of risk should be 
considered continuously during the lifetime of the project, rather than being a one-off 
activity.  
Three risk-management processes were mentioned by Dey (1999):  
 (i) Identifying risk factors; (ii) analyzing their effect; and (iii) responding to the risk. 
The following outlines some of the usual management actions and procedures which are 
adopted, such as the identification of the risk, its classification and then its analysis and 
treatment. 
3.5.2 Risk Management Framework 
Figure 3.1 shows the Framework Risk management model as suggested by (Flanagan and 
Norman 1993) and indicates the sequence for dealing with risk. The particular risk 
management system adopted has to be applied to each variation of the project under 
consideration.  The stages are usually: Risk Identification, when the source and type of risks 
are considered; Risk Classification, where the type of risk and the effect it might have on 
the person or organization is evaluated;  Risk Analysis which uses analytical techniques to 
predict the consequences connected with each type of risk, or combination thereof;  Risk 
Assessment in which the impact of the risk is calculated by means of risk measurement 
techniques;  Risk Attitude, which needs to be considered because the attitude of the person, 
or persons, within the organization who are taking the decisions will affect the outcome;  
and finally Risk Outcome in which the decision is taken to retain the risk or transfer it. 
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3.5.3 Risk Identification and Classification for BOT Projects  
The classification and categorization of risks is always important, so that they can be 
managed efficiently and effectively, but this is especially in the case for BOT projects 
which take place in an environment full of risks and uncertainties.  A new approach to risk 
identification was adopted by Tiong (1990) who suggested visualizing an infrastructure 
project as two separate distinct projects.  These projects consist of: a relatively high-risk 
construction project and a relatively low-risk utility project.  The different risks were then 
listed separately under the two phases: construction and operation.  The type of risk 
involved in the construction phase would include: political risks, force majeure, completion 
delays and cost overruns, while the operation phase would include risks such as: supply of 
raw materials, market forces, performance, technical problems involving operation and 
maintenance and foreign exchange rates, etc. 
Some BOT risks may be within the control of one, or several, parties within the project as 
suggested by Augenblick and Custer (1990) while others might be insurable at an 
appropriate cost, (or might be uninsurable).  They list eight typical risks and these are given 
as: performance and operations risks, cash flow risks, completion risks, inflation and 
foreign exchange risks, insurable risks, uninsurable risks, (force majeure), political risks, 
and commercial risk insurance. 
A completely different classification scheme was suggested by Walker and Smith (1995) 
who considered the risks under three headings: technical, financial and political, and 
RISK IDENTIFICATION 
RISK IDENTIFICATION 
RISK CLASSIFICATION 
RISK CLASSIFICATION 
RISK ANALYSIS 
RISK ANALYSIS 
RISK RESPONSE 
RISK RESPONSE 
RISK ATTITUDE 
RISK ATTITUDE 
Figure ‎3-2 The risk management framework proposed by Flanagan 
(1993) 
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suggested that these would appear at different phases of the project. The technical risks 
might include construction problems, delays in completion and operational risks.  The 
financial risks could include fluctuations in the foreign exchange and interest rates, market 
risks and those involving income and cost overrun.  The political risks would involve 
instability and sovereign risks.  They also suggested a further grouping consisting of, 
internal risks, (technical risks) and external risks, (financial and political risks).  The most 
difficult, but essential, consideration for risk management is the identification of each risk 
associated with the project, according to Williams (1995).  Here, it is important to consider, 
as suggested by Godfrey (1996) the particular features of the project, (that is the risk 
sources), which could cause the failure. 
Eight different categories of risk connected with BOT programmes in Kuwait were 
identified by Schaerer (1996) and these are listed as follows: i) construction risks involving 
the availability of supplies, of workers and materials and the duration of the construction 
phase; ii) operation risks, which include the supply of available experts, security problems, 
strikes and civil disturbances; iii) political risks involving politics and credibility, official 
support for the project outside the Five-Year-Plan, removal of concessions and the 
relationship with the local authorities; iv) financial risks involving issues of security, 
various problems within the local financial sectors, different perceptions of the time horizon 
amongst the sponsor, government and investor; v) commercial risks, where economic 
assumptions made may not be relevant over the lifetime of the project or there may be a 
decrease in the market for  products; vi) currency risks involving effects due to the 
involvement of foreign currency, foreign exchange rules for local currency earnings, off-
shore escrow accounts; vi) legal risks;  vii) the changing nature of the risks themselves 
which means that, due to political interference, some good commercial risks today might 
become bad in the future.  These risks are based on two sources: internal risks, caused by 
the performance of the project, and construction and operation risks while the other six 
categories are caused by the external influence to the project. 
To find a universal method for the identification, classification and allocation of BOT 
project risks, UNIDO (1996) have produced a risk checklist. This comprises two main 
categories each containing three subcategories. Category 1 consists of general/country 
risks and includes political, legal and commercial   risks. Category 2 covers specific 
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project risks and these include developmental risks, operating risks and 
construction/completion risks.  The operation and maintenance and service life risks can 
actually be as high as the construction risks because, if the initial estimates are too low, this 
error will remain throughout the concession period, which might be 20–25 years.  
Therefore, as pointed out by Bajaj (1997) it is very important to identify the source of each 
risk and divide into individual components, or influencing factors, which will allow them to 
be considered separately from each other, thus simplifying the analysis and management of 
the risk.    Edwards and Bowen (1998) classified risk into two main groups consisting of 
Natural, which includes the weather and geological systems and Human, which includes 
managerial, technical, cultural, social, political, legal, financial and health.  However, this 
classification does not take into consideration other important risks such as changes in 
legislation involving the environment, market demand, foreign exchange and convertibility, 
obsolete technology and the behavior of local partners, corruption, expropriation as a result 
of political, social or economic pressure, and a risk to the public image due to differing 
values,  living standards, and social systems . 
Lam and Chow (1999) have considered the significance of the financial risks in BOT 
projects, while Dahel (1997) investigated the various sources of finance available, 
concentrating on the BOT arrangement, and the risks to which project financers may be 
exposed.  Wang et al. (2000) identified risks that are specific to developing countries, while 
Akintoloye et al. (1998) considered PFI risk analysis and management and found that that 
design changes and the level of information available regarding functional, performance 
and output requirements for PFI schemes were of greatest concern in this procurement 
route.     
Dey et al. (2002) in their work have suggested that, as well as questionnaire surveys and 
interviews, the Delphi technique could also be used to identify risk.
 
 However, since risk 
analysis follows a top-down sequence only identified risks will be evaluated.  Therefore, 
much time is required to identify all risks.   However, they also point out that common or 
general risks associated with BOT projects could be produced in the form of risk checklists.  
These could then be separated off according to the type of BOT project.   Even so, these 
authors regard the most appropriate techniques for the evaluation of cash flow risk are the 
Monte Carlo and Sensitivity Analysis.  Xenidis and Angelides (2005) have outlined the 
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legal and financial risks in BOT projects. Li et al. (2004) identified risk allocation 
preferences in PFI/PFI in the UK, while Thomas et al. (2003) used India as a location for 
their study of risk perception for BOT projects.  The barriers to Public Private Partnerships, 
(PPP), were classified by Zhang (2005) into six main areas: 1) political, legal and social; 2) 
unfavorable economic and commercial conditions; 3) inefficient public procurement 
framework; 4) lack of mature financial engineering techniques; 5) problems related to the 
public sector; and 6) problems related to the private sector.  There is general agreement 
amongst experts regarding the particular risks in this type of construction project, there are 
also many other risks which depend on the country and type of project. 
The initial stage in risk management is the identification of relevant risks specific to the 
project and Godfrey (1996) suggests that the first consideration in risk identification is to 
discover the particular features, (risk sources), of the project, which might result in failure 
of the project.  However, this should be undertaken by all those involved in the project, in 
order to manage or mitigate the effect, so that the cost to the community of developing the 
project is not too great. Several project-planning methods are available when identifying 
risk and Chapman (1998) has listed the advantages of three of the most common of these. 
3.5.3.1 Brainstorming  
This is a common technique used in many areas, but particularly for building projects when 
identifying risk in construction contracts.  The idea is to provide a forum in which many 
ideas are put forward spontaneously and simply listed without comment in the initial stages.  
It involves redefining the problem, generating ideas for possible solutions, choosing the 
most feasible of these and carrying out an evaluation. 
3.5.3.2 Nominal Group Technique 
This method is similar to brainstorming, but instead the ideas are written down. It is 
considered to be more efficient than brainstorming. The written ideas are submitted to 
various groups for discussion and the feedback from each group on each idea is recorded on 
a flip chart, the different ideas may then be voted on and placed in order of suitability to the 
particular project. 
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3.5.3.3 Delphi Technique 
A description of the Delphi technique has been given by Chapman.RJ (1998) as‎ ‎ „‎ A‎
method for the systematic collection and collation of judgments from isolated anonymous 
respondents on a particular topic, through a set of carefully designed sequential 
questionnaires interspersed with summarized information and feedback of opinions, derived 
from‎earlier‎responses.‟ 
The respondents mentioned in the quotation above were either given a questionnaire or a 
list of the relevant issues.  They were then asked to give feedback.  All the results were 
collated and returned to the participants who then had the opportunity of modifying their 
own responses.  This process proceeds until a clear outcome is reached.  This technique is 
quite slow and is relatively expensive and so it is rarely used to identify risks.  Risk 
identification requires‎the‎need‎to‎„think‎outside‎the‎box‟‎for‎those‎involved‎in‎each‎stage‎of‎
the project, but the process becomes easier with set guidelines Chapman.RJ (1998). 
3.6 Risk Analysis 
The most important task of risk management is to analyses the risk so that appropriate 
decisions can be taken.  To carry out a risk assessment all of the potential risks need to be 
reviewed and understood and their significance for the success of the project assessed.  This 
process includes considering the relative importance of each risk which might have an 
impact on the project and then calculating the probability of its occurrence and likely size.  
Risk assessment allows the developers to have some understanding of which parts of the 
project are the most susceptible to risk and allows them to concentrate their resources; 
including time and money in the areas where the greatest contribution to minimize the risk. 
The aim of risk analysis is to collect all possible suitable options and then to analyze their 
various outcomes. Each option is weighted so that the decision-maker can quantify the risk 
and respond to it.  In order to select a suitable risk analysis technique the following points 
ought to be considered: 
 The size and type of the project. 
 The information on hand. 
 The time required to have the risk assessed including cost of the analysis. 
 The‎analyst‟s‎experience. 
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Risk analysis techniques allocate a series of specific values to uncertain data so, if costs and 
duration for particular a project are uncertain, the decision-maker can select a range of 
values within which it is believed they are likely to lie. For reasons of speed and accuracy, 
quantitative risk analysis techniques require the use of a computer and many programs have 
been designed for this purpose. 
Risk analysis tools and techniques, (RATTs), can be chosen in a systematic way, as noted 
by Dey and Ogunlana (2004) since risk assessment in BOT projects is the formulation of a 
systematic model for selection and application at various stages of the project.
 
  Several risk 
analysis techniques are available to evaluate the different types of risk within each risk 
category.  A table of the techniques and tools, which can be applied to risk analysis in BOT 
projects, is given below. 
 
SN.  Method SN.  Method 
1. Influence Diagrams  8. Neural network approach  
2. Monte Carlo Simulation  9. Decision tree 
3. Program Evaluation & Review Techniques   10. Fault Tree Analysis  
4. Sensitivity Analysis  11. Risk checklist  
5. Multi-criteria Decision Making  12. Risk Mapping  
6. Analytical Hierarchy Process 13. Cause/Effect Diagrams  
7. Fuzzy set approach  14.  Event tree analysis  
Table ‎3-1 - Risk analysis techniques Dey and Ogunlana (2004) 
Zayed and Luh-Maan (2002) have cited Dias and Ioannou, 1995 and 1996), as providing a 
proposal for both a qualitative and quantitative approach to risk analysis.   A risk index is 
derived using the main risk categories of a concession-type agreement.  These are then rated 
using a scaled value.  A risk index equation is derived based on completed BOT projects 
and is amended further by researchers when more BOT projects have been completed so 
more data is available to improve the accuracy of the risk index equation.  
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3.7 Risk Index  
The model put forward by Dias and Ioannou (1995) has been modified by Tarek and Luh-
Maan (2002) who have formulated a prototype risk index which can be used as an 
evaluation tool for BOT Infrastructure projects.  Their proposed risk index constitutes a 
single level hierarchical structure addressing eight of the main BOT risks.  The prototype 
risk index is calculated using holistic results and has resulted in more reliable results than 
the (Dias and Ioannou, 1996), approach.  However, Tarek and Luh-Maan (2002), also 
suggest that, to improve the accuracy of the model, a wider range of data collection is 
required for BOT Ifrastrucuture projects. 
3.8 Quantitative Risk Analysis 
Dey et al. (2002) proposed a quantitative risk analysis approach which is more structured 
since it uses the risk assessment concept in which the risk categories are separately defined 
and appropriate risk analysis techniques are used to assess the corresponding risk.  This is 
an intricate component of risk management but there are certain features within risk 
management systems, which are not considered in the reviewed literature.  These include, 
risk evaluation, organization and accountabilities, risk mitigation, measurement of progress 
in risk reduction, and finally, assessment and corrective action.  Quantitative methods of 
risk assessment consider the probability or likelihood of occurrence of the risk and its' 
impact involving the size, time and cost involved.  Two true quantitative methods for risk 
assessment are currently in use and these are the "Direct Calculation" technique and the 
"Monte Carlo technique".  Many and various tools and techniques can be used in     BOT 
Infrastructure project risk analysis, but the particular application will depend on the content 
and of the particular project and the context in which it is carried out.  
3.8.1 Risk Response 
The allocation of risk and the response to it can be found to be in four categories:  
 Risk retention. 
 Risk reduction.  
 Risk transfer.  
 Risk avoidance. 
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3.8.2 Risk Retention 
In order to allocate the risk adequately, two considerations must be: 1) the ability to contain 
the risk, and 2) the premium required to carry the risk.  One example is when a contractor 
pays an insured sum to cover the risk.  However, for lump-sum contracts, the greater risk 
will be carried by contractors. As previously noted, there should be adequate rewards 
connected with each risk, to encourage risk-bearing by the different parties involved. 
3.8.3 Risk Reduction 
One method of reducing risk is to share it with other parties.  One example of this is, in 
order to avoid paying liquidated damages for late completion of a project; the contractor 
will include liquidated damages clauses in any subcontract agreement. Also, in contractual 
arrangements, the management-fee type of contract will be more acceptable to contractors 
and should reduce the likelihood of direct-loss and expense claims. 
3.8.4 Risk Transfer 
This option moves the risk to a third party without reducing its criticality in any way.  It 
can, in fact, actually make the risk greater, if the party, who take on the risk, is unaware of 
the size of the risk.  Buying insurance is the usual method to accommodate risk as it 
converts the risk to a cost and transfers the risk tot\to the insurance broker.  The usual 
method of risk transference is by means of insurance, which converts risk exposure to an 
insurable cost.  Construction projects are often prone to faults and defects may be 
discovered a considerable time after the project is completed.  These could include any 
latent defects where it is not possible to detect upon completion of the project.   The 
advantage of risk transfer using insurance is that it decreases the need for legal action 
between different parties. 
3.8.5 Risk Avoidance 
This is basically a refusal to accept risks.  It occurs usually during pre-contract negotiations 
but often extends to decisions made during the lifetime of the project. The use of exemption 
clauses is one method of avoiding a specific risk or the consequences resulting from it. 
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3.8.6 Risk Attitude 
As previously mentioned, risk always goes hand in hand with reward.  The decision as to 
whether to accept a particular risk varies between individuals and is based on the attitude of 
risk‎choice‎and‎individuals‟‎risk‎preference.‎‎Generally,‎there‎are‎three‎types‎of‎people: 
 Risk loving.  
 Risk averse. 
 Risk neutral. 
Most risk theories are based on the concept of risk aversion.  It is less appealing to lose a 
given sum than to gain the same sum, since the former might result in a change of living 
standard. 
3.9 Why Is Risk Management Necessary? 
Several factors in this review highlighted the need for a systematic and rigorous approach to 
managing BOT project risks: the largely intuitive approaches to evaluation and 
management of risks; behavioral and cognitive limitations to systematic risk management; 
and non-identification of many sources of risk. Another factor is the singular, rather than 
multidimensional approach to risk management whereby individual risks are treated in 
isolation from other risks, Miller (1992).  The political, policy, economic and social 
uncertainties within a business environment are clearly interdependent.  The reduction of 
uncertainty in one dimension may result in increased exposure to another, Miller (1992). 
Previous Literature shows that no risk management studies are available for BOT 
Infrastructure Projects risk management in Kuwaiti.  
 It is important, therefore, to develop new risk-ranking methods for BOT infrastructure 
projects so that the major factors can be identified and the associated risks involved in these 
projects assessed for both the private and public sectors.  Due to the limited resources 
available to both private and public sectors, resource planning is essential.  The importance 
of the risk to the participants is carefully evaluated and then risk-ranking is carried out.  
Risks which are considered to be high are used in the risk response stage which should 
increase the effectiveness of risk management for BOT infrastructure projects, 
Ebrahimnajad et al.  (2010). In this research, a framework which ranked risks in order of 
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priority was developed for BOT infrastructure projects.  Also presented are the criteria for 
the ranking of risks. 
A risk management framework developed later in this research will facilitate the 
recognition of the interdependencies, between various risks, and should improve the risk 
management and decision-making process. 
According to Park and Chapin (1992) risk management, including risk analysis is becoming 
increasingly important. If a project is "unsuccessful" as per agreement in the project 
contract, the consequences can be detrimental to the private investors concerned, i.e. 
projected profit is wiped out.  It is apparent, after analysis that hardly any attention has been 
given to the particular risks which may occur in BOT Infrastructure projects. Forethought 
may have prevented erroneous decisions and substantial savings may have been made, -
saving time and improving quality.  The study of BOT Infrastructure projects worldwide 
indicates that these risks have been ineffectively dealt with. 
 
3.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduces the definition of "risk", as each person has a different perception of 
risk and a different attitude to taking risks.  There is a distinction between a "risk" and a 
"threat" and the different "pre-cautions" needed to identify and accommodate either.  The 
definition of "strategy" was defined concerning the manner in which to cope with, and 
manage the risk(s).  "Risk management" was discussed as a means of aiding and improving 
the performance of the management team in identifying, prioritizing, dealing with and 
minimizing risk(s).  A flow chart for identifying, classifying, analyzing, grading and 
responding to risk is discussed.   
The concept of using a "Framework" in which all known risks are documented and graded, 
("indexed"), into "seriousness", (i.e. What would happen to the project if the risk became a 
reality?), is introduced and the various methods of constructing such a "Framework" are 
tabled.  A description of different risk analysis, tools and techniques was discussed leading 
to a final discussion regarding the importance of risk management.  The next chapter 
provides a discussion of the research methodology employed, complete with information on 
data collection and the techniques used in data analysis.   
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Chapter 4 Research Methodology  
4.1 Introduction 
The last two chapters have incorporated an extensive review of the literature concerned 
with BOT infrastructure projects, including their characteristics, behaviour, the risks and 
risk management involved. This review has filled some gaps in our knowledge and has also 
enabled the formulation of research questions as well as defining the research objectives.  
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the particular research methodology used in this 
work. It is designed to form a bridge between the theories of research, such as in the areas 
of research strategy, techniques and data collection methods, and the level of practicality of 
this research. The objective is to clearly present a series of activities carried out during the 
research. There is justification given for the approach used in this thesis. According to 
Jancowicz (2000) research is undertaken so that people may increase their knowledge by 
finding information out systematically while Introna and Whitley (1997) state that 
methodology is a set of techniques and tools which can be used to solve a particular 
problem, which, in this case, involves the development of a risk management framework to 
be adopted by almost all parties who are involved in the BOT infrastructure projects in 
Kuwait. This will enable both the Public and Private sectors to identify the risk variables 
involved with BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait. The risks can then be assessed and 
mitigated. There are many choices to make when planning a research methodology and 
there‎is‎no‎“perfect”‎approach‎so‎many‎factors‎need‎to‎be‎considered.‎‎Also,‎a‎framework‎is‎
given for the methodology of the research, including a statement of the problem and a step-
by-step approach to the development of the proposed objectives. 
4.2 Theories of knowledge in research 
In‎any‎form‎of‎research,‎the‎nature‎of‎the‎inquiry,‎known‎as‎“ontology”,‎(see‎Lincoln,‎Guba‎
1985, Tashakkori, Teddlie 1998) is crucial when considering the particular path of inquiry 
which one is to follow, in order to achieve specific research goals. There are two different 
types of ontology providing different research perspectives. These are: an objective 
perspective which uses numbers to describe a reality or a fact, (Easterby-Smith et al.  2002) 
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and a subjective perspective which uses reflections, oral explanations and sensations to 
describe the reality or a fact (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002).  Quantitative methodological 
tools involving numbers for the answer to particular research problems would be more 
suited to the objective perspective, while qualitative methodological tools that use words to 
formulate a research problem, would be more appropriate for the subjective perspective, 
(Tashakkori, Teddlie 1998). Both methods will be discussed further in the chapter. 
It has been noted, (Lincoln, Guba 1985, Tashakkori, Teddlie 1998) that ontology of 
research requires the identification of the type of relationship that exists between the 
inquirer and the object of inquiry; this is called the epistemology of research. The 
relationship is based on the level of interaction.  As described by  Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
the inquirer and the object of inquiry can either be separate, (independent), from each other, 
known‎ as‎ “discrete‎ dualism”,‎ or‎ else,‎ the‎ inquirer‎ and‎ the‎ object‎ of‎ inquiry‎ may‎ be‎
inseparable, (highly interactive). However, in practice, it is more likely to be a combination 
of types, sometimes tending towards the subjective and sometimes towards the objective 
side and sometimes being separate while at others highly interactive, (Tashakkori, Teddlie 
1998).  Epistemology has to formulate the process of searching for the truth using 
“assumptions‎ about‎ the‎ best‎ ways‎ of‎ inquiring‎ into‎ the‎ nature‎ of‎ the‎ world”,‎ (Easterby-
Smith et al. 2002).‎ This‎ has‎ resulted‎ in‎ continuous‎ „waves‟‎ of‎ epistemology‎ where‎ the 
emphasis moves from the independence of the inquirer to complete interaction, thus 
forming a continuum of methods which will be discussed in detail later in the chapter. 
4.3 Research procedures 
This chapter considers the way in which the research methodology will be conducted and 
processed. When studying the risks involved with BOT infrastructure project, there are 
many quantitative and qualitative variables, (risk factors), which need to be considered and 
assessed when carrying out the risk management of BOT infrastructure projects. 
Interpreting the complex interrelationships between the risk factors and assessing their 
impact on the risk management of the BOT infrastructure project is one of the main 
challenges facing the decision maker.  
When commencing to formulate a research methodology, the first objective, that needs to 
be completed, is to consider the risk factors, both numerical and linguistic, that might affect 
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the risk management of the BOT infrastructure projects.  It is therefore necessary to collect 
all of the related risk factors from previous projects, which might include the environment, 
the particular characteristics and location of the project, as well as current conditions in the 
host country. The selection of the BOT infrastructure project risk factors will be based on a 
wide range of risk factors gathered from the relevant literature, (Tiong 1992, Levy 1996, 
UNIDO 1996, Gupta and Narasimham 1998, Ranasinghi 1999, Ozdoganm and Birgonul 
2000). Therefore, in this study, we will examine the information required and the research 
questions used in order to identify the risk factors facing the implementation of BOT 
infrastructure projects in Kuwait. A number of critical research questions need to be asked 
when considering the extent to which BOT infrastructure project risk management is 
affected by various issues. The research questions are: 
1. Which risks should be considered for BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait? 
2. How can such risks be integrated into a framework that will aid decision 
making, taking these risks into account and to endeavour to decrease or 
prevent them? 
The first requirement in any research project is to define the research questions, (Bryman 
1989).  Each subsequent action carried out by the researcher in a research inquiry depends 
very much on the original definition of the problem, (Graziano and Raulin 2007). For 
example, the identification of a particular type of risks of BOT Infrastructure project that 
will be involved in the study will help to keep the researcher focused.  However, it is 
apparent that the research questions considered during the early stages of a research project 
will be rather tentative and therefore may need changing or revising at a later stage after the 
discovery of new information, (Huberman, Miles 2002).  
Three case study projects are chosen and these are the Sulaibiya Wastewater Treatment 
Plant in Kuwait, the Channel Tunnel in UK, and Marsa Allam airport in Egypt, (see 
Appendix B). Mathematical methods are then used to process the data. 
The main reason for selecting the Sulaibiya Wastewater Treatment Plant in Kuwait is that 
the expert participants are familiar with this project and some even worked on this project. 
The Channel Tunnel was selected because it is one of the outstanding BOT infrastructure 
projects of the last century.  The expert participants are all familiar with the‎“Chunnel” and 
felt that they can use their experience to perform a meaningful project evaluation.   
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Marsa Allam airport in Egypt completed in 2001 was built by Kuwaiti companies with some 
of the expert participants having worked on it. 
The three case studies are well known to the expert participants and their experience will not 
only be invaluable but also very constructive, (-or more information, see section 4.6). 
A methodology is adopted to determine the most common and important risk factors, 
affecting BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait and to consider the extent to which they 
can be controlled.   
A set of risk factors is categorized according to their relevance to BOT Infrastructure 
Projects.  The study of the risk management of BOT systems was conducted on two levels.  
The first level considered risks concerning the host country involving eight main categories: 
Country Risks, Financial, Revenue Risks, Promoting, Procurement Risks, Development 
Risks, Construction and Operating Risks. The second level are sub-factors of these risk 
categories and are covered in Chapter 2.  
The main objective of this research is to construct a risk management framework that can 
be used/adapted for any BOT infrastructure project and then to adapt the framework so that 
it is specific to Kuwait.  
4.4 The philosophical position of the research 
Amaratunga et al. (2002) considers research to be carried out in a spirit of inquiry, with a 
great reliance on principles, laws, facts, real data, hypotheses and conjectures, experience 
and concepts and constructs. However, it is important that all research   has a well-defined 
methodology which is soundly scientifically based.  The methodology consists of a system 
of explicit rules and procedures on which the research is based and on which knowledge is 
evaluated, (Fromkfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996).  Eldabi et al. (2002), considers that 
no‎ research‎ has‎ a‎ “perfect”‎ methodology‎ because‎ none‎ is‎ universally agreed. Since the 
choice of methodology involves the consideration of many factors including the type of 
problem‎ under‎ investigation,‎ the‎ resources‎ available,‎ the‎ researcher‟s‎ background‎ and‎
experience, and the purpose of the study. 
Easterby-Smith et al. (1991), noted that research within the social sciences is often defined 
and‎ differentiated‎ in‎ terms‎ of‎ the‎ epistemology‎ or‎ the‎ “theory‎ of‎ knowledge”‎ it‎ adopts.‎
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Epistemology is the belief about the way in which knowledge is constructed. 
Epistemological assumptions in these cases involve the consideration of whether the 
knowledge can be acquired, or whether it is personally experienced, (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979; Eldabi et al. 2002).  A long-standing epistemological debate concerning the best way 
of carrying out research has been in existence between philosophers of science and 
methodologists and involves the relative value of two fundamentally opposed and 
competing schools of thought or inquiry paradigms: logical positivism and phenomenology 
(Amaratunga et al. 2002). The choice between them involves many philosophical 
assumptions and value judgments. A key consideration is the way in which the research will 
proceed; either inductively or deductively. Inductive research involves the researcher in the 
examination of specific instances resulting in a generalization, while deductive research is 
the opposite; reasoning from the general to the particular, (Case 2002). The method of 
logical positivism uses both experimental and quantitative methods to test hypothetical-
deductive generalizations. (Cavaye, 1996; Easterby-Smith;1991 and Remenyi et al. 1998), 
found that one of the main implications of this approach is that the observer should be 
independent of the subject under observation, and for hypotheses to be formulated for 
subsequent verification. An objective measurement of the properties is required, rather than 
a subjective inference, using reflection, intuition or sensation, (Easterby-Smith, 1991). The 
method of positivism requires fundamental laws and causal explanations, and simplifies 
analysis by reducing everything to its simplest possible elements, (Easterby-Smith, 1991; 
Remenyi et al. 1998).  
The phenomenological, (interpretive science), method of inquiry uses naturalistic and 
qualitative approaches in both an inductive and holistic way in order to understand human 
experience in the context of a specific setting. It attempts to understand and explain a 
particular phenomenon, instead of searching for external causes or fundamental laws 
(Easterby-Smith, 1991; Remenyi et al. 1998). As Eldabi et al. (2002) commented, it 
attempts to understand a phenomenon from the   viewpoint of the participant who is directly 
concerned with the phenomenon being studied. The phenomenological approach also 
rejects‎positivists‟‎beliefs,‎which‎are‎based‎on‎atomism,‎i.e.,‎that‎the‎objects‎of‎experience‎
are atomic, independent events. This concept is central to the idea of didacticism, which 
claims that by considering a finite set of events from the past, generalizations can be made 
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which will enable the prediction of future events, Amaratunga et al. (2002). A summary of 
the main differences between the phenomenological, (realistic), and posit ivistic viewpoints 
was given by Easterby-Smith, (1991) and these are illustrated in Table 4.1. 
 
 
Theme Positivist Paradigm Realism Paradigm 
Basic 
Beliefs 
- The world is external and 
objective. 
- Observer is independent. 
- Science is value-free. 
 
- The world is socially constructed 
and subjective. 
- Observer is part of what is 
observed. 
- Science is driven by human 
interests. 
 
Researcher 
should: 
 
- Focus on facts. 
- Look for causality and 
fundamental laws. 
- Reduce phenomena to 
simplest elements. 
- Formulate hypotheses and 
test them. 
 
- Focus on meanings. 
- Try to understand what is 
happening. 
- Look at the totality of each 
situation. 
- Develop ideas through induction 
from data. 
 
Preferred 
method in 
research 
 
- Operationalizing concepts so 
that they can be measured. 
- Taking large sample. 
- Using multiple methods to 
establish different views of the 
phenomena. 
- Small samples investigated in 
depth or over time. 
Table ‎4-1 Key features of positivist and realism paradigms 
 
Different situations will call for different methods. Table 4.2 summarizes   some of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the two research methods, (Easterby-Smith 1991). Yin (1994) 
explains the conditions, which provide the basis for strategic choice.  These are: the type of 
question posed which the control over actual behavioral elements, and the degree of focus 
on historical or contemporary contexts.  Table 4.3 presents a comparison of five research 
strategies in accordance with the three factors identified above. The research approach must 
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be relevant to the purpose of the study.  Galliers, 1992, cited in Remenyi et al. 1998, gives a 
list of approaches or tactics. Table 4.4 provides a summary of this list according to the 
general philosophical base underpinning the different research methods. Most of the 
research methods listed in the table can be used in some way as either positivistic, 
(quantitative), or phenomenological, (qualitative) devices. 
 
Theme 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Positivist 
(quantitative 
method) 
 
-The methods can provide wide   
coverage of a range of 
situations. 
-They can be fast and 
economical. 
-Where statistics are 
aggregated from a large 
sample, they may be of 
considerable relevance to 
policy decisions. 
-The methods used tend to be rather 
inflexible and artificial. 
-They are not very effective in 
understanding processes or the 
significance that people attach 
to actions. 
-They are not very helpful in 
generating theories. 
-Because they focus on what is, 
or what has been recently, they 
make it hard for policy makers 
to infer what changes and 
actions should take place in the 
future. 
 
Phenomenological 
(qualitative method) 
 
-Data-gathering methods are 
seen as natural rather than 
artificial. 
-Ability to look at change 
processes over time. 
-Ability to understand 
people‟s‎meaning. 
-Ability to adjust to new 
issues and ideas as they 
emerge. 
-Contribute to theory 
generation. 
 
-Data collection can be tedious 
and requires more resources. 
-Analysis and interpretation of 
data may be more difficult. 
-Harder to control the pace, 
progress and end-points of the 
research process. 
-Policy makers may give low 
credibility to results from a 
qualitative approach. 
Table ‎4-2 Comparison of strengths and weaknesses 
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Strategy Form of research 
question 
Requires control over 
behavioural events? 
Focuses on 
contemporary events? 
Experiment How, why Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, 
where, how many, 
how much 
No Yes 
Archival 
analysis 
How, why No Yes / No 
History How, why No No 
Case study How, why No Yes  
Table ‎4-3 Research strategies versus characteristics 
 
Research approaches Positivistic (quantitative) Phenomenological (qualitative) 
Action research  Strictly interpretive 
Case studies Have scope to be either Have scope to be either 
Ethnographic  Strictly interpretive 
Field experiments Have scope to be either Have scope to be either 
Focus groups  Mostly interpretive 
Forecasting research Strictly positivistic with some 
room for interpretation  
 
Futures research Have scope to be either Have scope to be either 
Game or role playing  Strictly interpretive 
In-depth surveys  Mostly interpretive 
Laboratory 
experiments 
Strictly positivistic with some 
room for interpretation 
 
Large-scale surveys Strictly positivistic with some 
room for interpretation 
 
Participant observer  Strictly interpretive 
Scenario research  Mostly interpretive 
Simulation and 
stochastic modelling 
Strictly positivistic with some 
room for interpretation 
 
Table ‎4-4 Research tactics and philosophical bases 
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The research methodology is required to answer specific research questions.  As pointed out 
by Poole and McPhee (1994) the‎method‎is‎the‎researcher‟s‎point‎of‎contact‎with‎the‎world‎
and therefore offers a choice of ways in which to pose questions and find answers.  
Therefore both research methods can be accepted.  
The various strengths and weaknesses of each method are illustrated in Table 3.2 and the 
fact there are advantages and disadvantages to both qualitative and quantitative   
questionnaire methods can be seen in Table 4.4, (Amaratunga et al., 2002; Eldabi et al., 
2002).   McGrath (1982) suggests that there are no ideal solutions, only a set of 
compromises. 
In this research, a quantitative approach was adopted at an early stage so that the most 
important risk categories and sub-factors affecting BOT infrastructure projects could be 
determined.  By researching related documentation, newspaper articles, company and 
government annual reports, and with discussion with the people involved in BOT 
Infrastructure projects, a questionnaire was composed.   By further research, including   a 
pilot study, the initial questionnaire was refined and improved.  
The questionnaires were distributed, by hand, to the expert participants in Kuwait.  Upon 
completion, the questionnaires were collected and the results analyzed.   
The results of the questionnaires are fundamental to the research methodology as the results 
are from local experts with local knowledge of BOT Infrastructure Projects and processes in 
Kuwait.  The Study Methodology Flowchart, Figure 4-1, provides a means to a clear and 
reasonable process of risk evaluation. 
Quantitative analysis techniques were used to rank the risk factors within their categories 
leading to the formulation of general principles and later qualitative techniques were 
utilized. 
This is a reasonable approach to the design of the study.  The various strengths and 
weaknesses of each method are illustrated in Table 4.2 and the fact that both quantitative 
and qualitative questionnaire methods have advantages and disadvantages can be seen in 
Table 4.5, (Amaratunga et al. 2002; Eldabi et al. 2002). According to McGrath, (1982) 
there are no ideal solutions, only a series of compromises. 
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After the quantitative approach discovered the most important risk factors affecting BOT 
infrastructure projects, in order to implement the proposed research model, it was necessary 
to examine other research methods, such as case studies, and also to carry out a review of the 
literature including documents and theories, so that the risk categories could be further 
evaluated and used in the risk-management model.  Therefore, this research has used a mixed 
approach, using triangulation to combine various methodologies and thus gain and verify the 
information. (Triangulation is discussed later in the chapter.) This research strategy is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1 Study Methodology Flow Chart shown below. 
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Figure ‎4-1 Study Methodology Flow Chart 
BOT Infrastructure Project  
Risk Assessment  
Initial Identification of Risk Factor 
Categories and Sub-Factors 
 Gathering Data via a Questionnaire 1 from a  
group BOT Infrastructure experts 
BOT Infrastructure 
project risk areas 
 Suitable projects using BOT 
Infrastructure process 
Revision of Questionnaire Initial Risk 
Management Framework for BOT 
Infrastructure projects 
Analysis and Prioritization of Risk Factors affecting 
BOT Infrastructure projects 
Attribute Relative Weight AHP Technique (Wi) 
Attribute local composite weight 
Attribute group composite weight 
 
 
Attribute local composite weight 
 
 Gathering Data via a Questionnaire 2 from a group 
BOT Infrastructure experts 
Attributes performance quality level Relative importance and Pairwise comparison 
Attributes Value curves and Calculation of 
attributes worth value Vi (xi) 
P2 = 100 Worth Value 
 
"P2 = 100" Approach 
Index = ∑ Wi *Vi(xi) 
Using Local/Group composite weights 
  
Three case studies 
Holistic Evaluation 
Risk Framework Validation 
Forming Initial Risk Management 
Framework for BOT Infrastructure 
projects 
Pilot Study Questionnaire for  
BOT Infrastructure projects 
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4.5 Stage One: The Framing Stage  
According to Sekaran (2003) questionnaires‎are‎defined‎as‎“a‎pre-formulated written set of 
questions to which respondents record their answers, usually within rather closely defined 
alternatives”.‎ They‎ are‎ mainly‎ used‎ to‎ collect‎ participants‟‎ opinions‎ and‎ preferences,‎
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 2002) and can easily be administered personally or 
conducted through mail or on-line, which is a much less expensive method than using 
interviews (Sekaran2003). Questionnaires are useful in that they can generate quick data for 
various research issues, but also have their weaknesses in that respondents might forget to 
respond or fail to do so due to pressure of work. This involves sending reminders. If there is 
a low response rate, it may not be possible to generalize the results, (external validity), and 
the quality of the conclusions, (internal validity), may not be good, (Tashakkori,Teddlie 
1998).  
In this study the questionnaires are intended for the collection of important data and to 
provide further direction for this research work.  They also provide information, which will 
identify the applicability for further work and guidance on this research.  This research is 
intended to provide information concerning the risk factors surrounding and inside BOT 
infrastructure projects.  The valuable data collected from the literature review and the 
participation of experts in developing the questionnaires is intended to strengthen the 
proposed BOT Risk Management framework. 
The questionnaire is designed to provide an understanding of the risks involved with a BOT 
infrastructure‎ project.‎ The‎ data‎ obtained‎ will‎ provide‎ a‎ „big‎ picture‟‎ of‎ the‎ risk‎ factors‎
influencing BOT infrastructure projects which will enable the presentation of a risk-
management framework for BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait. It is necessary to 
consider several research questions regarding critical issues to ascertain to what extent these 
affect the BOT infrastructure project risk management.  
In order to identify and gather knowledge, to construct research questions the most 
appropriate form is the quantitative questionnaire, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
Other types of questionnaire include: by telephone, face-to-face, by self-administration, as a 
handout, or by e-mail. In this research, the target sample will be selected from experienced 
professionals in the industry, who are involved in the development of BOT infrastructure 
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projects in Kuwait.  Their views and opinions of the research issues will be obtained and 
analyzed.  A self-administration survey was considered to be appropriate and useful for 
several reasons: Self-administered questionnaires are one of the cheapest types of survey 
involving only one researcher and since the respondents identity is kept secret, the effects of 
researcher bias are eliminated, (Bryman, Bell 2007).  As pointed out by Neumann (2007) 
the fact that respondents can complete the questionnaire at their own convenience aids in 
providing more accurate data. However, the low response rate for self-administered 
questionnaires requires the researcher to send reminder letters adding to the time and cost of 
the survey, (Sekaran 2003).  As Neuman (2007) comments, researchers cannot observe the 
conditions under which the questionnaire was completed and this may limit the ability of 
the researcher to verify the accuracy of the responses.  Usually traditional method,s (by 
mail, self-administered questionnaires and face-to-face), are the most common surveys 
carried out in academic research. Although a mail survey may be a very reliable method for 
use in the United Kingdom, it is not an appropriate method for Kuwait because of the poor 
performance of the postal system there.  
4.5.1 Sampling 
The difference between qualitative and quantitative methods can be understood best from 
the sampling approach. Sekaran (2003) explains that sampling is a process involving the 
selection of a number of elements from the available population. Sample size is important 
when conducting a study as the results can be used to generalize the findings for the whole 
population. A sample is a subset within a larger group which is known as a population.   
Sampling is a procedure mostly used by researchers to select representative units, 
representing the whole population under study in order to draw valid conclusions about the 
population. The sample size for this research was determined by the number of experts who 
were willing to participate in the survey.  Using the data from the participants, and using 
quantitative research, it is possible to generalize the results to the whole of the research 
population, as stated by Dawson (2006).  However, qualitative researchers attempt to 
describe or explain what is happening with the sample size available, thus providing insight 
into the behavior of the wider research population.  
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4.5.2 Sample selection and size 
This research involves obtaining in-depth details about the evaluation processes and 
practices of BOT infrastructure projects risks in Kuwait and so the sample frame consists 
mainly of experienced professionals in the industries, who are especially involved in the 
development of BOT projects in Kuwait. The research is concerned with the activities and 
practices of BOT infrastructure projects risks in Kuwait.  To discover the inter-relationships 
amongst the BOT infrastructure project risk attributes, which include combined qualitative 
and quantitative factors, it is necessary to assign weights and a performance, (quality), level 
for each attribute of the project risk and then to compare their relative importance which is 
a very important part of the process. In this research, the selection of the professional group 
(respondents) was based on the following criteria: 
1. The expert should be involved in developing one of the BOT projects. 
2. The expert should be a member of the top project management team. 
3. The variety of their project-type experience must be considered. 
4. The variety of the project party, which they represent, (i.e., public or private 
agencies or financiers), should be considered, and the differences in opinions of the 
participants concerning the feasibility of the potential projects and the degree of 
importance of the different project attributes should be reflected in the questions. 
4.5.3 Pilot Study 
Bryman (2004) notes that the purpose of piloting a survey is not simply to ensure that the 
survey questions are appropriate; but also to ensure that the research instrument as a whole, 
functions well. The pilot study is the final, and most important, stage before data collection, 
as it shows whether there are problems regarding the design of the questions. 
The methodology for this research began with the design of the questionnaire. It is of a 
quantitative type because it attempts to investigate and explore the importance of risk 
factors relating to BOT infrastructure projects. The first questionnaire has the aim of 
identifying the risk factors affecting BOT infrastructure projects generally. Also, this 
method obtains much information on how to reach respondents more effectively and 
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improves the quality of the questionnaire. Questionnaire one was a pilot study and was 
given to two different groups. The first group was the academic staff working at the Kuwait 
University including four researchers, (project management – engineering). The second 
group were four experts in BOT infrastructure projects Kuwait. The concept behind the 
questionnaire methodology is based on gathering as much information as possible from 
people with different background knowledge: academic knowledge and experience. The 
technique is particularly useful if the research boundary is very wide and opportunities for 
further work are not very clear.  
The reasons for adopting this technique are to assess the questionnaire, provide valuable 
insight into, and improve the questions in the questionnaire.    
4.5.4 The results of the pilot study. 
As mentioned above, the importance of the first questionnaire the pilot study is to improve 
the design of the questionnaire before it is used in the main study of the research. Many 
drawbacks and errors were found in the first questionnaire.  The improvements made to can 
be summarized as follows: 
1. The length of the questionnaire was reduced significantly. 
2. A progress message about how many questions were left was shown to 
respondents after each question page. 
3. The time needed to complete the questionnaire was reduced by changing the 
design of the questions after using the results from the pilot questionnaire. 
This was achieved by a reduction in the number of variables for each 
question and eliminating some of the questions. 
The pilot questionnaire had achieved a response rate of 100 percent. Next, the improved 
questionnaire, which contained modifications from the pilot Questionnaire, was distributed 
to the expert participants.  
This questionnaire was divided to two main parts; the first part was designed to assess the 
common risk factors affecting the BOT infrastructure project system, and to rank the 
common BOT infrastructure project risks according to their relevance in each of the project 
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categories. The second part of the first questionnaire was to determine the significance level 
of the common BOT infrastructure project risks for each category of the project.  The 
projects were grouped under four main categories: 'Public Works", "Public Utilities", 
"Public/Government Buildings", and "Other Facilities". 
4.6 Stage Two: The Risk management Framework stage. 
Stage two of the research consisted of three different parts:   In the first part the experts 
were asked to check in depth how relevant the grouped decision factors, (attributes), were 
to their categories.   In the second part, the participants were required to make a pairwise 
comparison for the relative importance between the attributes within each category and 
within the categories themselves under the project risk. The pairwise comparisons were 
performed with the aid of a qualitative scale which attempts to incorporate the decision 
maker‟s‎ subjectivity‎and‎experience‎and‎to‎reflect‎the‎degree‎to‎which‎the‎decision‎might‎
discriminate amongst the various relationships between attributes. According to Saaty, 
(1980), a qualitative scale with intensities which range from 1 to 9 is the most appropriate 
one. The reasons for this choice are stated as: 
1. The qualitative distinctions are meaningful in practice and are more precise when 
the items being compared are of the same order of magnitude or close together, with 
regard to the property used to make the comparison. 
2. The human ability to make qualitative distinctions is well represented by five 
attributes: equal, weak, strong, very strong, and absolute. As we can make 
compromises between adjacent attributes when greater precision is needed, the scale 
has nine values. 
3. The‎ assumptions‎ suggested‎ that‎ „the‎ brain‎ can‎ simultaneously‎ process‎ 7±2‎ items‟‎
Miller (1956). 
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Intensity of  
Importance 
Definition  Explanation  
1 Equal importance Two activities contribute equally to the objective 
3 Slight importance of one over 
another 
Experience and judgment slightly favour one activity over another  
5 Moderate importance  Experience and judgment moderately favour one activity over 
another  
7 Substantial importance  An activity is favoured very strongly over another 
9 Absolute importance The evidence favouring one activity over another is of the highest 
possible order of affirmation 
2,4,6,8 
 
 
Reciprocal   of 
above non-zero 
Intermediate values between 
adjacent scale values 
 
If activity i has one of the above non-
zero numbers assigned to it when 
compared with activity j, then j has 
the reciprocal value when compared 
with i  
When compromise is needed 
 
 
A reasonable assumption 
Table ‎4-5 Pairwise Comparison Scale (adapted from Saaty, 1980). 
 
A slightly modified version of the above scale was adopted so that a more uniform distance 
among the verbal expressions than the one provided by the original scale was obtained. This 
modified scale was used to perform pairwise comparisons in the questionnaires used in this 
study and an example was provided to explain the process, (see figure 4-2 below).  
The third part was designed to determine the score for each attribute by estimating the 
performance, (quality), and level of each attribute towards the project viability.  In this part, 
the participants were asked to assign a performance level of P1, P2 for each decision factor 
on the performance scale, (qualitative), as adopted by( Diaz and Ioannou, 1995), (see figure 
4-3, below). Two points P1, P2 describe the value curve.  P1 is the minimum plausible 
performance level for an attribute, and indicates the highest point on the performance scale 
where an attribute is worth its minimum (i.e., 0).  P2 indicates the maximum plausible 
performance level for an attribute, and reflects the lowest point on the performance scale 
where an attribute is worth its maximum, (i.e., 100). These two points characterize the 
generic form of value curves by dividing the performance scale into three regions: (1) a low 
flat region, (2) an intermediate region, (3) a high flat region. (See figure4-4.) 
An‎attribute‎is‎worth‎0‎points‎if‎it‎presents‎a‎performance,‎(quality),‎level‎in‎region‎A‎(“low‎
flat”),‎ between‎ 0‎ and‎ 100‎ points‎ if‎ it‎ represents‎ a‎ performance‎ level‎ in‎ region‎ B,‎
(“intermediate”),‎ and‎ 100‎ points‎ if‎ it‎ represents‎ a‎ performance‎ level‎ in‎ region‎ C‎ (“high‎
flat”).‎ Diaz‎ and‎ Ioannou‎ (1995) wrote that: region A, (low flat), is an extreme case of 
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minimal return per unit of performance. It suggests that the characteristics and features of 
the‎attribute‎being‎evaluated‎do‎not‎need‎ to‎be‎a‎“complete‎disaster”‎ in‎order‎to‎have‎ the‎
attribute worth zero points. Region C, (high flat), is the attribute performance interval that 
provides maximum worth. It suggests that the characteristics and features of the attribute 
being‎evaluated‎do‎not‎need‎to‎be‎“perfect”‎in‎order‎to‎have‎the‎attribute‎worth‎a‎hundred‎
points. In contrast to the Diaz and Ioannou approach, the performance value of P1 is kept at 
zero in this study. This is because all of the project decision factors are considered 
important and have an impact on the outcome of the total project risks. Even when its' 
impact is minimal, the performance should be considered in the evaluation.  
The‎“P2‎=100‎Approach”‎was‎used‎for‎calculating the score of each attribute; The “P2‎=100‎
Approach”‎ will‎ neglect‎ the‎ P1‎ value.‎ ‎ The‎ P2‎ value‎ will‎ be‎ the‎ maximum‎ value‎ on‎ the‎
performance scale. See figures 4.5. 
Figures 4.4 and 4.6 shows the Diaz and Ioannou approach, where both P1 and P2 are 
considered; and the "P2 Only Approach" which uses the P2 value given by the expert 
participants.   
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If A is more important than B use this side 
  
 
If B is more important than A use this side 
Figure ‎4-2 The Modified Decision Factors Comparison Table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎4-3 Equivalence between Qualitative and Quantitative Performance Scales 
Performance Scale (Diaz and Ioannou 1995). 
 
  
Extremely 
undesirable 
Substantially 
undesirable 
Moderately 
undesirable 
Slightly 
undesirable 
Neither 
desirable 
Nor 
undesirable 
Slightly 
desirable 
Moderately 
desirable 
Substantially 
desirable 
Extremely 
desirable 
  ExU          SuU           MoU           SiU             Nei             SiD           MoD            SuD          ExD 
  Desirable performance (quality) level 
(Intensity of desirability increases from left to right) 
  Undesirable performance (quality) level 
(Intensity of undesirability increases from right to left) 
    1              2                      3                       4                      5                      6                      7                       8                     9 
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Figure ‎4-4 The‎Modified‎Generic‎Form‎of‎the‎Value‎Curves‎in‎the‎“Diaz‎Approach”. 
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Figure ‎4-5 The Modified Generic Form‎of‎the‎Value‎Curves‎in‎the‎“P2=100‎
Approach”. 
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Figure ‎4-6 The‎Modified‎Generic‎Form‎of‎the‎Value‎Curves‎in‎the‎“P2‎Only‎Approach” 
 
The third part of the second questionnaire was designed to validate the risk management 
framework. Three case study projects were considered:  The Sulaibiya waste water plant in 
Kuwait, the Channel Tunnel in the UK, and the Marsa Allam airport in Egypt.    
The Sulaibiya waste water plant in Kuwait provides the benchmark and catalyst for the 
successful implementation of similar BOT projects in the Middle East region, which are 
particularly relevant due to the scarcity of water in the area.  The Sulaibiya Wastewater 
Treatment and Reclamation Plant in Kuwait won 'Wastewater Project of the Year' in the 2005 
Global Water Awards.  Described by the judges as a "powerful statement of the future of 
water resources across the whole Middle East and North Africa region", the plant is currently 
by far the largest facility of its' kind in the world.  This BOT Infrastructure project was 
chosen because it is a successful BOT Infrastructure project and all expert participants are 
familiar with this project.  This was a large BOT infrastructure project that was completed by 
the Al-Kharafi group; a company well known in Kuwait and to the expert participants.   
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The Channel Tunnel was selected because it is one of the best known examples of BOT 
infrastructure projects in the world.  The expert participants are all familiar with this project 
and felt that they can use their experience to perform a meaningful project evaluation. 
Marsa Allam airport in Egypt completed in 2001, is the first airport to use BOT 
Infrastructure approach in Egypt and was built by the Al-Kharafi Group, a Kuwaiti 
privately owned company which is the same company involved in the Sulaibiya waste 
water plant in Kuwait.  This was of particular interest to our expert participants, as it was 
the first time a Kuwaiti private company was using the BOT infrastructure project method 
outside of Kuwait.  
The case studies mentioned above were presented to 14 of the 16 expert participants who 
replied to the first questionnaire, (as the other 2 did not want any further involvement in the 
research), and they were asked to perform an intuitive evaluation for the model attributes 
and to rate them using a 1–10 scale. 
 
4.7 Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP ) and The Weighting Procedure 
The Analytic Hierarchy Process, (AHP), is a structured method for organizing and analyzing  
decisions that are complex in nature.  Based on mathematics and psychology, it was 
developed by Thomas L. Saaty of the University of Pittsburgh and has been constantly 
developed and improved over time.   AHP is popular with decision-makers who find the 
questions within it easy to answer and the AHP "Expert Choice" software is user friendly, 
(Goodwin and Wright, 2004) and also allows decision-makers to model a complex problem 
in the form of a hierarchical structure which indicates the relationship between the goal, 
objectives, (criteria), sub-objectives and alternatives.  It enables decision-makers to break 
down a decision into smaller parts, proceeding from the objectives to the goal, then to sub-
objectives and finally down to alternative courses of action, (Expert Choice, 2000).   In this 
research, the Eigenvalue Method, (EM), (which is a "scaling process"), was used to assign 
"weights" to the different decision factors.  "Weighing" comprises:  for each pair of Risk 
Factors,‎the‎decision‎maker‎ is‎required‎to‎answer‎the‎question:‎“How‎important‎ is‎Factor‎A‎
relative to Risk Factor B?  Rating the relative "Priority" of the Risk Factor is done by 
assigning a "weight" between 1, (equal importance), and 9, (absolute importance), to the 
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more important Risk Factor, whereas the reciprocal of this value is assigned to the other Risk 
Factor in the pair.  [This is also carried out for the Risk Categories.]    
EM has been used by Saaty (1980) in the development of a multi-attribute decision method; 
the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) which is a versatile decision tool having the ability 
to handle complex or multiple objective, (criteria) decisions. AHP has also has been used in 
many different scenarios, for example, in the selection of suppliers, (Bhutta and Huq 2002) to 
formulate a manufacturing strategy, (Quezada et al. 2003), to determine business 
performance measures, (Cheng and Li, 2001a) to determine priorities in a safety management 
system, (Chan et al. 2004) and for many other important tasks (Saaty and Forman 1992).   
The basic purpose of the eigenvalue method is to derive results, weighted in order of 
importance, from Pairwise comparisons amongst the different attributes of a multi-attribute 
model, to normalize these weights, (eigenvectors), and to detect a similarity in the 
responses.  The Pairwise comparison is performed with the aid of a qualitative scale which 
incorporates the decision-makers subjectivity and experience and which reflects the degree 
to which the decision might discriminate amongst the intensity of relationships between 
attributes. When Pairwise comparisons have been completed for the decision factors, a 
comparison matrix can be formed and the relative importance weights can be found by 
using the eigenvector method of raising the Pairwise comparison matrix to a certain power, 
"p", where the differences amongst its' normalized columns are smaller than a certain value 
of 1×10E
-4
, then all the columns of the matrix become similar, leading to the resultant 
eigenvector, (priority weights).  
A model with 'n" attributes needs n(n–1)/2 comparisons in order to provide enough 
information to form the comparison matrix. This is due to the fact that the comparison 
matrix is reciprocal, i.e. the elements of the main diagonal, ai,j (for all i =‎1,2,…,‎n), are 
equal to unity and the elements below the main diagonal are reciprocal to the elements 
above the main diagonal, ( aj,i = 1/ai,j ).  An example will explain the procedure: 
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The relative importance weights of a three-attribute model according to specific criteria can 
be determined.  For attributes:  A, B, and C. First, it is required o conduct a pairwise 
comparison of the attributes, i.e. compare A with B, A with C, and B with C. Suppose that 
the comparisons yield the following results:  
 A is slightly more important than B;    [ A > B, Scale = 3] 
 A and C are equally important;   [A  =  C]  and    
 C is moderately more important than B;   [C  > B, Scale  = 5] 
  
Which can be shown in a table:- 4-6 
 A B C 
A 1 3 1 
B 1 3  1 
1
5  
C 1 5 1 
Table ‎4-6 
M = 
3,33,23,1
2,32,22,1
1,31,21,1
aaa
aaa
aaa
   =   
11/a1/a
a11/a
aa1
3,23,1
2,32,1
1,31,2
  =  
151
1/511/3
131
 
 
In the case of exact transitivity the relations between the relative importance weights W i 
and the elements a i, j   are given by 
 
                 
j
i
w
w
    = ai,j       for      i, j = 1,2,3 …,n  and                 (4.1) 
 
                  M = 
Wn/Wn....Wn/WWn/W
M0MM
/WnW...../WW/WW
/WnW.....W1/W2/WW
21
22212
111
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Rewriting  
                    
j
i
w
w
 ai,j  = 1                   for      i = 1,2,3 …,n        (4.2) 
Thus, 
                    n
w
1w  a
i
j
n
1j
ji, 

            for      i = 1,2,3 …,n       (4.3)                        
or   
                    nw  a j
n
1j
ji, 

wi                    for    i  = 1,2,3 …,n          (4.4) 
 
The above formula can be expressed in the following matrix equation format: 
 
                    M w = n w                                                                (4.5) 
 
In exact transitivity where the relationship ai,j = wi /wj is not valid, it was noted by Saaty, 
(1980), that if matrix M is reciprocal, then small changes in ai,j keep the maximum 
eigenvalue‎λ‎max  close to n and there is still a unique solution for the relative weights of the 
different parameters, (i.e., wi and wj can change to allow for the change in  ai,j from the ideal 
case). Thus (4.4) can be written as  
 
                    

j
n
1j
ji, w  a  λ max  wi           for    i  = 1,2,3 …,n           (4.6) 
 
The problem reduces to finding the eigenvector, w` which satisfies  
 
                    M w` = λ max w`                                                        (4.7)   
The procedure used to compute the eigenvector, w`, consists of raising the comparison 
matrix to the power P where the differences within its normalized columns are smaller than 
a‎particular‎value,‎ε,‎(i.e.,‎0.001).‎The‎eigenvector,‎w`, is any of the normalized columns of 
the matrix (M`)
P
.  
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Saaty (1980) suggested‎that‎the‎variation‎of‎λ‎max due to small changes in ai,j  could be used 
as a measure of consistency,  and developed the consistency index CI  which measures the 
closeness of a comparison matrix to a true consistent matrix. The closer CI is to zero the 
more consistent is M  
CI = 
1n
nmax


                                (4.8) 
The consistency ratio, (CR) = CI/RI,   compares the consistency index of a matrix M with a 
random index (RI) given by a randomly generated reciprocal matrix of the same order as M 
and gives an indication of whether the comparison matrix is more logically consistent, or 
more random. Saaty derived the random index from a sample of size 100 of a randomly 
generated reciprocal matrix of size n using a scale where the elements ai,j  (for all i 
=1,2,3,…,n–1 and j =‎1,2,3,‎…n >i) could assume the following values: 1/9, 1/8, 1/7, 1/5, 
1/4, 1/3, 1/2, 1,  2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. This procedure resulted in the creation of a 
reciprocal matrix by making the elements of the main diagonal, ai,j (‎ for‎ all‎ 1,2,3,…,‎n), 
equal to unity and the elements below the main diagonal reciprocal to the elements above 
the main diagonal (aj,i = 1/ai,j ). The averages of RI according to matrices of different 
dimensions are given in Table 4-2. A consistency ratio of 0.1 or less was considered as 
acceptable by Saaty (1980). If this limit is exceeded, then in order to improve consistency, 
the decision-maker should revise his pairwise judgement. In this study a computer software 
program‎“Expert‎Choice”‎is‎used‎to‎compute‎the‎eigenvector.‎For‎the‎above‎example,‎w` = 
(0.405,‎0.114,‎0.481),‎λ‎max = 3.029, CI = 0.015, and CR =0.025 < 0.10.  
 
Matrix 
order (n) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Random 
index (RI) 
0 0 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 1.51 1.48 1.56 1.57 1.59 
Table ‎4-7 Random Consistency Index (Saaty 1980). 
 
4.8 Attributes Value Function 
 In‎previous‎studies,‎ the‎ term‎“value‎ function”‎ represents‎various‎different‎concepts. Diaz 
and Ioannou (1995) considered the value function to indicate a function used to transform 
an outcome, (i.e., the performance level of an attribute), into the decision- makers relative 
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worth for this outcome.  Transforming an attribute performance level to its worth score, by 
means of a value function, is more complicated than estimating the performance, (quality), 
level of an attribute directly through the use of a quantitative scale. It was very difficult to 
choose appropriate quantitative constructs to represent the model attributes, so a qualitative 
scale, common to all attributes, was considered to be the best solution for the development 
of the framework. The worth score of an attribute, Vi (xi), is a non-dimensional number 
representing the performance level for a specific project.  In order to calculate the "worth" 
score of an attribute, its performance level must be qualitatively assessed, and then the 
value function used to transform the subjectivity assessment into a numerical scale.  In this 
study, the modified performance scale and the value curve are used to develop the 'worth" 
score of the viability model attributes. See figures 4-3 to4-6.  
 
4.9 The Delta Dimension (δ) 
 The‎ delta,‎ (δ),‎ dimension‎ is‎ a‎ term‎ used‎ in‎ situations‎ where‎ the‎ performance‎ of‎ a‎ single‎
dominant attribute is low enough to reject the project or at least to make the project 
unattractive‎for‎promotion‎by‎the‎private‎sector.‎The‎total‎δ‎is‎calculated by summing all the 
“local‎deltas”,‎(i.e.,‎the‎delta‎of‎each‎attribute),‎that‎is‎ 
δ =  

n
1i
δi                                                       (4.9) 
An equation was developed by Diaz and Ioannou (1995).‎ ‎Here‎δi represents the delta of 
attribute i. If the intensity of an attribute is less than a certain threshold P1, (the cut-off 
point),‎set‎by‎the‎decision‎maker,‎ its‎δi is‎ set‎equal‎ to‎„zero‟,- otherwise‎ it‎ is‎set‎ to‎„one‟.‎‎
So,‎ δi = 0, whenever a dominant attribute, i, has a performance level. xi  ≤  P1, i.e.  
Whenever Vi (xi) = 0. The total contribution of the risk management framework attributes 
can‎ be‎ calculated‎ by‎multiplying‎ the‎ local‎ delta,‎ δ,‎ in‎ the‎ product‎of‎ each‎ attribute local 
weight by the "worth" score and summing the results as 
V(x) =   

n
1i
ii  i  i )(xvwδ               (4.10) 
In‎ this‎ study,‎ the‎ local,‎ δi ,  is always set equal to 1, because all the risk management 
framework attributes are considered very important, (dominant), and have different effects 
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on the project risks which means that any attribute performance value should be considered 
in the evaluation. The total contribution of the individual attributes to the total project risks 
can be found from the following equation  
  V(x) =    

n
1i
ii  i )(xvw                                     (4.11) 
4.10 Documentation 
Another data collection method for gathering relevant data is from documentation in the 
public domain, (i.e. government reports, company annual reports, newspapers, articles, 
etc.).  If sufficient accessible data exists, then according to Barnes, (2001), documentation 
can be considered to be an efficient and effective source of information. However, as 
Merriam, (1988), points out, there are disadvantages in that documents may contain 
information that the researcher cannot understand, and very often they have been produced 
by anonymous people, thus making it difficult to determine their authenticity and accuracy. 
As a data-collection method there are advantages and disadvantages of documentation. The 
advantages of this method are as follows. 
1. There is no requirement for a written procedure which must be followed. 
2. It provides useful data for use in triangulation. 
3. According to Barnes (2001) it‎ can‎ be‎ used‎ to‎ trace‎ the‎ company‟s‎ activities‎ over‎
time. 
4. No special skill on the part of the researcher is required. 
The disadvantages of the documentation method are as follows: 
1. It may be difficult to gain access to the document records required. 
2. Care must be taken to overcome the possibility of inadequacies and bias within 
the documents, (Barnes 2001). 
3. The documentary records may be unsuitable, limited or even unavailable for the 
purpose of the study.  
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Organizational documents are another valuable source of information used in case studies 
(Bryman, Bell 2007). These may constitute both private and public records, Creswell 
(2004). For several reasons, it is likely according to Yi (2009) that documentary 
information is useful for every case study objective.  One main reason is that information 
can be obtained in areas which cannot be found through other methods, such as the 
financial performance of an organization. Another reason is that, according to Bryman 
(1989) they can validate information collected through other means. They are particularly 
useful in this respect for case studies that enable the researcher to verify the correct names 
of places, people and processes that were mentioned in interviews.  
The documents, which were collected, provided a good source of data from which 
inferences were made about the risk management style and/or they provided other specific 
details concerning risk factors in the projects. Documents used in this research provided 
information regarding risk and risk management in BOT infrastructure projects, which 
could not be directly observed Patton (2002).  However, as Patton (2002) pointed that 
studying and comprehending documents is a skill required for qualitative research and is 
considered necessary for a researcher in such a research inquiry. 
4.11  Observations 
According to Merriam (1988) observations are a primary source of data in case study 
research and can be used as an initial data source to identify and shape the final elements 
which are involved in the study, so that a researcher can modify the data-collection 
procedures during the observations (Graziano, Raulin 2007).  Observation methods can be 
used in conjunction with statements and words collected during interviews in order to 
describe the facts and people in natural settings (Amaratunga et al. 2002).  Creswell, 
(2004),‎ defined‎ observations‎ as‎ “the process of gathering open-ended, first hand 
information by observing people and places at a research site”.‎ ‎Patton‎ (2002) describes 
them‎ as‎ the‎ “fieldwork”.‎ Merriam‎ (1988) suggested several reasons why and when a 
researcher might want to use observation methods: 
 The degree to which a researcher captures behaviour in interviews is limited; 
observations notice things that may lead to understanding a phenomenon. 
 144 
 
 Observations are powerful in recording behaviours as they are happening. 
 Observations are the best technique to use when a fresh perspective about a 
phenomenon is required. 
 Observations are the most appropriate alternative when participants do not feel 
free to discuss the topic under investigation. 
This research did not use observation as a data-collection method, as it was not feasible 
since the phenomenon on which data was to be collected was not observable for the 
purposes of this research for a number of reasons.  One of these is that the pre-construction 
phase of BOT projects takes years, and time and cost preclude observation of the process 
and participants.  BOT infrastructure projects, as other construction projects, are temporary 
coalitions formed from many organizations, such as clients/sponsors, contractors, design 
teams, subcontractors, lenders, lawyers, etc. and access to these meetings is impossible. 
4.12  Methodological Triangulation 
In social research, triangulation applies to situations in which two, or more, dissimilar 
measuring instruments or approaches are used (Singleton et al. 1993). Triangulation uses a 
combination of methodologies, which do not have the same weaknesses, for the study of a 
particular phenomenon. The effectiveness of triangulation lies in the fact that the 
weaknesses in one particular method will be compensated by the counter-balancing strength 
of another (Amaratunga et al. 2002). When both quantitative and qualitative techniques are 
used to study a topic, a great deal of insight is gained and the method is very powerful for 
making inferences and drawing conclusions, as illustrated in Figure 4.3 (Fellows and Liu, 
1997). 
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Quantitative data Qualitative data
Analysis and
testing
(statistical?)
Analysis, testing?
Theory and
literature (previous
research)
Results
(relationships)
Results (patterns)
Causation / explanation (discussion)
Insights and
inferences
Conclusions and
recommendation
 
Figure ‎4-7Triangulation (Source: Amaratunga et al., 2002) 
 
Triangulation, as a research support method, has the following advantages for collecting 
both quantitative and qualitative data. 
1. It‎provides‎new‎lines‎of‎thinking‎by‎noting‎surprises‎or‎paradoxes;‎and‎“turns‎ideas‎
around”,‎providing‎fresh insights (Rossman and Wilson 1991). 
2. It enables the confirmation of both sets of data since achieving the same result by 
different methods produces greater confidence in the results. 
3. It helps to elaborate and develop analysis and provides richer details (Rossman and 
Wilson 1991). 
4. It overcomes the limitation of a particular method by using the strengths of the other 
methods. 
5. It provides flexibility in data investigation so that an overall picture of the research 
topic can be developed.   
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4.13  Summary 
This chapter has presented an extensive account of the particular research methodology 
used in this research. It has focused on introducing a rigorous presentation of the flow of 
activities followed in the research inquiry. It also presents the research methodology, 
adapted by the author, to build up and identify the research framework. The author began 
by representing the philosophical position of the research, first by selecting a research 
strategy with a positivist focus in order to establish risk factors for BOT infrastructure 
projects in Kuwait. The research then takes on a phenomenological focus to investigate the 
research topic more deeply.  
The manner in which the research methodology was be conducted and processed was 
considered. The methodology consists of a system of explicit rules and procedures on 
which the research is based and on which knowledge is evaluated. 
The research methodology in this chapter is divided into two stages: In the first stage, 
several risk factors, (quantitative and qualitative), are specified that would affect the BOT 
infrastructure project risk management. A questionnaire was felt to be the most appropriate 
type of gathering data and useful for the identification of risk factors which would have an 
effect on BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait. These risk factors are necessary to support 
the‎ author‟s‎ views‎ to‎ emphasize‎ the‎ importance‎ of‎ the‎ research‎ work‎ and‎ to‎ show‎ how‎
appropriate procedures should be planned. A study methodology flowchart was produced 
and followed by an explanation of the criteria used in the selection of the expert participants 
for the risk assessment questionnaire and the results from the first stage questionnaire 
would be used to develop a risk management framework in the next chapter. 
The research then moves to the second stage, involving a second questionnaire, which 
includes three different parts; the first involves the identification and classification of the 
risk factors and the removal of the redundant risk factors. 
In the second part, the risk factors were evaluated pairwise, by expert participants, under 
their main categories according to their relevance in order to save extensive effort and time 
in determining their inter-relationships and evaluation.   
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The third part was designed to validate the risk management framework by the use of three 
case studies: the Channel Tunnel Project in the UK, the Sulaibiya Waste Water Plant in 
Kuwait and the Marsa Allam Airport in Egypt. 
The three above case study projects were used for number of reasons: first, to achieve an in-
depth investigation; second, to use multiple methods of data collection; third, to triangulate 
data in order to enhance the validity of the research findings; and fourth, to change the 
research findings into a generalized form.  
These in-depth investigations provide the researcher with important benefits including: 
discovering what is, and is not, important; finding the appropriate procedures and processes 
and the reasons for them; discovering the major risk factors that have an effect on BOT 
infrastructure projects in Kuwait.  Mathematical methods were used to process the data. 
Finally, the prioritization of risk categories and their sub-factors was examined using 
methodological triangulation. 
In the next chapter, the first stage, Framing Stage, of the research methodology, is discussed 
in detail. 
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Chapter 5  Questionnaire Results, Data Analysis and 
Framework Construction 
5.1 Introduction  
The research methodology consists of two main stages: the framing stage and the risk 
management framework stage. This chapter is particularly concerned with the framing stage 
of the research methodology, as presented in Section 4.5, and provides an understanding of 
the risks that affect on BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait. Also, this stage will provide 
support and direction for further research work. 
The major aim of this research is to extract types of Risk that affects BOT projects in 
Kuwait and the second aim is to develop a framework that will enable to deal with these 
risks and try to decrease or prevent them.  
The methodology for this research began with the design of the questionnaire. It is of a 
quantitative type because it attempts to investigate and explore the importance of BOT 
project risk factors. The first questionnaire has the aim of identifying the most important 
risk factors affecting BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait. 
This chapter is intended to provide information concerning the most important risk factors 
surrounding and inside BOT projects. Therefore, the data collected via a questionnaire is 
presented, analyzed and discussed in order‎ to‎ understand‎ respondents‟‎ perceptions‎
regarding their experiences in BOT infrastructure project Risks. The questionnaire was 
distributed within Kuwait to carefully chosen professionals with experience of BOT 
infrastructure projects and because of the poor state of the postal system in Kuwait, the 
questionnaire was distributed and collected by hand, which resulted in a100% response rate.  
 This chapter reports and discusses the information provided by these BOT infrastructure 
experts. The questionnaire was designed to assess the common risk factors affecting the risk 
of BOT infrastructure system, and to rank the common BOT infrastructure risks according 
to their relevancy to each of the project categories (appendix A).  It was sent to sixteen 
BOT professionals representing different sectors, (financial, legal, consultancy, developers, 
university professors, and official agencies), which is comparable to and more than used in 
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previous studies, (Dias and Ionnou, 1996 and Salman et al. 2007). Their answers 
characterize their understanding of BOT infrastructure risk factors relating to their 
experience with a BOT infrastructure projects.  The sixteen respondents all comply with the 
criteria set out in Section 4.5.2. 
The experts completed the survey and expressed their readiness to provide more support to 
this research project. The collected data from the questionnaires are tabulated and discussed 
in the following sections. 
The analysis was based on results gained from above questionnaires that targeted different 
aspects of risks affecting the BOT infrastructure projects, firstly the Risk Factors Affecting 
the BOT Infrastructure Project System in Kuwait and secondly the Assignment of BOT 
Risks to Each Project Category.  
In the first part of the questionnaire participants were asked to rate and provide answers on 
a nine point scale in which one refers to an extremely low significance level and nine refers 
to an extremely high level significance.  
In the second part of the questionnaire participants were asked to rate their answers on a 
five points scale where one refers to no relation at all and five refers to extremely related.   
The results in this chapter are explained in the same order as the questions were asked in the 
questionnaire; the data mainly focuses on the numerical aspects of analysis where the 
average‎mean,‎percentage‎and‎the‎rank‎numbers‎are‎used‎to‎determine‎the‎study‟s‎overall‎
outcome. It is essential to understand that no inferential tests were used in this section as the 
above statistics were the main concern through which the research aims and objectives are 
to‎be‎answered.‎The‎importance‎of‎risk‎factors‎was‎ranked‎based‎on‎participants‟‎scores‎and‎
evaluation. Generally, the risk factor that generated the highest mean number is ranked first 
and is considered the most influential, and the risk factor that generates the lowest average 
mean is ranked last. In this manner, the researcher is able to reach a conclusion as to which 
one(s) of these factors are considered highly relevant to BOT infrastructure projects in 
Kuwait.  
The current study makes use of the same risk analysis factors as previous studies of BOT 
infrastructure projects in other countries, (Tiong 1992; Levy 1996; UNIDO 1996; Gupta 
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and Narasimham 1998; Ranasinghi 1999; Ozdoganm and Birgonul 2000; Salman et al.; 
2007, Ebrahimnejad et al. 2010). 
5.2 Population and sample description 
In this research, the population is made up of experienced professionals in the industry of 
BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait, who are especially involved in the development of 
BOT infrastructure projects.  The reason as to why there is such a low number of BOT 
infrastructure projects experts used in this research is because it was difficult to identify and 
contact such people, however, the sample selected represents many different sectors, i.e. 
financial, legal, consultancy and development, university professors, and official agencies.  
One of the most important concerns about the population and the sample of the target 
participants is to define a convenient and satisfactory sample that would represent the 
overall population involved in BOT infrastructure projects.  
Finding the right people with the required expertise in BOT infrastructure projects in 
Kuwait was difficult because the private sector companies in Kuwait together with the 
respective Kuwaiti governmental departments tend to be uncommunicative and unhelpful as 
a means to protecting their interests. 
. In order to overcome this concern, three main strategies were taken into account: 
 Information was gathered from acquaintances about Senior Managers of private 
companies and Kuwaiti government departments working on BOT infrastructure projects 
in Kuwait. 
 Regularly, in Kuwait there is a conference regarding BOT infrastructure projects and 
Senior Managers, Consultants and government officials were identified as the people who 
have the right background and experience to assist in this research. 
 During the distribution of the questionnaire, further candidates came to light, whom were 
requested to participate in this research and participated. 
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5.2.1 Respondents‟ personal backgrounds  
This section identifies the backgrounds of the respondents in terms of their positions within 
their organizations. A summary of the results is presented in Table 5.1.  
 
Position of the respondent Number Percentages BOT Project 
Project Company Manager 4 25% 
Bubiyan Island Development, (2) 
Bubiyan Harbour development project, (2) 
Project Head Of Site offices 3 18.75% 
Sulaibiya Waste Water Plant, (1) 
Bubiyan Island Development, (1) 
Bubiyan Harbour development project, (1) 
Engineering Consultant 4 25% 
Silk City- known as Madinat Al Hareer, (2) 
Kuwait International Airport Expansion Plan 
- New Passenger Terminal Two, (2) 
Management Construction 
Consultant 
2 12.5% Sulaibiya Waste Water Plant, (2) 
Financial Consultant 2 12.5% 
Sulaibiya Waste Water Plant, (1) 
Souk Sharq Shopping Mall (1) 
Government Consultant 1 6.25% Failaka Island Development Project, (1) 
Total 16 100%  
Table ‎5-1 Respondents' personal backgrounds 
5.3 Risk factors affecting the BOT infrastructure project system  
In the first Part of the Questionnaire a number of risks categories were collected and 
grouped according to previous studies of BOT infrastructure projects in other countries, 
(Tiong 1992; Levy 1996; UNIDO 1996; Gupta and Narasimham 1998; Ranasinghi 1999; 
Ozdoganm and Birgonul 2000; Salman et al. 2007; Ebrahimnejad et al. 2010). 
 All participants were asked to rate and indicate the significance level of the BOT risk 
factors within each category of risks, using a nine-point scale (1-9).‎On‎this‎scale‎“1”‎means‎
extremely‎low‎level‎of‎significance,‎and‎“9”‎extremely‎high‎level‎of‎significance. The risk 
categories are Country Risk, (Political & Regulatory Risk), Financial Risks, Revenue Risks, 
(Economic and Demand), Promoting Risks, Procurement Risks, Development Risks, 
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Construction Risk and Operating Risk, (firstly Performance and secondly Cost Overrun and 
Liability). 
5.3.1 Country Risk (Political & Regulatory Risk) 
The first risk to be introduced is the Country Risk, referring to political and regularity risks. 
This category is divided into 13 risk factors each explaining a different risk with regard to 
Country Risks. After calculating the mean number for all the thirteen risks, they are ranked 
and the standard deviation, as well as the percentage, was calculated. 
Country Risk  (Political & Regulatory Risk) 
Mean x  SD % Rank 
Government instability                                         7.50 1.37 10.68 
1 
Government failure to provide permits necessary for construction, 
maintenance, and operation of the project 
6.56 2.53 9.34 
2 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system that enforces 
contracts and provides a framework to resolve disputes 
6.50 2.90 9.25 
3 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) 6.13 3.03 8.72 
4 
Changes on general legislation affects the project                6.06 3.07 8.63 
5 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts  5.50 2.88 7.83 
6 
Changes on legislation affecting technical standards and the use of 
technology for the construction and maintenance and operation of 
the project facility 
4.94 2.77 7.03 
7 
Government interference in the operation of the facility (tariff 
levels) 
4.94 2.11 7.03 
7 
Expropriation 4.69 2.52 6.67 9 
Changes in physical policy (tax law and royalties) 
                      
4.44 2.76 6.32 
10 
Privatization arrangement 4.38 2.22 6.23 11 
Nationalization 4.38 3.56 6.23 11 
Changes to the legislation that determines the repatriation of funds 
policy                                                                              
4.25 3.04 6.05 13 
Table ‎5-2 This table shows the average rating, SD, percentage and the rank number for risks 
within the category of country risk. 
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It‎ was‎ found‎ that‎ the‎ “Government‎ instability”‎ factor‎ was‎ ranked‎ first‎ being‎ the‎ most‎
influential and important factor within the country risk category (𝑥   = 7.50, SD = 1.37).  
Since 2005, Kuwait has had 6 governments all of which have had ministers resign due to 
being questioned about graft indicating a lack of continuity in governance with the result of 
serious delays in approving/financing BOT projects which discourages foreign investment. 
The current government, headed by the Prime Minister, is likely to pass a controversial 
economic stimulus package that was proposed by the previous government but opposed by 
parliament. The present government will likely pass the stimulus package as an emergency 
law. However, when a new parliament is elected, it has the power to cancel the emergency 
law.  
It is worth noting that the new parliament will not be able to question the new and current 
prime-minister about the stimulus package. It will, therefore, resort to questioning other 
government ministers.  The make-up of the new parliament is likely to be similar to the 
dissolved parliament. As a result, if elections are indeed held within 2 months of the 
resignation of the present government, the new parliament is likely to question the passage of 
the economic stimulus package   as   an   emergency   law   and   may   scrap   it.   If   this   
happens,   it   would   create   more   serious problems for the government, as by then, some 
companies would have benefited from the bill, making its' termination more difficult. 
However, the Government may not hold elections within the constitutional period. If this 
happens, there is a serious likelihood of visible civil unrest, manifested in street protests and 
demonstrations. It was reported late last year, (2011), that Kuwaiti security forces have 
already prepared themselves for such an eventuality. 
The‎second‎most‎highly‎rate‎ factor‎ is‎“Government‎failure‎to‎provide‎permits‎necessary‎ for‎
construction,‎ maintenance,‎ and‎ operation‎ of‎ the‎ project”.‎ This‎ factor‎ generated‎ a‎ slightly‎
lower mean than the first ranked factor, (𝑥   = 6.56, SD = 2.53).  Due to the many changes in 
the Kuwaiti government over the last few years, decisions on providing permits for projects 
are far and few between because one never knows whether the new government will revoke 
the permit(s) as has happened recently to the Agility Logistic Co. involved in running a 
container terminal, including port and harbour management, (2008). 
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Thirdly is "Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system that enforces contracts and 
provides a framework to resolve disputes".  (𝑥   = 6.50, SD = 2.90). The Kuwaiti judicial 
system works at a slow pace and often frustrates claimants so that they give up, however it 
does recognize, and enforces, foreign judgments when reciprocal arrangements are in place. 
The Direct Foreign Capital Investment Law states that Kuwaiti courts are accountable for 
resolving any disputes concerning a foreign investor and other parties, (-arbitration is 
permitted). Few contracts in Kuwait contain clauses specifying arbitration when in dispute. 
Kuwait has not developed any effective antitrust laws to discourage wrong doing, and its' 
bureaucracy can be compared to that of a developing country. When government intervention 
does occur, however, it is to the benefit of Kuwaitis', usually. 
Fourthly,‎the‎“Outbreak‎of‎hostilities‎(wars,‎riots,‎and‎terrorism)”‎risk‎factor‎(𝑥   = 6.13, SD = 
3.03).  Kuwait's neighbours Iran and Iraq, both have links to terrorism.  Any foreign 
contractors in Kuwait must still be vigilant with respect to their personal safety and to the 
safety of their personnel. For security reasons the Kuwaiti government has an agreement to 
have several American Army bases in Kuwait which can be possible targets for terrorist 
attacks. Depending on how the future government moves forward to revive the economy and 
improve the lives of ordinary people, there may be Bahraini type disorder in the country.  
Fifthly, Changes in general legislation effects on the project 𝑥   = 6.06 and SD = 3.07.  Do not 
promote confidence to prospective private investors as in Kuwait there have been at least two 
changes, (in 2006 and 2008), because of concerns about transparency, corruption and fairness 
of the tendering process.   Finally, "Lack of commitment to concession contracts" (𝑥   = 5.50 
and SD = 2.88), due to disputes within governmental bodies concerning transparency and 
openness of the tendering process which has led to several large contracts being cancelled 
within the last three years, i.e. Dow Chemicals, ($17 Billion, Kuwait National Petroleum Co 
(KNPC) cancelled building a refinery, $4 billion,) which has deterred foreign private 
companies from investing.  The least influentially rated‎factor‎was‎“Changes‎to‎the‎legislation‎
that‎determines‎the‎repatriation‎of‎funds‎policy‎“which‎was‎ranked‎last‎in‎the‎13th‎place‎(𝑥   = 
4.25, SD = 3.04), which makes private investors more confident in proceeding with BOT 
projects. However two different factors which had similar means and were both ranked in 
11th‎ place:‎ “Privatization‎ arrangement,‎ Government‎ interference‎ in‎ the‎ operation‎ of‎ the‎
facility‎(tariff‎ levels)",‎and‎‎ ‎"Nationalization”‎all‎with‎a‎mean‎of‎𝑥  =4.38 and SD=2.22 and 
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3.56, respectively.  The Government has little or no interest in Nationalization because of 
lack of expertise and/or personnel. 
5.3.2 Financial Risks  
The financial risk contained seven possible risks, each one was rated by all participants, and 
all these factors were then ranked according to their mean average across all participants. 
Table 5-3. Below shows the average rating, SD, percentage and the rank number for risks 
within the category of financial risks. 
 
2. Financial Risks 
Mean 
𝑥 
SD % Rank 
Failure to raise finance 6.44 2.50 17.67 1 
Undeveloped general business 
environment 
6.31 2.57 17.32 2 
Difficulty in the resale of the equity  4.94 2.11 13.55 3 
Default on loan or bond repayments 4.88 2.80 13.38 4 
Non viable project  4.81 2.26 13.21 5 
Default on interest payments 4.75 2.67 13.04 6 
Inappropriate financial structure  4.31 2.94 11.84 7 
Table ‎5-3 Average rating, SD, percentage and the rank number for risks within the category 
of financial risks. 
The‎first‎factor‎to‎receive‎the‎highest‎rating‎mean‎was‎found‎to‎be‎“Failure‎to‎raise‎finance”‎
with a mean of (𝑥   = 6.44, SD = 2.50).  Irregularities in the Kuwait Stock Exchange forced 
it to close recently, 16
th
 May 2012, because it failed to submit its' quarterly financial results.  
As the Stock Exchange is the main source of financing large private sector projects this 
indeed is a major issue, (Khaleej Times May 2012). 
http://theextinctionprotocol.wordpress.com/2012/05/16/kuwaits-financial-crisis-brewing-
31-investment-firms-suspended-in-trading/). The global financial crisis has made banks 
cautious with respect to lending money for capital projects. 
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In‎the‎second‎place‎is‎the‎“Undeveloped‎general‎business‎environment”‎risk‎factor‎(𝑥   = 6.31, 
SD = 2.57). Over the past few years, Kuwait has passed a series of economic reform 
measures, including new capital markets, as well as labour and privatisation laws, and has 
created a $115 billion investment to be undertaken by the public and private sectors in the 
four-year development program.  These‎ measures‎ will‎ contribute‎ to‎ the‎ “Kuwait‎ Vision‎
2035,”‎ a‎ sweeping‎ plan‎ to‎ transform‎ the‎ country‎ into‎ a‎ regional‎ finance‎ and‎ trade‎ hub‎
(www.ForbesCustom.Com). However amongst businessmen there is a perception of 
inefficient Government beaurocracy which is somewhat justified a Kuwait is ranked as 142
nd
 
out of 183 countries for starting a business.  The least influential factor according to 
participants‎is‎the‎“Inappropriate‎financial‎structure”‎(𝑥   = 4.31, SD = 2.94). Currently, there 
is a lack of adequate banking regulations that prevent foreign investment.  Banking 
Regulations should be developed   so that the legal structure prohibits a clash of interests 
regarding allied parties dealings. Which can be realized that by further strengthening the 
supervision capacity by engaging and training inspectors which will cut down the time of the 
on-site supervision phase.  
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5.3.3 Revenue risks  
The Revenue risks category was divided into 13 factors each explaining a different risk with 
regard to Revenue risks. After calculating the mean number for all the thirteen risks, they 
were ranked and the standard deviation as well as the percentage was calculated. 
3. Revenue Risks ( Economic & Demand) Mean, 𝑥 SD % Rank 
Failure to receive revenues from principal (end 
user) 
6.50 2.25 9.21 1 
Changes in demand of the product or the facility 
over concession period due to economic 
downturns competing facilities. 
6.44 1.67 9.12 2 
Change in economic policies 6.31 2.27 8.95 3 
Error in forecasting demands for service 6.13 2.03 8.68 4 
Tariff fight with competing facilities 6.06 2.02 8.59 5 
Accuracy of demand with the existing facilities 5.75 1.91 8.15 6 
Social acceptability of user pay policy 5.56 2.25 7.88 7 
Low historical pricing of services 5.25 2.29 7.44 8 
Exchange rate fluctuation 4.88 2.09 6.91 9 
Convertibility to foreign currency 4.69 2.44 6.64 10 
Inflation 4.63 2.06 6.55 11 
Reliability of demand and growth of forecasts 4.44 2.63 6.29 12 
Variation in interest rate 3.94 2.35 5.58 13 
Table ‎5-4 Table shows the average rating, SD, percentage and the rank number for risks 
within the category of revenue risks (Economic and Demand). 
The‎first‎ranked‎factor,‎that‎was‎considered‎the‎most‎important,‎in‎this‎section,‎was‎“Failure‎
to‎receive‎revenues‎from‎principal‎(end‎user)”‎(𝑥   = 6.50, SD = 2.25).  For services such as 
electricity and water, government officials do not collect/ask for payment of bills.  
Therefore, ordinary people just do not pay their bills. This has become the "norm" in 
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Kuwait and as a result, all moneys due are cancelled after 5 years because people cannot be 
expected to pay the full accumulated amount in one go. This extends to the private sector as 
well, where private companies do not pay any utility bills either.   This has become standard 
practice and is a part of Kuwaiti culture as the government rarely enforces existing laws and 
does not prosecute any people/companies.  Also, recently, people are advised by some MP's 
not to pay any utility bills because the MP's are making promises that the bills will be 
cancelled and paid by the government as a form of vote chasing. 
For example, the Kuwaiti Ministry of electricity has major obstacles those difficulties in 
meter reading and also fee collection. Moreover, the political philosophy of tolerating 
nonpaying consumers is another and even more serious issue. 
 
The‎second‎important‎factor‎which‎is‎“Changes‎in‎demand‎of‎the‎product”‎with‎a‎mean‎of‎(𝑥   
= 6.44, SD = 1.67). In, 2009, the Kuwaiti government has taken a number of steps to 
liberalize the economy and create new opportunities for both domestic companies and 
international investors. For example, the parliament passed a series of economic reforms for 
new capital markets, labour and privatization laws. This year, 2009, the government launched 
a $107 billion plan to modernize‎ the‎ country‟s‎ infrastructure,‎ giving‎ Kuwait‟s‎ hard-bitten 
investment companies a golden opportunity to make up losses incurred during the crunch. 
The plan covers a wide range of projects, including construction of a national railway, a 
metro system, a causeway, and various airport schemes and tourism projects. Mr. Al 
Marzooq said that the attention of local and foreign investors has already turned to 
infrastructure companies such as construction and cement.  This has gone some way to 
counteract the worsening of the global economy over the last three years. 
In‎the‎third‎place‎is‎the‎“Changes‎in‎economic‎policies”‎factor‎with‎a‎mean‎of‎(𝑥   = 6.31, SD  
= 2.27).  Kuwait's economic policies change whenever a new government is voted into 
power, presently approximately every year.  New governments have been known to cancel 
existing contracts and permits amidst accusations by same new government that when the 
contracts/permits were issued by the outgoing government, there was little to no transparency 
and graft taking place, for example, the ongoing Dow Chemicals court case in the US 
regarding the cancellation of the contractor agreement by the incoming government. 
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The reasons for changes in economic policies have been addressed above, but in 2011, the 
Muthanna Investment Company (MIC), launched a "Business Optimism Index".  The 
Business Optimism Index on Kuwait is issued quarterly and is based on a survey conducted 
amongst a sample of the country's business community, representing key sectors of the 
country's economy and will measure the optimism in the Kuwaiti business community, 
gauge their expectations and measure how this relates to the current economic environment 
in Kuwait, regionally, and globally. The index is intended to be an aid to companies 
planning for the future. 
The‎ least‎ important‎or‎significant‎factors‎were‎“Variation‎ in‎ interest‎rate“(𝑥   = 3.94, SD = 
2.35,‎ and‎ “Reliability‎ of‎ demand‎ and‎ growth‎ of‎ forecasts”‎ 𝑥   = 4.44, SD = 2.63 
respectively). According to the World Bank survey, lending Interest rates in Kuwait were 
4.9% in 2011. (Lending interest rate is the rate charged by banks on loans to prime 
customers.) http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.LEND.  
In (2009) a Business Optimism Index, was introduced which is a quarterly survey of 
business sentiment in companies such as hydrocarbons, financial enterprises, transport and 
communications. The index measures the pulse of the business community and strives to 
make up for a dearth of economic indicators in the local market.  The index is intended to 
be an aid to companies planning for the future. The trend over the last few years is that 
Kuwaiti's have started to shop in supermarkets, previously where mainly the ex-pat 
community has shopped, and as a result, due to increased disposable income the 
supermarkets have thrived. 
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5.3.4 Promoting Risks. 
Promoting Risks Mean 𝑥 SD % Rank 
Lack of experience 
6.63 2.47 17.58 1 
Lack of expertise 6.56 2.45 17.41 2 
Lack of independent management 6.44 2.48 17.08 3 
Inability to allocate risks to participants best 
able to manage them 
4.81 3.21 12.77 4 
Lack of negotiation skills 4.69 3.14 12.44 5 
Financial weakness 4.63 2.87 12.27 6 
Inability to define the specific functions of 
each member of the promoting team 
3.94 1.84 10.45 7 
Table ‎5-5 Average rating, SD, percentage and the rank number for risks within the category 
of promoting risks. 
Table 6-4 above shows the average rating, SD, percentage and the rank number for risks 
within the category of promoting risks. There are a number of risks associated with the 
Promoting‎risks,‎these‎risk‎factors‎were‎rated‎and‎ranked‎according‎to‎their‎mean.‎“Lack‎of‎
experience”‎appeared‎to have received the highest mean among other risk factors, it showed 
a mean of (𝑥   = 6.63) and a standard deviation of (SD = 2.47). Lack of experience is due to 
several factors concerning administration of an organization of the contract by both 
governmental departments and private companies.  This relates to the supervision of the site 
by all parties, how to deal with relationships between sub-contractors and how to deal with 
relationships between the employers and the labor force.  Experience is needed by both the 
governmental departments and private companies, (and their sub-contractors), of suitable 
and relevant project management skills for Kuwait.  Experience is needed in inspection for 
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quality, of build and quality of design. Also, experience is needed to provide appropriate 
training for proper operation after handover. 
The‎ second‎most‎ influential‎ factor‎was‎ found‎ to‎be‎ the‎ “Lack‎of‎ expertise”‎with‎ a‎mean‎
slightly less than the first factor (𝑥  = 6.56, SD = 2.45). Lack of expertise is due to Lack of 
experience and the only way to overcome this is to conduct more projects and gain 
experience/expertise on site.  Presently, the Kuwaiti Government, together with the private 
sectors, uses a lot of foreign labor to do the work.  There is a shortage of highly skilled 
productive workers, i.e. Scientists & Engineers and of those working in the company, due 
to cultural values and belief, there is a perception that there is a lack of work ethic. Any 
projects now require for the private sector to train Kuwaitis and transfer of modern 
management techniques including practical, technical and marketing expertise.  
Furthermore the Kuwaiti Government is encouraging the private sector in Kuwait to expand 
and take up more contracts, with the aim of creating jobs for more Kuwaitis. This in turn 
will lead to more training of Kuwaitis.  The government is also encouraging the export of 
national products, (-not just oil!). 
In third place, the "Lack of independent management" factor, (𝑥   = 6.44, SD = 2.48).  
Promoting the BOT project is the responsibility of the government, and there is a shortage 
of capable manpower that can convince private investors that the government is committed 
to the project and to distribute information regarding the project to any interested/affected 
parties including the general public.  This is the reason as to why the Audit Bureau was 
introduced.  The least influential factor to have the lowest mean on the risk scale is the 
“Inability‎ to‎define‎ the‎ specific‎ functions‎of‎each‎member‎of‎ the‎promoting‎ team”‎which‎
scored a mean of (𝑥  = 3.94) and a standard deviation of (SD = 2.84).  Management needs to 
effectively develop and implement overall contracts management strategies and define 
specific job functions for each individual /department.  
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5.3.5 Procurement Risks  
Procurement Risks Mean  𝑥 SD % Rank 
Changes in project specifications 
6.56 2.19 18.17 1 
Expensive and long tendering process 6.50 2.19 17.99 2 
Lack of integrity on the (tendering process) 6.38 2.13 17.65 3 
Delay in granting concession  4.50 2.94 12.46 4 
Unrealistic expectations of the principal due to 
lack of experience and experts  
4.25 2.72 11.76 5 
Intellectual rights not protected 4.19 2.26 11.59 6 
Innovative ideas not being rewarded by the 
principal  
3.75 2.77 10.38 7 
Table ‎5-6 this table shows the average rating, SD, percentage and the rank number for risks 
within the category of procurement risks. Further information can be seen in the table below. 
Procurement risks category was constructed from seven related risk factors, after being 
rated on the risk scale from 1-9,‎it‎was‎found‎that‎the‎highest‎ranked‎risk‎is‎the‎“Changes‎in‎
project‎specifications”‎risk‎factor,‎(𝑥  = 6.56, SD = 2.19), which can be addressed by careful 
identification of requirements before finalizing the contract as there normally is a financial 
penalty to pay for implementing any changes made afterwards.  There is a need for the 
Audit Bureau to oversee contracts and verify the final specification.  The same independent 
monitoring body should be consulted with respect to any additional changes and 
modifications to the contract and approval for changes should be authorized before 
implementation. 
In‎second‎place‎is‎the‎“Expensive‎and‎long‎tendering‎process”‎factor‎with‎a‎slightly‎lower‎
mean number (𝑥   = 6.50, SD = 2.19), therefore they can be considered the most influential 
risk factors within the Procurement risk category as by their nature, BOT projects are large 
and complex projects which require very careful and very detailed analysis and perceptive 
understanding.  Extensive time is taken up by the preparation and agreement of the 
specification. 
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Thirdly, "Lack of integrity in the tendering process", (𝑥   = 6.38, and SD = 2.13), 
discourages private companies in tendering for BOT contracts. The Audit Bureau is to 
oversee contracts should also carry out an audit of current practice, legislature and 
institutional infrastructure to eliminate the possibility of any wrong doing. 
Al-Hamad in (2007) noted that 6 of the 12 contracts approved by the Ministry of Finance in 
Kuwait in the 1990's were later cancelled for violations, (i.e. for alleged graft, corruption 
and bribery), and, in fact, only 10 projects have been carried out over the last forty years.  
Unfortunately, according to Taleb, (2008), billions of Kuwaiti Dinars have left the country, 
since there were much better opportunities elsewhere and Kuwaiti legislation has prevented 
the procurement of BOT projects.  
 According to Curran (2008) the Audit Bureau were concerned about the fairness and 
transparency of the award processes and possible irregularities in their implementation and 
for this reason, in 2006, they suspended several lucrative BOT projects which had been 
granted to the private sector by four government bodies, including the Public Authority for 
Industry, the Public Customs Department, the Touristic Enterprises Company, and the 
Finance Ministry. The government had then appointed a ministerial committee to carry out 
a review of these projects (Curran 2008).   While the investigations were taking place, all 
work on any new Kuwaiti BOT projects stopped until 2008 when, in January, Law No. 7 
“seeking‎to‎establish‎and‎clarify‎a‎structure‎for‎the‎BOT‎model‎in‎Kuwait”‎was passed by 
parliament (Curran 2008).  Under this new law, government bodies needed to obtain the 
approval‎of‎a‎new‎„supreme‎committee‟,‎without‎which‎it‎would‎be‎impossible‎to‎enter‎into‎
a BOT agreement which involved state-owned land. The committee would consist of senior 
administrators, such as the head of the environmental authority, and would be chaired by 
the Minister of Finance and include the Minister of Public Works and the Minister of 
Municipality.  The purpose of the committee is to set BOT policy, to review and issue 
approvals and to administer a sub-committee with the remit of coordinating all technical 
aspects of the reviews (Curran 2008). 
Furthermore, for Sulaibiya Wastewater project tendering for the contract started in October 
1998 and bids were received in April 2001.   The Sulaibiya Wastewater project was approved 
by The Ministry of Public Works and awarded BOT contract to Utilities Development 
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Company (UDC).  The formal signing of the contract was delayed until May 2001 by 
unsuccessful legal action over aspects of the tender process and the plant opened in 2004. 
On‎the‎other‎side‎the‎“Innovative‎ ideas‎not‎being‎rewarded‎by‎the‎principal‎”‎showed‎the‎
lowest mean on the risk scale (𝑥  =4.19, SD=2.26), leading to employees being 
unenthusiastic about making  any suggestions, which in the longer term would be more 
beneficial to the project and  reduce costs had the suggestions been implemented, -in whole 
or even in part. 
 
5.3.6 Development Risks  
The Development risks category was made from eight related risk factors. As it was done 
with previous categories, all participants were asked to rank the importance of these points on 
the risk scale of 1-9 points. 
Development Risks Mean 𝑥 SD % Rank 
Excessive development cost 
7.13 1.54 16.06 1 
Delays in design approval 6.69 2.44 15.07 2 
Use of technology that may be proving 
economically or structurally non-viable  
6.63 1.86 14.93 3 
Changes in design during construction  6.50 1.83 14.65 4 
Incomplete design scope  4.69 2.91 10.56 5 
Inadequate specifications and standards  4.63 2.92 10.42 6 
Short design life  4.31 2.91 9.72 7 
Incompatibility with existing facilities and 
services  
3.81 2.69 8.59 8 
Table ‎5-7 Average rating, SD, percentage and the rank number for risks within the category 
of developmental risks. 
The‎Development‎risks‎category‎shows‎that‎the‎“Excessive‎development‎cost”‎factor‎is‎the‎
most influential of the eight categories receiving a mean of 𝑥  =7.13 and a standard deviation 
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of SD=1.54 means that some private investors may be un-enthusiastic about bidding for a 
BOT project due to high development costs which they may never recover.  
In‎ the‎ second‎ rank‎ came‎ the‎ “Delays‎ in‎ design‎ approval”‎ risk‎ factor (𝑥  =6.69, SD=2.44), 
may be due to the fact that the private contractor has to deal with officials from the 
government who have many other duties to perform and the officials who are empowered to 
make a final decision may be difficult to reach.  
In third place is "Use of technology that may be proving economically or structurally non-
viable" risk, (𝑥   = 6.63 and SD = 1.86). Excessively sophisticated technology may not be 
practicable in some BOT projects, not only increasing to the initial cost of the project but 
increasing operation, maintenance and repair costs.  Suitable technology needs to be 
updated during the operating time of the plant and be fit for purpose during, and after, the 
handover at the end of the concession period.   
Fourthly, "Changes in design during construction" (𝑥   = 6.50, and SD = 1.83), can add a 
significant cost. The causes of project change may be due to technological changes, changes 
in the customer expectations/requirements, changes in government and policies and/or 
changes in the economy. In BOT contracts there are usually conditions and financial 
penalties to pay whenever a change is made to the specification taking into consideration 
that the completion date for the project may not be met.  In this case both the Government 
and the private sector have to share the risk and come to a new agreement. 
The least influential risk factor within the development risk category was found to be the 
“Incompatibility‎with‎ existing‎ facilities‎ and‎ services”‎ receiving‎ a‎ mean‎ of‎ 𝑥  =3.81 and a 
standard deviation of SD=2.69 should not be an issue due to feasibility studies undertaken 
during the procurement stage. 
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5.3.7 Construction Risks 
Construction 
Risk 
Mean, 𝑥 SD % Rank 
Cost-overrun 
risks 
6.75 1.81 39.71 
1 
Performance 
related risk 
5.88 2.55 34.56 
2 
Safety related 
risks 
4.38 2.68 25.74 3 
Table ‎5-8 Average rating, SD, percentage and the rank number for risks within the category 
of construction risk 
The construction risk was constructed of three risks.‎ It‎was‎ found‎ that‎ the‎ “Cost-overrun 
risks”‎ generated‎ the‎ highest‎mean‎number,‎ (𝑥   = 6.75, SD= 1.81) and may be due to not 
having the Audit Bureau oversee the project.  Cost over runs might be also related to 
providing an initial unrealistic estimate of the project cost, inadequate project management.  
Unproductive use of materials and resources together with increased prices of materials can 
considerably contribute to cost over runs and finally, (but not least), "unforeseen events" 
such as disruption/delays due to weather or the economical/political situation.  Completion 
guarantees could be rewarded by performance incentives. 
In‎ second‎ place‎ is‎ the‎ “Performance‎ related‎ risk”‎ (𝑥  =5.88, SD=2.55), whereby (sub-
contractors do not complete their part of the project on time or to the required standard or 
specification.  Performance incentives could be introduced to encourage the contractor to 
complete their part on time and to specification.  
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5.3.8 Operating Risk 
 Operating Risk Mean 𝑥 SD % Rank 
Unavailability of power supply 6.69 2.36 9.16 1 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 6.56 2.28 8.99 2 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate 
the facility 
6.50 2.13 8.90 3 
Inappropriate operating methods  6.13 2.47 8.39 4 
Lack of license to operate facility  4.94 2.52 6.76 5 
Error in training cost estimates 4.94 2.08 6.76 5 
Inability to perform as expected   4.88 2.60 6.68 7 
Latent Construction Defects 4.81 2.37 6.59 8 
Incompatibility with associated facility 4.75 2.46 6.51 9 
Operations and maintenance contractors may not 
meet the quality standards 
4.69 2.63 6.42 10 
Inability To Meet Increase In Demand  4.63 2.83 6.34 11 
Equipment Failure Or Accidental Damages  4.63 2.36 6.34 11 
Inappropriate operating conditions  4.56 2.34 6.25 13 
Changes in local ecosystem due to the 
environmental impact caused by project during the 
operation phase   
4.56 2.16 6.25 13 
Accidents and labour injuries  4.31 2.12 5.91 15 
Insufficient time allowance for maintenance  4.19 2.32 5.74 16 
Employee dishonesty   3.81 2.10 5.22 17 
Vandalism  3.25 2.21 4.45 18 
Table ‎5-9 This table shows the average rating, SD, percentage and the rank number for risks 
within the category of operations risk (Performance & Cost Overrun and Liability). 
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Operating risk was divided included 18 factors; the factors were ranked as previous sections. 
The‎ first‎ ranked‎ factor‎ in‎ this‎ sections‎ was‎ “Unavailability‎ of‎ power‎ supply“‎ (𝑥  =6.69, 
SD=2.36).  The demand for electrical power in Kuwait has doubled over the last fourteen 
years and meeting the demand is becoming more and more difficult.  In Kuwait, every 
summer temperatures can reach 55° Celsius with the consequence of having a high peak load 
every July and August.  The peak load increases every year in proportion to the size of 
increase in population. 
Stable electrical supply is crucial for development of BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait 
and the government is in the process building an adequate and stable electrical supply system, 
i.e. The Ministry of Electricity and Water, (MEW), is planning and constructing several new 
power stations in conjunction with the private sector.  
Followed‎by‎the‎“Error‎in‎operation‎and‎maintenance‎cost‎estimate”‎with‎a‎mean‎of‎(𝑥  =6.56, 
SD=2.28), is a concern for private sector even though  BOT contracts should stipulate that 
there is a warranty and maintenance contract in place to repair any equipment.  The BOT 
contract should also include an insurance clause for loss and damage to the project facilities 
by means of a mandatory insurance package.  The BOT contract should state that there is to 
be regular inspection of the facility to ensure that satisfactory investment programme and 
maintenance regimes are followed.  Also, in the BOT contract there may be a requirement for 
a technical assistance agreement between the suppliers of the equipment and the project 
company.  
In‎the‎third‎place‎is‎the‎“Unavailability‎and‎quality‎of‎personnel‎to‎operate‎the‎facility”‎factor‎
with a mean of (𝑥  =6.50, SD=2.13) can be initially addressed by the private sector who are 
required by the BOT contract to provide the personnel and expertise to run and operate the 
facility to a good standard including any technical documentation.  BOT infrastructure 
project contracts in future in Kuwait must include provisions that the private sector provides 
education and training to Kuwaitis in order ensure that the operation of the plant is 
maintained to a good standard.  This becomes crucial when approaching the end of the 
concession to allow smooth transfer and operation of the plant. 
In fourth place is "Inappropriate operating methods", 𝑥   =  6.13 and SD = 2.47.  This risk 
factor is due to a shortage of highly skilled productive workers, i.e. Scientists & Engineers  
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and of those working in the company, due to cultural values and belief, there is a perception 
that there is a lack of work ethic.  It can be overcome by having experienced and reliable 
management personnel.  Good management personnel as well as experienced operating 
personnel are needed to operate the plant.  The senior management of the plant makes the 
operating decision policy and arranges for the training, maintenance and inspection regime of 
operation system of the plant. 
5.4 The Structure of the Project Risk Management Framework  
The research aim is to develop a framework that will enable decision makers in the private 
and public sectors decide how to deal with the risks that affect BOT infrastructure projects in 
Kuwait and allow decision makers to investigate ways to decrease or prevent them.  The most 
important task in the development of a multi-attribute decision Framework is the 
identification of the relevant Framework attributes.   
The first questionnaire included all of the eighty Risk Factors grouped together in their 
respective Category Risk sections for the BOT infrastructure projects and expert 
participants were requested to rank the Risks Factors in order of importance with respect to 
their experience of BOT Infrastructure projects. 
The most important Risk Factors, (i.e. Government instability, Lack of experience), were 
identified and classified into five main categories, (i.e. Countries Risk, Development risks, 
etc.).  The reason for combining the original eight risk categories into only five risk 
categories was to make the comparisons of the factors easier and more meaningful to the 
respondents, and to make the calculations easier, i.e. to reduce the size of the comparison 
matrix).  Also, this was based on the assumptions that the brain can simultaneously process 
7±2 items, Miller (1956).  Risk Factors were listed according to their relative importance in 
descending order by the participants, (i.e. the most important risk factor is at the top, the 
second most important risk factor is second, etc.).  
Information collected from the first questionnaire was analyzed by using the mean average, 𝑥 , 
standard deviation, SD, percentage and ranking which resulted in Figure 5.1, which is a Risk 
Management Framework for BOT Infrastructure Projects specific to Kuwait showing the 
ascendency of the twenty-eight different Risk Factors within their respective Risk Category. 
Each Risk Category is taken to be of equal significance, (weighting), with respect to the 
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others whilst the Risk Factors were "graded" in descending order of importance within their 
Risk Category.  
The information gathered from the expert participants from the first questionnaire are shown 
in Tables 5-2 to 5-9.  Within each Risk Category, i.e. Country Risk, the Risk Factors are 
listed, in the Framework shown below, in descending order of importance, (-with the most 
important at the top).  This process is repeated for all Risk Categories from information in the 
above Tables. 
The original eight Risk Categories have been combined into five with the Financial Risk 
being combined with Revenue Risk; Promoting Risks have been combined with Procurement 
Risks; and finally, Construction Risks have been combined with Operating Risks to show five 
categories, for reasons mentioned earlier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5-1 Risk Management Framework for BOT Infrastructure Projects specific to Kuwait 
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5.5 Risk categories assignment to BOT projects groups 
The objective of studying the risk factors affecting Kuwaiti BOT infrastructure projects in 
this study is to indicate the most important risk factors in different BOT infrastructure 
projects. Naturally, each project has its' own risks and different policies may be used to 
allocate and mitigate the same risks in different projects due to the different countries 
conditions.  However, determining the most important risk factors that will mostly be 
inherent in any BOT project which will offer the benefit of decreasing the vast cost in 
money and in time.  
The second part in the first questionnaire deals with risks in BOT projects which includes 
identification, assignment, and evaluation of risk significance levels in each group of 
projects on qualitative‎ scale‎ from‎„1-5‟.‎Previous‎studies‎of‎BOT‎risks‎(Tiong‎1992,‎Levy‎
1996, UNIDO 1996, Gupta and Narasimham 1998, Ranasinghi 1999, Ozdoganm and 
Birgonul 2000, Salman et al, 2007, Ebrahimnejad, Mousavi and Seyrafianpour, 2010), 
classified the sources of risks in ten different risk categories. Each category consists of a 
group of risk sub-factors, the classification and identification of these risks and their sub-
factors are mentioned in detail in chapter two. Assignment of risk categories to each project 
group with their average significant levels, the standard deviations of responses, (Appendix 
A), and rank of risk factors are shown in tables 5-9 to 5-12. 
This section of the results explains a number of risk categories that could have an effect on 
the BOT infrastructure project system. A number of possible risks were selected and 
evaluated by 16 participants, all of whom were asked to rate their answers between 1 and 5 
points, (in this case 1 refers to no relation at all, and 5 refers to absolute relation of the risk 
factor). The infrastructure projects were divided into four groups the first is called "Public 
Works", secondly "Public Utilities", thirdly "Public/Government Buildings" and fourthly 
"Other Facilities". 
The average mean, Standard deviation (SD), percentage and the rank of each risk factor 
were calculated through Excel. Based on these descriptive statistics the researcher can find 
which risk category has the highest, or least, effect on the BOT infrastructure project 
systems in Kuwait.  
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The risk categories were assessed for all project groups, and each one of these groups was 
assessed with 10 possible risk categories regarding each one of these project groups, i.e. 
political, force majeure, physical, financial, revenue, promotion, procurement, 
development, construction and operation risk category. 
The table 5.10 below illustrates the significance of each type of risk category to each 
different group involved in the project.  The Financial Risk is the most important to all of 
the groups.  It is interesting to note that there is a significant difference in following risk 
categories depending on the type of BOT Infrastructure project.   
For Public Utilities,(i.e. Power Generation), and Other Utilities, (i.e. Industrial plants), the 
Revenue risk is of major concern mainly for the private companies operating the plant 
during the concession period as the private sector is eager to return a profit to the investors.  
Whereas, for Public Works, (i.e. Bridges, airports, roads), and Public/Government 
Buildings, (i.e. Hospital, Schools, Jails), are a services provided by the government for the 
people and funded by the government during the operating period, and may have private 
companies running the project during the life span of the facility. 
The most interesting difference between the four types of BOT Infrastructure projects in the 
table is the significance of the Political risk factor.  In the Public Works, (i.e. Bridges, 
airports, roads), sector the Political risk factor is placed second, whereas in the other three 
project types the Political risk factor is far less important.  The Kuwaiti government and 
investors understand that the Public Utilities,(i.e. Power Generation), Other Utilities, (i.e. 
Industrial plants), / Government Buildings, (i.e. Hospital, Schools, Jails), are always going 
to be needed even when there is a change in government.  However, for Public Works, (i.e. 
Bridges, airports, roads), the private sector seems to be much more cautious about 
embarking on a BOT Infrastructure project which infers that Public Works Infrastructure 
are most susceptible and prone to graft.  The recent frequent change of the Kuwaiti 
government over the recent years has meant that many Public Works Infrastructure projects 
have been re-negotiated or at worse revoked. 
Finally, it can be seen that the Promotion risk category is more important in the Other 
Facilities, (Industrial plants) projects rather than in the other three project groups.  The 
Other Facilities, (Industrial plants) BOT Infrastructure projects include the main industry in 
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Kuwait, i.e. the drilling for and refining of oil.  The oil drilling companies and oil refineries, 
(and the ancillary companies which support the oil industry), promote their interest very 
vigorously due to the sums of potential revenue/profits involved. 
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Revenue 4.13 0.89 11.32 1 
Construction 3.69 1.35 11.11 2 Financial 4.06 0.85 11.14 2 
Operation 3.69 1.08 11.11 2 Promotion 3.94 0.93 10.80 3 
Procurement 3.69 0.87 11.11 2 Operation 3.94 1.24 10.80 3 
Development 3.44 1.21 10.35 5 Construction 3.75 1.34 10.29 5 
Revenue 3.38 1.31 10.16 6 Development 3.56 1.31 9.77 6 
Promotion 2.94 1.44 8.85 7 Procurement 3.50 1.10 9.60 7 
Political 2.94 1.53 8.85 7 Political 3.25 1.53 8.91 8 
Force Majeure 2.88 1.15 8.66 9 Physical 3.19 1.17 8.74 9 
Physical 2.81 1.28 8.47 10 
Force 
Majeure 3.13 1.02 8.57 10 
Table ‎5-10 Assignment of Risk Categories to Infrastructure of Project Types in Kuwait 
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Table 5-11 shows the overall priority of the Risk Categories for all four types of project 
groups shown in Table 5-10 above and the most important categories are discussed below. 
 
Risk factors 
 
Mean age’% Rank 
Financial 
 
3.8750 15.1708 1 
Procurement 
 
2.6250 10.2770 2 
Operation 
 
2.6100 10.2183 3 
Revenue 
 
2.5650 10.0421 4 
Development 
 
2.5325 9.9148 5 
Construction 
 
2.5325 9.9148 5 
Physical 
 
2.2500 8.8088 7 
Political 
 
2.2375 8.7599 8 
Promotion 
 
2.1575 8.4467 9 
Force 
 Majeure 
2.1575 8.4467 9 
Table ‎5-11 Significance Level of Risk Categories Impact on BOT Infrastructure Projects in 
Kuwait 
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5.5.1 Financial Risk Category 
The Financial Risk category was considered as the most important in three of the four 
project types in Kuwait indicating that this is of greatest concern to the private sector and 
governmental departments because in Kuwait because banks are reluctant to lend money 
due to the global recession.  According to "Trading Economics", 14
th
 June 2012, inflation in 
Kuwait is presently stabilized at around 3.6%, down from a high of 10.5% in 2008 at the 
start of the global economic crisis, thus becoming a lesser risk factor over time.  Variations 
in Kuwaiti inflation were not only due to the global crisis in 2008, but due to wage 
increases, currency fluctuations and the rise in demand for food and housing.   
According to Bloomberg's, in May 2007, the Kuwait government removed the link between 
the Kuwaiti Dinar and the US Dollar, meaning that the Dinar is now linked to a basket of 
currencies including the Euro, the Pound Sterling and the Japanese Yen, as well as the US 
Dollar, with the intention to keep the Dinar stable in, (the present), difficult economic 
conditions.   
Private contractors, together with Kuwaiti Government agencies should also seek financial 
backing from international financial institutions such as the World Bank, European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development.  Flexible loan payments should be used whenever 
possible to facilitate the finance for the project and the use of international professional 
consultants who introduce an appropriate financial structure should ensure a smooth flow of 
investment funds.  If required, the Kuwaiti government should also make sure that further 
loans, via an escrow arrangement, are available if the project company's cash flow is 
insufficient. 
5.5.2 Procurement Risk Category 
As the Procurement Risk category shows a significant concern to all parties, the procurement 
process has been amended by the Kuwaiti government with the intention of making the 
procurement process more transparent and fair in order to clarify the roles to be played by the 
government and the private sector, however, the private sector has complained that this has 
made the procurement process more difficult and longer as there has been an increase in 
regulations and red tape.  The increase in paper work and subsequent delays has led to a 
 177 
 
smaller number of tenders being submitted over the last few years. (Amendments to Kuwait's 
state BOT contracts, Law No. 7 of 2008). 
The Kuwaiti government's overhaul of the procurement process was intended to make clearer 
the principal requirements of the project and to expedite the tender process as in the past, 
several potential project promoters spent a lot of time and money to prepare a package to 
procure a BOT infrastructure project only to be disappointed with the outcome and left with 
large costs incurred in the tendering/preparation for the BOT project.  Further amendments 
should be introduced which would restrict the tendering process to smaller number of 
companies and also share the cost of the procurement process especially the areas of research 
and analysis of proposed site, expected demand for the final product(s).  Also, the Kuwaiti 
Government should refund some of the costs for tendering to the private companies and 
should guarantee adequate compensation to the innovating private companies for their 
intellectual property rights. 
5.5.3 Operating Risk Category 
Minimising the Operating Risk is vital to make sure that there is profit to be made during the 
life span of the plant. There are concerns regarding a stable electrical power supply in 
Kuwait, as demand for which has doubled over the last few years the Kuwaiti government 
has responded by signing a US$2.7 billion deal in September 2009, with General Electric of 
the‎ US‎ and‎ South‎ Korea‟s‎ Hyundai‎ Heavy‎ Industries‎ to build a 2,000 MW power plant, 
which is expected to be fully operational by mid-2012. A gas-fired plant at Subbiya, north of 
Kuwait City, is set to start production next year, according to 
www.constructingweekonline.com, (14
th
 June 2010). According to Mohammed Al Khaldi of 
Al Watan Daily, (11
th
 Feb 2010), the city Ali Sabah Al-Salem (Um Al-Haiman, is presently 
under consideration because of environmental factors and pollution.  The Kuwaiti 
government is debating whether to relocate the population, or some of the factories close to 
the city, so as to protect the local population from health hazards such as cancer in which 
there has been a significant increase over the last few years.  
Another concern from the point of view of the private sector are warranty and maintenance 
agreements which may be overcome by a technical assistance agreement between the 
suppliers of the equipment and the project company.   
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In all projects types, good management and operators are needed to run and operate the 
facility after completion which presently is a difficulty in Kuwait and can only be resolved 
with education and training of the indigenous workforce.   
Experienced personnel should be appointed to provide accurate estimates for the safe 
operation and safe maintenance to avoid cost over runs when operating and maintaining the 
plant.  Operating costs overruns can be substantial amounts, but with the use of the correct 
equipment, proven technology can be minimised.  Introducing performance incentives which 
are meant to increase the use safe practice, including quality assurance systems, will lessen 
the risk of cost over run. 
Commercial insurance is available in the case of interruption and stoppage of the plant to pay 
for overheads and loss in earnings. 
5.5.4 Revenue Risk Category 
Revenue risks include could be due to changes in demand of the product due to economic 
downturns or competition.  In the case of failure to receive sufficient revenues from the end 
user, the Kuwaiti government should allow the private company to revise their pricing 
structure, and even provide loans and/or grants whenever the revenues drop below certain 
amounts agreed in the contract.  In the case of competition, the Kuwaiti government is in a 
unique position at the outset of the procurement process to protect the project from 
competition. i.e. there is a guarantee that a competing plant will be built during the lifetime of 
the existing project.  Changing economic policies by the Kuwaiti government is another 
method of guaranteeing agreed revenue earnings, i.e. the Kuwaiti government take a lower 
percentage of the profit thereby guaranteeing the private company's profit margin. Error in 
forecasting long term demands for service(s) may prompt the Kuwaiti government to change 
the length of the concession period of the BOT project with compensation being paid to the 
private company and the time of the handover brought forward.  
 
5.5.5 Development Risk Category 
Decisions made at the initial stages of a BOT infrastructure project may have serious and 
costly consequences which may be detrimental to the overall profitability of the BOT project.  
These decisions may affect the type of technology used in the construction of the project, 
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(which may well increase the development costs substantially), as well as in the operation of 
the facility and subsequently whether the project is fit for the purpose initially intended.  
These developmental risks may be decreased or even prevented by careful selection of known 
and proven technologies and complete with consultants' expertise which this should ensure 
that the development of the BOT Infrastructure project makes a good start. 
The Kuwaiti government and the private company should aim to avoid costly delays in 
design approval by employing experienced and established consultants to finalise the design 
specification.  The design should incorporate apposite technology as well as being 
economical and, finally, the agreed design specification may not be changed during 
construction as this is a considerable source of cost over runs.  Should the design be altered 
during the construction phase then this may have substantial knock-on effects on the whole of 
the project.  High Development costs are a source of concern to the private sector that may 
become un-enthusiastic about bidding for a BOT infrastructure project due to high 
development costs which may never be recovered.  
5.5.6 Construction Risk Category 
Cost over runs tend to be mainly due to incomplete site geological surveys, delays in 
procuring construction materials, technical difficulties, poor management, or by a 
combination of above. Since BOT Infrastructure investors only start receiving income from 
the completed project(s), any delay in completion delays the generation of revenue.  Cost 
over runs result in lower profitability of the project by increasing construction and financing 
costs.  The Kuwaiti government and the private company should have contingency plans in 
place to mitigate for cost over runs by having an efficient quality assurance system in place 
and completion/performance incentives and bonuses together with penalties for delays in the 
construction.  The Kuwaiti government should order the private company to have casualty 
insurance covering personnel as well as plant and equipment.  
5.5.7 Physical Risk Category 
Physical risks are those where there is damage to property or assets that the private company 
own or have in their possession during the construction and the concession periods. Physical 
risks include damage to equipment and/or material and/or facilities and also injury, or worse, 
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to members of the workforce.  This risk is minimal in Kuwait and if this risk does become 
more significant, the Kuwaiti government should issue guarantees and/or provide insurance 
cover.  
5.5.8 Political Risk Category 
Political risks are divided into two categories, instability risks and sovereign risks.  , 
According to Tam (1999) instability risks can mean that not only there are revisions and/or 
cancellations of contracts but also damage and/harm to property and people from riots 
and/or terrorism.  According to Lang (1998) sovereign risk is due to government 
interference, including expropriation of assets, restriction of operating freedom, increases in 
tax or other financial penalties, restraint on the ability to keep profits and any further 
government action which could jeopardize the project.  In developing countries, the 
political Risk factor becomes more and more important  as there may be a sudden and 
violent change in government, which could cause the company to pull out and  end the 
project altogether or the company goes bankrupt.  Kuwait is a developing country and to 
move forward to have a stable government in place where longer term decisions can be 
made and followed through, then: Parliament of Kuwait and the ruling government should 
make a pact to cooperate with each other which will result is a smoother running of the 
country as the conflict between the rulers is lessened.  Any BOT infrastructure project 
under consideration should not be automatically suspended when there is a change in 
government so that there is confidence in the procurement process regardless of the political 
party in power.  Private companies can still protect themselves from the political fallout in 
Kuwait by purchasing Political risk insurance from export credit agencies, (i.e. US 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation or UK Export Credits Guarantee Department), or 
from Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.  
5.5.9 Promotion Risk Category 
The private sector company is responsible for managing a project through all the project 
stages.  In interactions between the Kuwaiti government, Private Sector Company, lender, 
contractors and other interested parties, there should be the necessary experience and 
expertise to minimize this risk.    Reasons for delays include the following factors:  The 
private sector company should ensure that there is sufficient expertise within the negotiation 
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team responsible for the promotion.  The Kuwaiti government and private sector company 
should agree to have an independent management system in place to oversee the project 
which can advise in allocating risks to suitable project team members so as to ensure that 
each party knows who is responsible for certain functions of the project.  For any BOT 
Infrastructure project to be successful, appropriate financing should be in place as weak 
financing will lead to uncertainty and lack of confidence in pursuing the project 
5.5.10 Force Majeure Risk Category 
Some risks are outside the control of the Kuwaiti Government and project investors. Events 
like natural disasters and wars are causes of force majeure risk. Besides the force majeure, 
(or Acts of God), these risks are related to damage to property and to personnel and are 
beyond the control of project investors. Although this risk can be classified as having a low 
chance of happening, the consequences can be quite significant and severe. The investing 
companies should find ways to limit these risks and the Kuwaiti Government, together with 
the private companies, should make provision by including fair clauses to provide relief 
against this type of risk in the Concession Agreement.  The risks can be accommodated by 
taking out Commercial insurance coverage.  The Kuwaiti government should provide 
assurances and give backing to any outstanding debts, and other financial obligations, in 
case of force majeure events which affect of the operability of the project. 
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5.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented the results for first part of the research methodology with 
discussion. This part is a very important stage for gathering knowledge about the BOT 
Infrastructure projects and to provide further direction for this research work by means of 
providing information concerning the risk factors regarding BOT projects and providing a 
strong foundation for implementing the proposed framework in this research.   
The questionnaire survey was carried out via a self-administration questionnaire. The 
responses were tabulated in order to examine and represent responses in terms of 
average, 𝑥  , percentage and the rank numbers with the aim to ascertain the extent of which 
risk factors in risk categories risk affect the BOT infrastructure projects. 
Significant results were presented and discussed and related to BOT Infrastructure projects 
in Kuwait. A Risk Management Framework was developed which shows ranking of the 
most important, or the most influential, Risk Factors affecting the work of the participants 
in the survey.     
All information collected and analyzed in this chapter constitutes important knowledge that 
will be used to build an Analytical Hierarchy Process model to be presented in Chapter 6.  
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5.6.1 Summary 
The first questionnaire assessed the common risk factors which affected the management 
systems for BOT infrastructure projects and to rank the common BOT risk factors 
according to their relevance to each of the project categories on a qualitative scale of 9 
points. After careful selection of the project risk factors framework attributes, 28 attributes 
were extracted from the first questionnaire. The attributes were identified and classified 
under 5 main categories. In order to reduce the size of the comparison matrix and to also 
ensure that the comparison attributes were more meaningful, only attributes of the same 
nature were compared and these were divided into 5 categories. This was following the 
assumption made by Miller (1956) that the brain can simultaneously process 7±2 items. 
The graphs below refer to the results generated from the first questionnaire in which a 
number of risk factors were recognize with regard to their importance to the expert 
participants when related to BOT infrastructure projects.   
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Figure ‎5-2 Country Risk (Political & Regulatory Risk 
 
Figure ‎5-3 Financial Risks 
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Figure ‎5-4 Revenue Risks –Economic 
 
Figure ‎5-5 Revenue Risks-Demand 
 186 
 
 
Figure ‎5-6 Promoting Risks
 
Figure ‎5-7 Procurement Risks 
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Figure ‎5-8 Development Risks 
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Figure ‎5-9 Construction Risk 
 
Figure ‎5-10 Operating Risk-Performance, 
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Figure ‎5-11 Operating Risk- Cost Overrun and Liability 
 
 
Figure ‎5-12 This figure shows the results of the second part of the questionnaire based on 
average for each infrastructure project (public works, public utilities, public/government 
buildings and other facilities). 
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Chapter 6 BOT risk Management Framework result and 
discussion 
The scope of this research is very broad as there are many risk factors that have an 
influence on the actions of decision makers.  The author of this research has constructed a 
BOT infrastructure project risk management framework, using the results from the first 
questionnaire, for companies to evaluate, and thereby accommodate, the various risk factors 
in different stages of the BOT project life cycle. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a better understanding of the risk factors 
mentioned in Chapter 2 and to further prioritize the same risk factors relative to the BOT 
project concept. 
In order to consider and evaluate the BOT project method in Kuwait, a decision-making 
tool is required. From the literature review, it is apparent that no standards are available to 
assist the Kuwaiti Government and/or private companies, in managing the risks for BOT 
projects. This research has developed a general evaluation process which can be used by the 
Government to determine the appropriate importance of each risk. 
6.1 BOT Risks framework Attributes Selection 
In the first questionnaire, the respondents were required to assess the common Risk Factors 
which affected the management systems for BOT infrastructure projects and to rank the 
common BOT Risk Factors according to their relevance within their respective Risk 
Category on a quantitative scale of 1 to 9 points.  The five Risk Categories and twenty-eight 
subsequent Risk Factors can be seen in the Framework, fig. 5.1, whose position in the Risk 
Management Framework was determined by calculating the average mean, 𝑥 , and the 
Standard Deviation,  SD.  All of the five Risk Categories and the twenty-eight respective 
Risk Factors,  were utilized in the second questionnaire which was divide into three parts:  
Part 1: "Relative Importance among project risk factors and categories;   Part 2:  
"Measurement of performance level", (for P2 = 100 approach);  and Part 3:  "Holistic 
Evaluation", (in order to validate the Risk Management Framework);  
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6.2 BOT Project Risk Attributes Relative Weights 
From the responses obtained in the second questionnaire, (from the remaining fourteen 
expert participants out of sixteen, 87.5%, -as the other two did not want to participate any 
more), pairwise comparisons of Risk Factors were carried out by the respondents which 
represented the relative importance of one Risk Factor compared to another, utilizing a 
numerical scale of 1-9. 
 By means of the "Eigen value Method", (EM), in the Analytical Hierarchy Process, (AHP), 
as described in Chapter 4, the "weight" of each Risk Category were calculated relatively to 
each other, as well as the "weight" of each Risk Factor relative to the other Risk Factors 
were‎calculated‎using‎the‎computer‎software‎package‎called‎“Expert‎Choice”,‎ -which also 
uses an Analytical Hierarchal Process, (AHP). 
The five Risk Categories and twenty-eight Risk Factors were carefully input into the Expert 
Choice software, according to the Risk Management Framework, fig. 5.1. 
Next, the values of pairwise comparisons, from the respondents, (second questionnaire), 
were also input into the "Expert Choice" Analytical Hierarchal Process, (AHP) software 
package.  The inconsistency index was calculated by the Expert Choice software using 
equation 5.8. and table:  5.2.  There were two inconsistent responses in the questionnaires 
and the respondents were contacted and revised their responses and the questionnaires were 
returned, (about three months later). 
  
6.2.1 Category Weights 
6.2.1.1 Local Weights 
The project Risk Categories were classified within 5 main categories as shown in Figure 5-
1. Individual results provided by participants for comparison of the relative importance of 
the different categories, as well as the calculated risk category weights, are presented in 
Table 6-1. The results indicate, (Average Weights), that 28% of the respondents, suggest 
the Financial & Revenue Risk category to be the most important  in the project risk 
decision, while 27% find the Country Risks category to be the most important, ranking it 
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2nd in the list. 18% thought that Construction & Operating Risk was the most important 
category, while 17% found Development Risk to be the most important category. 
Promoting & Procurement Risks, (10%), came out as the least important of all.   From this, 
it can be concluded that the Financial & Revenue Risks category is the most important one, 
being slightly ahead of the Country Risks category and about twice as important as the 
Construction & Operating Risk and Development Risk categories. From this, it follows that 
the decision-maker needs to give the highest priority to Financial & Revenue Risks and 
Country Risk factors when carrying out an assessment for project risks in Kuwait. 
 
  R1  R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Category Relative Importance       
CR vs FR 1     1/9  1/3 6     1      1/3  1/2  1/3 4     5     1     1      1/2 2     
CR vs PP 2     
 
1/7 
 1/4 9     3      1/3  1/2  1/3 7     5     3     2     7     5     
CR vs DR 2     
 
1/6 
 1/5 9     1      1/3 2      1/3 7     5     1     1      1/3 7     
CR vs Co 8     1      1/5 9     1      1/5 2  1/5 9     5     1     9      1/3 7     
FR vs PP 7     3      1/2 9     1      1/3 6      ¼ 9     3     1     9     9     7     
FR vs DR 4     5      1/3 9      1/3  1/7 5     1     9     3      1/2 2     3     9     
FR vs CO 4     5      1/5 7     2      1/3 3      1/3 5     3     3     5     2     7     
PP vs DR  1/5 1      1/6 1     1     1     1     1     1      1/3 1      1/5  1/6 2     
PP vs CO 1     1      1/5 1     2      1/3  1/2  1/3 1      1/3 1      1/2  1/4  1/3 
DR vs CO 4     1      1/2 1     3      1/2  1/2  1/5  1/3  1/2 3     5      1/2  1/5 
 
 
Ave wt. 
Legend      CR: Country Risk (Political & Regulatory)    (0.27) 
  FR: Financial & Revenue Risks  (0.28) 
  PP: Promoting & Procurement Risks  (0.10) 
DR: Development Risk   (0.17) 
CO: Construction & Operating Risk   (0.18) 
 
Table ‎6-1 Category Pairwise Comparison Matrix and Relative Weights 
  R1  R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Weights 
CR 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.61 0.25 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.55 0.53 0.24 0.28 0.13 0.44 
FR 0.39 0.51 0.09 0.26 0.17 0.09 0.46 0.12 0.29 0.20 0.21 0.36 0.38 0.37 
PP 0.07 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.18 0.19 0.13 0.22 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.06 
DR 0.18 0.15 0.32 0.04 0.29 0.27 0.09 0.14 0.04 0.09 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.03 
CO  0.06 0.11 0.43 0.04 0.12 0.38 0.15 0.46 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.25 0.10 
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6.2.1.2 Group Weights for five Risk Category  
In order to calculate the contribution weight of each Risk Category to the project risk, the 
overall weight of individual responses, (the group weight), for each Risk Category is 
required.  The geometrical, rather than the arithmetic mean of responses, was used to group 
the individual judgments for each risk category, because, according to Saaty and Aczel 
(1983) the method used to consolidate individual judgments, needs to preserve the 
reciprocal nature of the comparison matrix.  From Table 6-2, it can be seen that the group 
weights of risk categories are almost the same as the average of the local weight.   
It is apparent that the Financial & Revenue Risks category has the highest weight of 31.1%, 
followed by Country Risks which have 23.4%, Construction and Development, 17.1%, 
Development Risks, 17%, and finally, the Promoting & Procurement Risks category, which 
has the lowest weight of 11.4%. 
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Table ‎6-2 Category Group Pair-wise Comparison and Group Relative Weights 
  
Category Comparison 
 
Relative Importance (Geo-mean) 
 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory) vs   
Financial & Revenue Risks  
 
0.90 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory) vs 
Promoting & Procurement Risks  
 
1.61 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory) vs  
Development Risk 
 
1.19 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory) vs   
Construction & Operating Risk 
 
1.65 
Financial & Revenue Risks vs   Promoting & 
Procurement Risks 
 
2.62 
Financial & Revenue Risks vs  Development 
Risk 
 
1.94 
Financial & Revenue Risks vs   Construction & 
Operating Risk 
 
2.19 
Promoting & Procurement Risks vs    
Development Risk 
 
0.60 
Promoting & Procurement Risks vs 
 Construction & Operating Risk 
 
0.56 
Development Risk vs Construction & Operating 
Risk 
 
0.83 
 
Category group weights 
 
 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory)  
 
0.234 
Financial & Revenue Risks 
 
0.311 
Promoting & Procurement Risks 
 
0.114 
Development Risk 
 
0.170 
Construction & Operating Risk 
 
0.171 
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6.2.1.3 Local Weights for Risk Factors 
Twenty-eight Risk Factors in the Risk Management Framework were classified according 
to their relationship to 5 risk Categories, see Fig 5.1.  The relative importance to the 
participants for each risk factor within each risk category and also the local attribute 
weights are presented in Tables 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6 and 6-7.  
Considering the local weights of Risk Factors within their Risk Categories, it is apparent 
that changes in general legislation will affect the project and the regulations in the Country 
Risks Category.  The failure to raise the necessary finance will affect the Financial & 
Revenue Risks Category.  Lack of integrity during the tendering process will affect the 
Promoting & Procurement Risks Category.  Changes in design during the construction 
phase will affect the Development Risk Category.  These are the most significant decision 
factors that will have the maximum impact on the project risk and therefore, they should be 
given very high priority by the decision-maker. 
 
6.2.1.4 Group Weights for the Risk Factors 
The group weights of the Risk Factors were calculated by a similar method to that used for 
the Risk Category group weights, in order to find the contribution of each Risk Factor to its' 
Risk Category.  From the results in Table 6-8, it can be seen that the Risk Categories with 
the highest weights are: Changes in General legislation,0.261), affecting the project in the 
Country Risks category, an Failure to raise Finance, (0.248), in the Financial & Revenue 
Risks category, a Lack of Integrity, (0.305), in the Tendering Process in the Promoting & 
Procurement Risks category, Use of Technology, (0.408), in the Development Risk 
category and  Inappropriate  Operating  Methods, (0.242),  in the Construction & Operating 
Risk category.  The weights of the attributes in each category sum to unity. 
 
6.2.1.5 Composite Weights 
The process of comparison was simplified by classifying the initial eight project risk 
categories under 5 main Risk Categories and then calculating the local attributes weights 
within their Risk Categories.  Afterwards, the similarities and differences between 
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individual weights were checked and the contributions of individual Risk Factors to the 
overall project risk were calculated.  In order to do this, it was necessary to determine the 
individual relative weight of each Risk Factor towards the total project risk, (composite 
weight‎“Wi”).‎ ‎The‎composite‎weight‎of‎each‎Risk‎Factor‎ is‎ equal‎ to‎the‎ local‎weight‎of‎
that‎Risk‎Factor‎“Wi”‎multiplied‎by‎its'‎local‎Risk‎Category‎weight‎“Wc”. 
Wi = W¹*Wc    (6-1) 
The sum of the composite weights of the "Risk Factor Weight" × "Risk Category Weight" 
must equal to unity, so, 
Σ Wi = 1    (6-2) 
The composite weights of the 28 Risk Factors calculated from equation (6-1) for each 
contribution are displayed in Table 6-10. 
The average composite weight of each Risk Factor and its' boundaries of ± standard 
deviation can be seen in Figure 6.1 from results seen in Table 6.13.  
These results show that for the Country Risk Category, the most significant Risk Factor is 
the "Government Failure to Provide Permits", (Composite Weight = 0.0636).    
In the Financial and Revenue Risk Category, the "Failure to Raise Finance" is the most 
important Risk Factor, (Composite Weight = 0.0579).   
The Promoting and Procurement Risk Category, indicates that the most important Risk 
Factor "Lack of Integrity in the Tendering Process", (Composite Weight =0.0629).  
 The Development risk Category shows that "Use of Technology",  
(Composite Weight = 0.0707), is the most significant Risk Factor.   
Finally in the "Construction and Operating Risk" Category, the main Risk Factor is "Cost 
Over-runs", (Composite Weight = 0.0636).  
The expert participants recommend that the BOT project participants should pay particular 
attention to the Country Risk, Construction & Operating and Financial Risk categories. 
However, they also need to be aware of all the other model risks, because their weights are 
relatively close. 
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6.2.1.6 Group Composite Weights 
The relative importance of a risk to the total project is given by its group composite weight. 
This can be found by multiplying the Risk Category Weight, (Table 6-8), by the 
corresponding group Risk Factor Weight, (Table 6-2). 
For example, to find the group composite weight of the Risk Category "Government 
Instability", the group weight of this Risk Factor, (from Table 6-8), must be multiplied by 
the group weight of the Country Risk category, (from Table 6-2).  Therefore, we find that 
the group composite weight of this Risk Factor is: 0.126 × 0.234 = 0.02945 
Table 6-9 shows the group composite weights of Risk Factors, (attributes), towards the 
project risk.  
The highest weight of 7.7%, is allocated to "Failure to raise finance", in the Financial and 
Revenue Risks Category.  Followed by 6.9%, "Use of Technology", in the Development 
Risk Category.  Next is 6.1%, for "Changes in general legislation affecting the project", in 
the Country Risk Category.  Followed by 4.1%, for "Inappropriate operating methods" in 
the "Construction & Operating" risk Category and finally, 3.5%, for "Lack of Integrity in 
the Tendering Process", in the Promoting & Procurement Risk Category. 
In Figure 6-2, the individual range of each Risk Factor Weight shown in the form of a 
column can be seen.  For each a Risk Factor, the lower part of the column represents the 
minimum importance weights, which were assigned by respondents, while the top of the 
column indicates the maximum importance weights. 
The darker line in the middle indicates the group composite weight of the Risk Factor, 
whilst the shaded regions, which can be seen above and below the line of group composite 
weights, indicate the standard deviation of the individual Risk Factor Weights, where half 
of the standard deviation is above and the other half is below the line. Table, 6.13, shows 
the data in figure 6.2 in a table format. 
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A close look at this figure indicates that three Risk Factors have quite a large range between 
their maximum and minimum importance weights.  Changes in the project specifications 
risk Factor will have the maximum range of weight difference, with reference to the 
different‎ replies‎ of‎ respondents,‎ (the‎ minimum‎ weight‎ was‎ given‎ by‎ R13,‎ „government‎
consultant‟‎and‎the‎maximum‎weight‎was‎given‎by‎R6,‎„private‎consultant‟).‎ 
Three Risk Factors have quite a small range,‎(i.e.‎the‎difference‎in‎weights),‎with‎the‎„lack‎
of‎ experience‟‎ Risk‎ Factors‎ having‎ the‎ smallest,‎ due‎ to‎ the‎ fact‎ that‎ respondents‎ have‎
approximately the same view regarding the risk weight for the project team experience. 
 
 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Country Risk Political & Regulatory 
GI      vs.    GFP 
9 1/5 1/2 9 1 1/7 9 1/3 7 1/3 1/4 5 1/2 2 
GI      vs.    NLS 
5 1/9 1/5 1 1/3 1/7 6 1/5 2 1/9 1/4 1/4 1/2 2 
GI      vs.    OH 
8 1 1/5 9 1/3 1/5 3 1/3 9 1/5 1/5 5 1/4 1/5 
GI      vs.    CGL 
2 1/9 1/4 1/2 1 1/7 2 1/7 7 1/9 1 1/2 1/3 1/3 
GI      vs.   LCCC 
7 1/9 1/6 9 3 1/7 8 1/3 9 1/3 3 3 1/5 1 
GFP  vs.   NLS 
1/5 1/9 1/7 1/9 3 1 1/3 ½ 1/3 1/9 3 1/9 1/3 3 
GFP  vs.   OH 
1/7 1 1/2 2 3 1 1/4 1/3 3 3 2 3 1/3 1/7 
GFP  vs.   CGL 
1/9 1/9 1/3 1/7 5 1/2 1/8 1/7 1/7 1/9 5 1/9 1 1/3 
GFP  vs.   LCCC 
1/3 1/9 1/5 7 5 2 1/2 1/5 2 1 5 2 1/2 1/5 
NLS  vs. OH 
1/2 8 1/3 9 1 4 1/2 1/5 7 4 1 9 1/3 1/7 
NLS  vs. CGL 
1/2 2 1 2 3 2 2 ¼ 2 2 3 2 1/2 1/3 
NLS vs. LCCC 
1/2 1 1/3 9 3 2 2 1/3 7 5 3 9 1/2 1/5 
OH vs. CGL 
1/4 1/3 1 1/9 5 1/2 1 1/3 1/9 1/3 1 1/3 1/2 7 
OH vs. LCCC 
3 1/4 1/4 1 5 1/3 2 1/3 1 1/3 4 1/3 2 3 
CGL vs. LCCC 
6 1 1/2 7 2 1/2 7 2 7 4 2 9 2 1/3 
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 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
 
Local Attribute weights 
 
GI 
0.453 0.029 0.037 0.274 0.124 0.026 0.431 0.042 0.484 0.027 0.1 0.152 0.056 0.096 
GFP 
0.024 0.093 0.059 0.061 0.347 0.196 0.033 0.059 0.056 0.088 0.378 0.056 0.107 0.057 
NLS 
0.078 0.347 0.171 0.334 0.189 0.086 0.135 0.096 0.216 0.416 0.162 0.431 0.134 0.039 
OH 
0.116 0.03 0.193 0.028 0.224 0.102 0.153 0.175 0.028 0.089 0.211 0.037 0.261 0.478 
CGL 
0.262 0.244 0.159 0.281 0.07 0.187 0.194 0.376 0.187 0.314 0.099 0.278 0.258 0.128 
LCCC 
0.067 0.278 0.382 0.026 0.45 0.202 0.053 0.252 0.03 0.066 0.049 0.048 0.184 0.202 
Table ‎6-3 Country Risk Political & Regulatory Category & Local attribute weights 
Legend:  
 GI: Government instability 
 GFP: Government failure to provide permits 
 NLS: Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system 
 OH: Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) 
 CGL:  Changes in general legislation affect the project  
 LCCC: Lack of commitment to concession contract  
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Legend:   
 FRF:  Failure to raise finance 
 UGBE: Undeveloped general business environment 
 FRRFP: Failure to receive revenues from principal (end user) 
 CIDP: Changes in demand of the facility over concession period. 
 CIEP: Change in economic policies 
 EIFDS: Error in forecasting demands for service  
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Financial & Revenue Risks 
COR      vs.    PRR 2     9      1/3 2      1/3  1/2 9     9     7     9     9 2     9      1/3 
COR      vs.    UOPS 2     2      1/5 4      1/5  1/3 3     1     5     9     7 2     2      1/5 
COR      vs.    EIO 1     1      1/7 1      1/7  1/2 1     1      1/3 3     7 1     1      1/7 
COR      vs.    UPO 9     3      1/3 5      1/3  1/2 1     5     5     5     7 9     3      1/3 
COR      vs.  IOM 3     3      1/3 8      1/3 4      1/3 3     6     3     7 3     3      1/3 
PRR  vs.   UOPS 3     
 
1/4 
 1/3 3      1/3 1     1      1/6 3      1/3  1/7 3      1/4  1/3 
PRR  vs.   EIO 2     
 
1/7 
 1/4 
 
1/2 
 1/3 1      1/3  1/9  1/7  1/7  1/2 2      1/7  1/4 
PRR  vs.   UPO 7     
 
1/7 
 1/5 3      1/2 2      1/9  1/7  1/2  1/7  1/3 7      1/7  1/5 
PRR  vs.   IOM 2     2      1/3 3      1/3 2      1/9  1/7  1/2  1/2  1/3 2     2      1/3 
UOPS  vs. EIO 2     7      1/6 2      1/6 1     1     1      1/3  1/2 5     2     7      1/6 
UOPS  vs. UPO 7     2      1/6 3     1      1/2  1/6 2     2      1/2 5     7     2      1/6 
UOPS vs. IOM 3     4      1/5 4      1/3  1/5  1/3 7     1     1     3     3     4      1/5 
EIO vs. UPO 8     2     1/ 6     2     1      1/3 2     6     2      1/2 8     2     1/ 
EIO vs. IOM 3     4      1/4 6     3     2      1/3 2     6     8      1/3 3     4      1/4 
UPO vs. IOM  1/3 3     3     1      1/3  1/4 3     1      1/2 1      1/3  1/3 3     3     
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
 
Local Attribute weights 
 
FRF 
0.478 0.056 0.24 0.282 0.294 0.044 0.327 0.041 0.196 0.186 0.28 0.307 0.452  0.564 
UGBE 
0.092 0.386 0.206 0.256 0.037 0.073 0.186 0.079 0.216 0.033 0.024 0.093 0.03 0.03 
FRRFP 
0.115 0.3 0.084 0.184 0.302 0.077 0.164 0.128 0.215 0.062 0.279 0.096 0.73 0.202 
CIDP 
0.154 0.059 0.206 0.175 0.202 0.309 0.234 0.902 0.15 0.1 0.217 0.43 0.248 0.044 
CIEP 
0.08 0.099 0.152 0.026 0.12 0.32 0.047 0.124 1.217 0.353 0.105 0.044 0.118 0.6 
EIFDS 
0.086 0.1 0.111 0.078 0.045 0.177 0.041 0.226 1.075 0.265 0.095 0.058 0.078 0.1 
Table ‎6-4 Financial & Revenue Risk Category & Local attribute weights 
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Legend: 
 LOE:  Lack of experience 
 LE: Lack of expertise 
 LIM: Lack of independent management 
 CIPS: Changes in project specifications 
 ELTP: Expensive and long tendering process 
 LOI: Lack of integrity on the tendering process  
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Promoting & Procurement Risks 
LOE     vs.   LE 1/3  1/2  1/2 
 
1/6 
 1/5 2      1/2  1/3  1/2 3     8     3     
 1/6  1/3 
LOE      vs.    LIM  1/6 1      1/6 
 
1/3 
 1/6  1/4  1/6  1/3  1/6  1/2 3     1     
 1/6 5     
LOE      vs.    CIPS  1/7  1/4  1/7 
 
1/6 
 1/5  1/3  1/7  1/3  1/7  1/9 3     3     
 1/7  1/3 
LOE      vs.    ELTP 
 
 1/3  1/4  1/7 
 
1/6 
 1/7  1/3  1/7  1/3  1/7  1/5  1/3 
 1/9  1/7  1/5 
LOE      vs.  LOI  1/9  1/4  1/9  ½  1/7  1/3  1/9  1/3  1/7  1/5 1      1/9  1/9 5     
LE  vs.   LIM  1/2  1/2  1/2 2     1      1/5 1     2      1/2  1/4 3      1/3 2     5     
LE  vs.   CIPS  1/2 1      1/7  ½  1/5  1/5  1/7  1/2  1/7  1/9  1/7  1/3 2     2     
LE  vs.   ELTP 2      1/2  1/6 2      1/3  1/5  1/7  1/3  1/7  1/5  1/7  1/9 3     1     
LE  vs.   LOI  1/5 2      1/6 2      1/5  1/5  1/9  1/3  1/9  1/5  1/9  1/9  1/2 7     
LIM  vs. CIPS  1/2 2      1/6 
 
1/3 
1      1/4  1/7  1/3 1      1/9  1/7 
1      1/2  1/5 
LIM  vs. ELTP 1     1      1/4 2      1/3  1/3  1/7  1/3  1/7  1/4  1/7  1/8 1      1/5 
LIM vs. LOI  1/8 1      1/4 2      1/3  1/3  1/9  1/3  1/9  1/9  1/9  1/5  1/3 2     
CIPS vs. ELTP 2     1      1/5 7     1      1/3 1      1/3  1/2  1/5  1/2  1/2  1/2 3     
CIPS vs. LOI  1/3  1/2  1/2 6     1     1      1/2  1/2  1/5  1/5  1/9  1/5  1/6 5     
ELTP vs. LOI  1/5 1     1      ½ 3     1      1/3  1/2  1/5 1      1/9 1      1/5 5     
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
 
Local Attribute weights 
 
LOE 
 
0.030 0.074 0.026 0.040 0.029 0.066 0.026 0.058 0.028 0.050 0.196 0.084 0.025 0.113 
LE 
 
0.099 0.162 0.041 0.202 0.083 0.039 0.040 0.115 0.037 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.215 0.286 
LIM 
 
0.113 0.200 0.078 0.112 0.119 0.127 0.057 0.088 0.083 0.079 0.037 0.066 0.106 0.045 
CIPS 
 
0.153 0.156 0.206 0.431 0.221 0.225 0.237 0.168 0.135 0.216 0.097 0.078 0.115 0.284 
ELTP 
 
0.117 0.210 0.367 0.094 0.313 0.306 0.226 0.266 0.272 0.274 0.256 0.367 0.122 0.239 
LOI 
 
0.487 0.197 0.281 0.121 0.235 0.237 0.414 0.035 0.445 0.353 0.387 0.375 0.418 0.034 
Table ‎6-5 Promoting & Procurement Risks & Local attribute weights 
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 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
 
 
Local Attribute weights 
 
EDC 0.046 0.06 0.08 0.333 0.076 0.09 0.065 0.096 0.312 0.042 0.062 0.06 0.167 0.658 
DIDA 0.065 0.493 0.095 0.06 0.083 0.138 0.076 0.169 0.045 0.581 0.057 0.064 0.193 0.083 
UOT 0.368 0.181 0.413 0.274 0.481 0.502 0.401 0.368 0.378 0.218 0.44 0.497 0.047 0.048 
CIDDC 0.521 0.261 0.413 0.333 0.36 0.27 0.458 0.368 0.266 0.159 0.442 0.379 0.593 0.212 
Table ‎6-6 Development Risks Category:  local attribute weights 
Legend: 
 EDC: Excessive development cost 
 DIDA: Delays in design approval 
 UOT: Use of technology 
 CIDDC: Changes in design during construction 
 
  
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Development Risks 
EDC      vs.    DIDA 1/2 1/7 1/2 7 1 1/2 1 1/3 7 1/9 1 1 1 7 
EDC      vs.    UOT 1/8 1/4 1/4 1 1/6 1/4 1/7 1/3 1 1/8 1/6 1/8 3 9 
EDC      vs.    CIDDC 1/8 1/3 1/4 1 1/5 1/3 1/7 1/3 1 1/4 1/8 1/6 1/3 5 
DIDA      vs.    UOT 1/8 3 1/6 1/3 1/8 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/7 3 1/9 1/5 7 2 
DIDA      vs.  CIDDC 1/8 2 1/6 1/7 1/3 1/3 1/7 1/3 1/7 5 1/7 1/9 1/5 1/3 
UOT  vs.   CIDDC 
 
1/2 1/2 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 2 9 1/6 
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Legend: COR:   Cost-overrun risks 
PRR :  Performance related risk 
UOPS: Unavailability of power supply 
EIO :  Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 
UPO :  Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the facility 
IOM :  Inappropriate operating methods 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Construction & Operating Risk 
COR      vs.    PRR 
 
1 1/5 1/4 7 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/5 1 1 1/2 5 
COR      vs.    UOPS 
 
8 1 1 2 1/5 1/5 8 1/3 1/3 1/5 1/5 1/2 2 1/7 
COR      vs.    EIO 
 
1 1/5 1/4 7 1/3 1/3 2 1/3 1/7 1/5 1/3 1/2 1/2 1 
 
COR      vs.    UPO 
3 1/4 1/3 1 1/5 1/3 3 1/3 1/2 1/5 1/5 1/2 2 1/3 
COR      vs.  IOM 
 
3 1/5 1/4 1/5 1 1/4 3 1/3 1 1/5 1 1/4 1/3 2 
PRR  vs.   UOPS 
 
5 1 2 1/5 1/3 1/4 5 1/4 1/2 1/2 1/3 2 3 1/9 
PRR  vs.   EIO 
 
5 1 1/4 2 1/3 1/4 2 1/4 1/2 1/5 1/3 2 1 1/5 
PRR  vs.   UPO 
 
5 2 1/3 1/7 1 1/7 5 1/2 1 1/5 1 2 2 1/7 
PRR  vs.   IOM 
 
5 1/2 1 1/6 1 1/2 5 1 1/5 1/5 1 1/3 1 1/3 
UOPS  vs. EIO 
 
1/7 1 1/4 7 3 2 1/7 1/5 1 1 3 1/2 1/3 2 
UOPS  vs. UPO 
 
1/3 1/2 1/4 1 9 1/2 1/3 1/5 2 1/5 2 1 1 3 
UOPS vs. IOM 
 
1/3 1/7 1/3 1/2 1 1/3 1/5 1/3 2 1/5 1 1 1/4 7 
EIO vs. UPO 
 
5 1 1/4 1/7 1 1/3 3 1/3 3 1/5 ½ 2 1/2 3 
EIO vs. IOM 
 
4 1/7 2 1/7 1/9 1/5 1 1 1 1/5 1 1/2 3 6 
UPO vs. IOM 
 
1/2 1/7 2 1/2 1 1 1/5 2 1/2 1 1 1 1/7 1 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 1 2 3 R14 
 
Local Attribute weights 
 
COR 0.232 0.047 0.056 0.233 0.087 0.05 0.278 0.066 0.084 0.042 0.074 0.087 0.112 0.109 
PRR 0.387 0.16 0.122 0.047 0.105 0.056 0.327 0.088 0.089 0.069 0.105 0.192 0.204 0.028 
UOPS 0.033 0.08 0.058 0.152 0.315 0.176 0.032 0.153 0.241 0.07 0.309 0.137 0.066 0.422 
EIO 0.209 0.117 0.243 0.03 0.168 0.116 0.157 0.203 0.271 0.135 0.161 0.171 0.285 0.23 
UPO 0.061 0.11 0.37 0.208 0.144 0.287 0.062 0.297 0.104 0.342 0.199 0.137 0.074 0.143 
IOM 0.078 0.485 0.15 0.33 0.181 0.307 0.144 0.194 0.205 0.342 0.153 0.276 0.26 0.069 
Table ‎6-7 Construction & Operating Risk Category:  local attribute weights 
 204 
 
6.3 Attributes one-dimensional value function Vi (xi) 
In order to determine the individual contributions of the Risk Factors to the project risk 
index, see equation (4.11), 
  V(x) =    

n
1i
ii  i )(xvw                                     (4.11) 
 it is necessary to find the "worth score", Vi (xi), of each attribute and then to multiply it by 
its relative composite weight. The "worth score" measures the value of a particular Risk 
Factor for a specific project and is a non-dimensional number.  To determine the "worth 
scores" of worth score", first evaluate the performance, (quality), level of this Risk Factor  
and then use a value function to obtain its "worth score", Vi (xi).  This process has been 
described in detail in Chapter 4. 
6.4 Attributes performance (quality) level 
The second questionnaire involved asking the expert participants, (14), to estimate two 
points, P1 and P2, (where the normal is P), which represent the lowest and the highest 
points of each Risk Factor performance, as well as the normal performance level for each 
Risk Factor on the performance scale shown in Figure 4-4.   P1 represents their complete 
discontent and P2, their complete satisfaction with the performance of the Risk Factor 
characteristics and features. In this research, the normal performance level, N, is used in the 
analysis. The individual "worth score" of each Risk Factor, Vi(xi), in every project profile 
was obtained by plotting the performance level points N given in Table 6-12 on the 
corresponding value curve and obtaining the resulting "worth scores" for each approach.  
The value curve used here is the curve of P1=0 and P2=100, as verified in Salman (2003).  
This is because all the modelled Risks Factors and their categories are the most important 
ones and therefore, the performance effects on the project must be considered. 
It is interesting to note that the highest performance, (quality,) levels were obtained by: use 
of technology, unavailability of power supply, government failure to provide permits, cost-
overrun risks and lack of integrity on the tendering process.  The average N is between 
moderately and substantially important.  For other Risk Factors, the average N lies in the 
region between moderately important and slightly important. 
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Attribute Group Weight 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory)   
Government instability 0.126 
Government failure to provide permits 0.101 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system 0.242 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) 0.142 
Changes in general legislation affecting the project 0.261 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts 0.128 
  
Financial & Revenue Risks  
Failure to raise finance 0.248 
Undeveloped general business environment 0.103 
Failure to receive revenues from principal (end user) 0.165 
Changes in demand of the facility over concession period 0.222 
Change in economic policies 0.130 
Error in forecasting demands for service 0.132 
  
Promoting & Procurement Risks  
Lack of experience 0.056 
Lack of expertise 0.079 
Lack of independent management 0.088 
Changes in project specifications 0.207 
Expensive and long tendering process 0.264 
Lack of integrity in the (tendering process) 0.305 
  
Development Risks  
Excessive development cost 0.113 
Delays in design approval 0.115 
Use of technology 0.408 
Changes in design during construction 0.364 
  
Construction & Operating Risk  
Cost-overrun risks 0.106 
Performance related risk 0.130 
Unavailability of power supply 0.150 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 0.184 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the facility 0.188 
Inappropriate operating methods 0.242 
Table ‎6-8 Group Weights for Comparison of Attributes within their Categories  
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Attribute Group 
Composite 
Weight 
Group Composite 
Weight(×10E-2) 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory)    
Government instability 0.029 2.90 
Government failure to provide permits 0.024 2.40 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system 0.057 5.70 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) 0.033 3.30 
Changes in general legislation affecting the project 0.061 6.10 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts 0.030 3.00 
   
Financial & Revenue Risks   
   
Failure to raise finance 0.077 7.70 
Undeveloped general business environment 0.032 3.20 
Failure to receive revenues from principal (end user) 0.051 5.10 
Changes in demand for the facility over the concession 
period 
0.069 6.90 
Change in economic policies 0.04 4.00 
Error in forecasting demands for service 0.041 4.10 
   
Promoting & Procurement Risks   
   
Lack of experience 0.006 0.60 
Lack of expertise 0.009 0.90 
Lack of independent management 0.01 1.00 
Changes in project specifications 0.024 2.40 
Expensive and long tendering process 0.03 3.00 
Lack of integrity in the (tendering process) 0.035 3.50 
   
Development Risks   
   
Excessive development cost 0.019 1.90 
Delays in design approval 0.02 2.0 
Use of technology 0.069 6.90 
Changes in design during construction 0.062 6.20 
   
Construction & Operating Risk   
   
Cost-overrun risks 0.018 1.80 
Performance related risk 0.022 2.20 
Unavailability of power supply 0.026 2.60 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 0.031 3.10 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the 
facility 
0.032 3.20 
Inappropriate operating methods 0.041 4.10 
 
 
 
  
Table ‎6-9 Attribute Group Composite Weight  
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R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Country Risk (Political &Regulatory)             
Government instability 0.137 0.001 0.002 0.166 0.031 0.002 0.075 0.002 0.0264 0.002 0.014 0.024 0.0043 0.007 
Government failure to provide 
permits 
0.007 0.003 0.003 0.38 0.086 0.012 0.006 0.003 0.031 0.012 0.047 0.092 0.016 0.014 
Non-existence of the legal and 
regulatory system 
0.023 0.017 0.008 0.025 0.047 0.017 0.023 0.006 0.118 0.017 0.221 0.039 0.112 0.018 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, 
riots, and terrorism) 
0.035 0.002 0.009 0.017 0.056 0.006 0.027 0.01 0.015 0.006 0.047 0.051 0.01 0.035 
Changes in general legislation 
affecting the project 
0.079 0.012 0.007 0.172 0.017 0.011 0.034 0.002 0.103 0.011 0.167 0.024 0.079 0.034 
Lack of commitment to 
concession contracts 
0.02 0.014 0.018 0.016 0.011 0.012 0.009 0.015 0.017 0.012 0.035 0.012 0.013 0.025 
Financial & Revenue Risks               
Failure to raise finance 0.187 0.029 0.021 0.074 0.05 0.004 0.149 0.005 0.043 0.038 0.058 0.11 0.172 0.207 
Undeveloped general business 
environment 
0.036 0.198 0.018 0.067 0.006 0.007 0.085 0.01 0.063 0.007 0.005 0.033 0.011 0.011 
Failure to receive revenues 
from principal (end user) 
0.043 0.154 0.008 0.048 0.0051 0.007 0.075 0.015 0.063 0.013 0.058 0.025 0.028 0.074 
Changes in demand of the 
facility over concession period 
0.06 0.03 0.018 0.046 0.34 0.028 0.107 0.048 0.044 0.02 0.045 0.154 0.095 0.016 
Change in economic policies 0.031 0.051 0.014 0.007 0.02 0.029 0.021 0.015 0.064 0.072 0.022 0.016 0.045 0.022 
Error in forecasting demands 
for service 
0.034 0.051 0.01 0.02 0.008 0.016 0.019 0.027 0.017 0.045 0.02 0.021 0.03 0.037 
Promoting & Procurement Risks 
Lack of experience 0.002 0.013 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.013 0.003 0.013 0.001 0.003 0.03 0.005 0.001 0.006 
Lack of expertise 0.007 0.028 0.005 0.008 0.015 0.007 0.005 0.025 0.02 0.002 0.04 0.002 0.008 0.016 
Lack of independent 
management 
0.008 0.035 0.009 0.005 0.021 0.024 0.007 0.019 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.002 
Changes in project 
specifications 
0.01 0.027 0.024 0.018 0.039 0.43 0.031 0.037 0.007 0.012 0.015 0.005 0.004 0.016 
Expensive and long tendering 
process 
0.008 0.037 0.042 0.004 0.055 0.059 0.03 0.058 0.014 0.015 0.04 0.002 0.0034 0.013 
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Table ‎6-10 Local Composite Weights of the Attribute towards the Project Risk  
 
 
  
Lack of integrity in the 
(tendering process) 
0.033 0.035 0.032 0.005 0.041 0.046 0.055 0.067 0.022 0.02 0.06 0.022 0.015 0.002 
Development Risks               
Excessive development cost 0.008 0.01 0.026 0.014 0.022 0.025 0.006 0.013 0.013 0.004 0.017 0.014 0.033 0.023 
Delays in design approval 0.012 0.076 0.03 0.002 0.024 0.038 0.007 0.024 0.002 0.053 0.015 0.015 0.038 0.003 
Use of technology 0.067 0.028 0.132 0.011 0.0\139 0.137 0.035 0.051 0.016 0.02 0.1119 0.119 0.009 0.002 
Changes in design during 
construction 
0.095 0.04 0.132 0.014 0.104 0.074 0.04 0.051 0.011 0.014 0.119 0.09 0.116 0.007 
Construction & Operating Risk               
Cost-overrun risks 0.013 0.005 0.024 0.01 0.01 0.019 0.042 0.03 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.028 0.011 
Performance related risk 0.022 0.017 0.053 0.002 0.012 0.025 0.05 0.041 0.006 0.008 0.013 0.012 0.052 0.003 
Unavailability of power supply 0.002 0.009 0.025 0.007 0.037 0.067 0.005 0.071 0.016 0.008 0.039 0.008 0.017 0.043 
Error in operation and 
maintenance cost estimate 
0.012 0.013 0.104 0.001 0.02 0.045 0.024 0.094 0.018 0.016 0.02 0.01 0.072 0.023 
Unavailability and quality of 
personnel to operate the 
facility 
0.003 0.012 0.159 0.009 0.017 0.11 0.009 0.137 0.007 0.041 0.025 0.008 0.019 0.015 
Inappropriate operating 
methods 
0.004 0.055 0.065 0.014 0.021 0.117 0.022 0.09 0.014 0.041 0.019 0.017 0.066 0.007 
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R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory)  
Government instability 13.7 0.1 0.2 16.6 3.1 0.2 7.5 0.2 2.64 1.4 2.4 0.43 0.7 4.2 
Government failure to provide 
permits 
0.7 0.3 0.3 38 8.6 1.2 0.6 0.3 3.1 4.7 9.2 1.6 1.4 2.5 
Non-existence of the legal and 
regulatory system 
2.3 1.7 0.8 2.5 4.7 1.7 2.3 0.6 11.8 22.1 3.9 11.2 1.8 1.7 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, 
riots, and terrorism) 
3.5 0.2 0.9 1.7 5.6 0.6 2.7 1 1.5 4.7 5.1 1 3.5 21.1 
Changes in general legislation 
affecting the project 
7.9 1.2 0.7 17.2 1.7 1.1 3.4 0.2 10.3 16.7 2.4 7.9 3.4 5.7 
Lack of commitment to 
concession contracts 
2 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.5 1.7 3.5 1.2 1.3 2.5 8.9 
Financial & Revenue Risks               
Failure to raise finance 18.7 2.9 2.1 7.4 5 0.4 14.9 0.5 4.3 3.8 5.8 11 17.2 20.7 
Undeveloped general business 
environment 
3.6 19.8 1.8 6.7 0.6 0.7 8.5 1 6.3 0.7 0.5 3.3 1.1 1.1 
Failure to receive revenues from 
principal (end user) 
4.3 15.4 0.8 4.8 0.51 0.7 7.5 1.5 6.3 1.3 5.8 2.5 2.8 7.4 
Changes in demand of the facility 
over concession period 
6 3 1.8 4.6 34 2.8 10.7 4.8 4.4 2 4.5 15.4 9.5 1.6 
Change in economic policies 3.1 5.1 1.4 0.7 2 2.9 2.1 1.5 6.4 7.2 2.2 1.6 4.5 2.2 
Error in forecasting demands for 
service 
3.4 5.1 1 2 0.8 1.6 1.9 2.7 1.7 4.5 2 2.1 3 3.7 
Promoting & Procurement Risks 
Lack of experience 0.2 1.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.3 0.3 1.3 0.1 0.3 3 0.5 0.1 0.6 
Lack of expertise 0.7 2.8 0.5 0.8 1.5 0.7 0.5 2.5 2 0.2 4 0.2 0.8 1.6 
Lack of independent 
management 
0.8 3.5 0.9 0.5 2.1 2.4 0.7 1.9 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 
Changes in project specifications 1 2.7 2.4 1.8 3.9 43 3.1 3.7 0.7 1.2 1.5 0.5 0.4 1.6 
Expensive and long tendering 
process 
0.8 3.7 4.2 0.4 5.5 5.9 3 5.8 1.4 1.5 4 0.2 0.34 1.3 
Lack of integrity in the (tendering 
process) 
3.3 3.5 3.2 0.5 4.1 4.6 5.5 6.7 2.2 2 6 2.2 1.5 0.2 
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 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Development Risks               
Excessive development cost 0.8 1 2.6 1.4 2.2 2.5 0.6 1.3 1.3 0.4 1.7 1.4 3.3 2.3 
Delays in design approval 1.2 7.6 3 0.2 2.4 3.8 0.7 2.4 0.2 5.3 1.5 1.5 3.8 0.3 
Use of technology 6.7 2.8 13.2 1.1 0.139 13.7 3.5 5.1 1.6 2 11.19 11.9 0.9 0.2 
Changes in design during 
construction 
9.5 4 13.2 1.4 10.4 7.4 4 5.1 1.1 1.4 11.9 9 11.6 0.7 
               
Construction & Operating Risk 
Cost-overrun risks 1.3 0.5 2.4 1 1 1.9 4.2 3 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.5 2.8 1.1 
Performance related risk 2.2 1.7 5.3 0.2 1.2 2.5 5 4.1 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.2 5.2 0.3 
Unavailability of power supply 0.2 0.9 2.5 0.7 3.7 6.7 0.5 7.1 1.6 0.8 3.9 0.8 1.7 4.3 
Error in operation and 
maintenance cost estimate 
1.2 1.3 10.4 0.1 2 4.5 2.4 9.4 1.8 1.6 2 1 7.2 2.3 
Unavailability and quality of 
personnel to operate the facility 
0.3 1.2 15.9 0.9 1.7 11 0.9 13.7 0.7 4.1 2.5 0.8 1.9 1.5 
Inappropriate operating methods 0.4 5.5 6.5 1.4 2.1 11.7 2.2 9 1.4 4.1 1.9 1.7 6.6 0.7 
Table ‎6-11 Local Composite Weights of the Attribute towards the Project Risk (× 10E-2) 
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EM Composite Attribute Weights 
 
Risk Attribute 
Figure ‎6-1 Average EM Composite Attribute Weights with its Boundaries of ± Standard Deviation 
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Figure ‎6-2 Group Composite Attribute Weights with Range of Individual Composite Weights 
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R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
AVG 
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Government instability 9 1 6 9 4 4 8 3 8 7 4 7 5 6 5.8 
Government failure to provide 
permits 
9 1 8 9 5 5 7 5 8 8 5 8 4 7 6.4 
Non-existence of the legal and 
regulatory system 
7 1 4 9 4 6 9 6 9 9 4 9 3 7 6.2 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, 
and terrorism) 
6 5 4 7 5 4 8 4 8 6 5 6 7 6 5.8 
Changes in general legislation 
affecting the project 
8 5 4 7 5 6 9 6 7 7 5 7 4 7 6.2 
Lack of commitment to concession 
contracts 
7 1 4 6 4 5 9 5 7 4 2 4 2 5 4.6 
Failure to raise finance 7 6 8 9 2 5 7 6 9 7 3 7 3 6 6.1 
Undeveloped general business 
environment 
6 7 7 7 3 7 6 6 8 4 3 4 7 7 5.9 
Failure to receive revenues from 
principal (end user) 
5 5 6 8 3 7 8 6 8 4 3 4 8 6 5.8 
Changes in demand of the facility 
over concession period 
5 1 4 7 5 7 7 5 9 4 5 4 3 6 5.1 
Change in economic policies 5 6 9 7 1 7 7 7 7 7 1 7 5 6 5.9 
Error in forecasting demands for 
service 
4 5 5 8 3 7 6 7 7 4 3 4 6 7 5.4 
Lack of experience 4 1 5 8 1 6 5 7 8 7 1 7 5 7 5.1 
Lack of expertise 7 9 5 7 1 7 5 7 9 7 1 7 3 7 5.9 
Lack of independent management 4 6 5 8 1 7 5 7 8 6 1 6 6 5 5.4 
Changes in project specifications 4 6 4 7 1 6 4 6 8 8 1 8 9 6 5.6 
Expensive and long tendering 
process 
5 5 8 8 4 6 5 6 7 8 3 6 3 6 5.7 
Lack of integrity in the (tendering 
process) 
6 6 8 8 5 6 7 6 8 6 5 7 5 5 6.3 
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Table ‎6-12 Risk Attributes Performance Level point N in the Performance Scale 
  
 
 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 AVG 
Excessive development cost 4 1 8 9 4 6 5 6 8 9 4 9 4 5 5.9 
Delays in design approval 6 6 5 7 3 6 4 6 8 9 3 9 6 7 6.1 
Use of technology 6 6 8 8 9 7 6 7 7 8 9 8 4 6 7.1 
Changes in design during 
construction 
6 5 7 8 5 4 6 4 8 6 5 6 7 6 5.9 
Cost-overrun risks 7 1 6 8 9 5 6 5 8 6 9 6 6 7 6.4 
Performance related risk 7 6 4 8 5 5 7 5 8 4 5 4 4 6 5.6 
Unavailability of power supply 7 5 4 8 8 6 7 6 8 7 8 7 5 5 6.5 
Error in operation and maintenance 
cost estimate 
4 1 4 7 1 6 7 6 8 6 1 6 6 7 5.0 
Unavailability and quality of 
personnel to operate the facility 
5 5 4 8 5 6 4 6 7 7 5 6 3 7 5.6 
Inappropriate operating methods 5 1 3 8 5 6 5 6 8 6 5 6 7 7 5.6 
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Risk Factors, (Attributes) Average STD AVE+STDV 
AVE-
STDV 
Government instability 5.79 2.39 8.18 3.39 
Government failure to provide permits 6.36 2.27 8.63 4.08 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system 6.21 2.67 8.88 3.55 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) 5.79 1.37 7.15 4.42 
Changes on general legislation affects the project 6.21 1.48 7.69 4.74 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts 4.64 2.17 6.81 2.47 
Failure to raise finance 6.07 2.16 8.24 3.91 
Undeveloped general business environment 5.86 1.66 7.51 4.20 
Failure to receive revenues from principal (end user) 5.79 1.85 7.63 3.94 
Changes in demand of the facility over concession period 5.14 1.99 7.14 3.15 
Change in economic policies 5.86 2.28 8.14 3.57 
Error in forecasting demands for service 5.43 1.65 7.08 3.78 
Lack of experience 5.14 2.54 7.68 2.61 
Lack of expertise 5.86 2.57 8.42 3.29 
Lack of independent management 5.36 2.17 7.53 3.19 
Changes in project specifications 5.57 2.50 8.07 3.07 
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Expensive and long tendering process 5.71 1.68 7.40 4.03 
Lack of integrity on the (tendering process) 6.29 1.14 7.42 5.15 
Excessive development cost 5.86 2.44 8.30 3.41 
Delays in design approval 6.07 1.90 7.97 4.17 
Use of technology 7.07 1.38 8.46 5.69 
Changes in design during construction 5.93 1.27 7.20 4.66 
Cost-overrun risks 6.36 2.02 8.38 4.33 
Performance related risk 5.57 1.45 7.02 4.12 
Unavailability of power supply 6.50 1.34 7.84 5.16 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 5.00 2.42 7.42 2.58 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the 
facility 
5.57 1.40 6.97 4.17 
Inappropriate operating methods 5.57 1.87 7.44 3.70 
Table ‎6-13 Average Composite Weight of Each Risk Factor and Standard Deviation 
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6.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described the processes used for the Pairwise comparisons to prioritize the 
Risk Factors into descending order of importance within each Risk Category that will be 
used in the BOT Risk Management Framework.   The research into the structure of the 
BOT Risk Management Framework describes the complexities associated with the practices 
used in BOT infrastructure projects.   It also presents a clearly defined technique to 
prioritize Risk Categories and their Risk Factors which can be used to evaluate alternative 
risk decisions by means of "Expert Choice" software that uses Analytical Hierarchal 
Process, AHP method.  
The size of any infrastructure project is too complex to make an informed risk analysis 
without the use of computers and vast experience.  According to Al-Bahar and Crandell 
(1990) people involved in large scale infrastructure projects have a difficulty of 
understanding the magnitude of risk.  Furthermore, the perception and importance  of "risk" 
is different to different people associated with the same project, states Kogan and Wallach 
(1964) and the role a person plays in a project has a direct effect on their 
perception/importance of risk.  With reference to fig. 6.2, "Government Failure to provide 
Permits",  Changes in Demand of the facility over concession period" &  "Change in project 
specifications" are much more important to the private sector, represented by the upper 
value in each respective bar, than to the Public Sector, represented by the lower value in 
each respective bar. 
It is intended that, for many risk decisions, the approach used within the Risk Management 
Framework, will provide a systematic and practical aid for decision-makers in BOT project 
risks.  
In the next chapter, the BOT Risk Management Framework will be tested using three case 
studies with the intention of demonstrating its' potential use when examining and evaluating 
risks in BOT infrastructure projects. 
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Chapter 7 Framework Validation 
The benefits of the proposed risk Management Framework need to be demonstrated and 
evaluated in order to prove that the Framework can be applied by anyone involved in BOT 
Infrastructure projects.  According to Adler and Winograd (1992) the main consideration as 
to whether a design will be effective, is its usability.  It is therefore important to evaluate 
the proposed Framework in order to achieve the research objectives.  Previous Frameworks 
which have been developed to assist any parties involved with the risk evaluation process, 
have mostly been designed to be explanatory, or guidance models, and may be difficult to 
implement in practice.  The applicability and usability of the proposed Risk Management 
Framework will be assessed and feedback provided. 
The purpose of the Frameworking procedure is to extract information from reality.  It is 
important that the Framework provides comprehensive, reliable information.  A serious 
shortcoming in many Frameworks is due to the lack of attention given to the validation 
phase of Framework development. Validation is extremely important, as it attempts to 
develop a rigorous and practical approach for the testing and future development of the 
Framework.  As Creswell (2003) states it is important that developers describe the steps 
they will take in their studies, so that the accuracy and credibility of their findings can be 
checked.  Framework validation is a major stage in the sequence of Framework building. 
This‎research‎uses‎validation‎and‎experts‟‎opinions‎in‎order‎to‎provide‎an‎assessment‎of‎the‎
validity of the BOT Risk Management Framework. 
Mutti (2004) commented on the idea that the purpose of the Framework validation is not to 
prove whether it is true or false, but rather to concentrate on the degree of confirmation of 
the particular Framework.  If more positive results are achieved in relation to the 
Framework, then confidence in the Framework should grow.  One of the best ways for 
validation of the Framework could be to use it for case study for evaluation.  However, it is 
not always practicable for implementation of the Framework to test the results.  High costs 
and time constraints may be limiting factors for the completion of validation studies.  The 
next section describes the validation process of the BOT Risk Management Framework. 
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This process aims to deliver a reliable and acceptable Framework which has been validated 
for use in the risk management process. 
7.1 Attributes worth scores and the framework validation approach 
It was Diaz and Ioannou (1996) who stated that, due to multi-attribute decision models 
being essentially subjective in nature, it is difficult to use external criteria to assess the 
validity of evaluation models objectively.  For this reason, previous researchers have used 
indirect approaches, such as convergent validation, predictive validation and axiomatic 
validation. Convergent validation involves comparing the results obtained by a multi-
attribute decision model with holistic evaluations made by the decision makers(s).  For this 
approach, several alternative projects are defined and then evaluations based using the 
Framework and on‎the‎decision‎maker‟s‎ judgments,‎are‎compared‎regarding‎how‎they‎rate‎
and/or rank the alternatives.  If there is good correlation between the decomposed 
Framework and the holistic evaluation, then it can be verified that the Framework meets the 
decision maker‟s‎ requirements.   A convergent validation approach was used in this 
research to validate the Risk Management Framework.   
Three existing BOT projects, (the Channel Tunnel Project in the UK, the Sulaibiya Waste 
Water Plant in Kuwait and the Marsa Allam Airport in Egypt), were described and 
presented to the expert participants.  The expert participants evaluated the twenty eight Risk 
Factors within each Risk Category twice.   
Firstly, on a scale of 1 – 9, (for the P2 = 100 approach), with respect to the "Performance 
Level", i.e. how desirable a Risk Factor is, (or is not), within its' Risk Category; (1 is 
"Extremely Undesirable, and 9 is Extremely Desirable). 
Therefore: 
1. Determine the Relative Importance of each Risk Factor with respect to the other Risk 
Factors, (Appendix B). 
Within the same Group Category, the participants initially compared Risk Factors to 
other Risk Factors to determine the relative importance of each Risk Factor compared 
to the other Risk Factors. 
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2. Determine the Relative Importance of each Group Category with respect to the other 
Group Categories, (Appendix B). 
The participants then compared each Group Categories to the other Group Categories 
to determine the relative importance of each Group Category with respect to the 
others. 
3. Risk Category Performance Level section of the questionnaire indicates the level of 
“requirement”‎for‎each‎of‎the‎Group‎Risk‎Categories,‎(Appendix B, Part II, Table 1): 
a)  The‎value‎in‎the‎top‎row‎is‎the‎“minimum‎preferred”‎level‎of‎‎performance 
b) The values in the second‎row‎are‎“worst”‎experience‎of‎performance‎and‎the‎
“best”‎experience‎of‎performance‎encountered‎by‎the‎participants.‎‎‎ 
 
4. Risk Factors Performance Level section of the questionnaire indicates the level of 
performance towards the Project Risk Categories, (Table 2, p 340 to 343): 
a) The‎value‎in‎the‎top‎row‎is‎the‎“minimum‎preferred”‎level‎of‎performance. 
b) The‎values‎in‎the‎second‎row‎are‎“worst”‎experience‎of‎performance‎and‎the‎
“best”‎experience‎of‎performance‎encountered‎by‎the‎participants.‎‎‎ 
 
5. The‎results‎of‎the‎questionnaires‎were‎carefully‎input‎into‎“Expert‎Choice‎2000”‎AHP‎
Software package for analysis and shown in Tables 7-2 to Table 7-10.  
a)  The‎into‎“Expert‎Choice‎2000”‎AHP‎Software‎calculated‎the‎“weights”‎
between each Group Category, (Section 6.2.1.2), Group Weights for Five Risk 
Categories, 
b) The‎into‎“Expert‎Choice‎2000”‎AHP‎Software‎calculated‎the‎“weights”‎for‎
each Risk Category, (Section 6.2.1.3), Local Weights for Risk Factors. 
 
Secondly, the respondents completed a questionnaire using‎ “Holistic Evaluation” which 
was in two parts. 
In‎Part‎1,‎the‎respondents‎were‎required‎to‎evaluate‎the‎performance‎level‎or‎“quality”,‎(on‎
a scale of 1 – 9), for each Risk Category and Risk Factor using their expertise and 
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knowledge of the three projects.  (Number 9 was of the Highest quality and excellent 
performance and number 1 is poor.) 
In‎Part‎2,‎the‎respondents‎were‎asked‎to‎assign‎a‎“weight”‎value,‎”,‎(on‎a‎scale‎of‎1‎– 10),  
to each Risk Category and Risk Factor to determine the level of influence and/or 
importance of each Risk.  (Where a value of 1 = 10%, therefore the respondent indicates 
that this risk Factor has a very low priority in their opinion, (and in their present job 
function), for the case study project). 
As the questionnaire was completed by Kuwaiti respondents, the author believes that the 
replies represent the Kuwaiti perspective to Risk evaluation.  Indicating that if the 
respondents to the same questionnaire were from a different country, and in a different 
country, the results, once analyzed, would be characteristically different to the Kuwaiti 
results. 
In Table 7-1, the average risk Factor performance level for each of the three project profiles 
can be seen in the following tables: Table 7-2, Channel Tunnel, (UK, and France); Table 7-
3, Marsa Allam Airport, (Egypt) and Table 7-4, Sulaibiya Waste Water Treatment plant, 
(Kuwait), which demonstrate the performance levels for the three case studies. 
 The decomposed evaluation approach, (P2=100), was used to calculate the "worth score" 
for each project profile as shown in Tables 7-5,7-6 and 7-7, to establish the best approach to 
attaining a holistic evaluation. 
 
7.1.1 P2 = 100 Approach 
For this approach, the P1 value is always equal to zero, based on the logical assumption that 
all of the framework decision factors, (attributes), are important and will have some impact 
on the project risk.  Their performance level, P, must therefore be considered in the 
evaluation,‎(even‎for‎very‎small‎performance‎values‎where‎P‎≤‎P1),‎whilst‎the‎P2‎value‎is 
always equal to 9, (the extremely desirable point on the performance scale).  The value 
curve will therefore extend from the origin to the extreme point of extremely desirable. See 
Figure 4-6.  Tables showing the average Risk Factor performance level: Table 7-2 Channel 
Tunnel, (UK, France); Table 7-3, Marsa Allam Airport, (Egypt); and Table 7-4, Sulaibiya 
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Waste Water Treatment plant, (Kuwait).Tables using P2=100 showing Individual "worth 
score" are below Table  7-5, Channel Tunnel, (UK, France); Table 7-6 Marsa Allam 
Airport, (Egypt); and  Table 7-7, Sulaibiya Waste Water Treatment plant, (Kuwait). 
  Project  
Attribute Sulaibiya 
waste water 
plant 
Marsa 
Allam 
Channel 
Tunnel 
Country Risk (Political & Regulatory) 8.1 6.4 5.21 
Government instability 5.6 6.1 7.57 
Government failure to provide permits 7.4 7.2 7.29 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system 6.3 5.9 5.14 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) 7.2 7.6 6.29 
Changes in general legislation affecting the project 6.9 7.1 6.43 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts 7.0 7.3 5.43 
Financial & Revenue Risks 5.6 7.9 5.71 
Failure to raise finance 6.9 7.1 6.00 
Undeveloped general business environment 5.1 8.0 8.07 
Failure to receive revenues from principal (end user) 6.4 7.1 6.43 
Changes in demand for the facility over concession 
period 
7.7 7.7 6.93 
Change in economic policies 6.1 6.1 6.07 
Error in forecasting demands for service 6.1 5.9 6.71 
Promoting & Procurement Risks 5.8 5.6 6.71 
Lack of experience 6.0 5.8 5.00 
Lack of expertise 5.6 6.9 4.64 
Lack of independent management 4.8 7.6 6.93 
Changes in project specifications 6.4 5.6 7.50 
Expensive and long tendering process 7.0 5.1 8.14 
Lack of integrity in the (tendering process) 7.4 5.2 7.93 
Development Risks 5.0 5.9 8.00 
Excessive development cost 4.4 5.0 7.43 
Delays in design approval 7.4 6.6 6.64 
Use of technology 5.0 6.2 4.79 
Changes in design during construction 5.1 5.6 6.21 
Construction & Operating Risk 6.9 7.0 6.71 
Cost-overrun risks 7.4 7.0 7.57 
Performance related risk 8.1 6.4 5.21 
Unavailability of power supply 5.6 6.1 7.57 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 7.4 7.2 7.29 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the 
facility 
6.3 5.9 5.14 
Inappropriate operating methods 7.2 7.6 6.29 
Table ‎7-1 Average Performance Level for Project Profiles 
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Performance Level Channel Tunnel R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Government instability 1 1 4 1 4 5 4 7 3 6 7 5 6 5 
Government failure to provide permits necessary for construction, 
maintenance, and operation of the project 
4 2 6 4 7 6 7 8 6 5 6 4 5 6 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system that enforces contracts 
and provides a framework to resolve disputes 
2 2 7 2 5 5 5 7 5 7 5 6 8 6 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) 1 5 8 1 4 5 4 3 3 3 7 2 7 9 
Changes in general legislation affecting the project 1 4 3 1 6 5 4 3 3 5 6 3 9 6 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts 1 3 4 1 7 7 4 5 2 3 9 2 6 5 
Failure to raise finance 1 2 4 1 4 4 4 6 4 2 8 1 8 6 
Undeveloped general business environment 1 3 7 1 3 4 4 6 5 5 6 3 6 3 
Failure to receive revenues from end user 1 3 3 1 2 6 4 8 6 7 5 6 7 4 
Changes in demand for the product or the facility over concession period 
due to economic downturns or competing facilities. 
4 1 2 4 7 4 7 2 6 5 5 4 7 2 
Change in economic policies 3 1 4 3 6 2 6 4 5 6 5 5 7 4 
Error in forecasting demands for service 3 3 5 3 6 2 6 4 5 8 6 7 9 1 
Lack of experience 8 1 7 8 5 5 5 7 6 9 8 8 9 8 
Lack of expertise 8 1 6 8 5 7 5 5 9 9 8 8 8 8 
Lack of independent management 8 1 8 8 5 8 5 6 6 9 8 8 6 8 
Changes in project specifications 7 4 2 7 4 5 4 8 5 5 6 4 6 7 
Expensive and long tendering process 4 4 3 5 8 2 8 6 7 3 5 2 9 6 
Lack of integrity in the tendering process 1 2 4 1 4 5 4 8 3 7 5 6 8 5 
Excessive development cost 7 4 2 7 4 2 3 4 9 8 7 7 7 8 
Delays in design approval 3 4 4 8 5 4 5 6 6 8 8 7 8 8 
Use of technology that may be proving economically or structurally non-
viable 
3 8 6 3 7 4 6 2 5 5 3 4 7 6 
Changes in design during construction 3 4 6 3 7 4 6 8 5 8 3 6 7 8 
Cost-overrun risks 9 3 6 9 6 4 6 9 7 8 9 6 8 7 
Performance related risk 7 2 6 7 4 6 4 3 9 6 7 5 7 7 
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Performance Level Channel Tunnel R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Unavailability of power supply 7 1 6 7 4 2 4 5 2 6 7 5 7 9 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 5 2 7 5 8 5 8 8 3 4 5 3 9 8 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the facility 6 2 7 6 9 5 9 7 4 8 6 7 7 9 
Inappropriate operating methods 5 2 7 5 5 5 8 6 7 5 5 4 9 9 
Table ‎7-2 Individual‟s‎Attributes‎Performance‎Level‎for‎Each‎Project‎Profile 
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Performance level  Marsa Allam R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Government instability 3 2 5 4 3 6 6 8 5 7 5 6 6 8 
Government failure to provide permits necessary for 
construction, maintenance, and operation of the project  
2 3 6 3 2 3 5 5 4 6 7 5 8 7 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system that enforces 
contracts and provides a framework to resolve disputes 
1 3 5 2 1 6 4 8 2 7 5 6 7 7 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) 1 2 9 2 1 5 4 7 2 4 8 3 6 8 
Changes in general legislation affecting the project                 1 6 3 3 1 5 4 7 2 7 6 6 7 8 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts 2 3 5 4 2 3 5 5 4 3 6 2 7 7 
Failure to raise finance  3 2 6 5 3 4 6 6 5 7 3 6 8 6 
Undeveloped general business environment   2 1 5 6 2 8 5 6 4 5 5 4 7 5 
Failure to receive revenues from end user 3 3 4 7 3 3 6 5 5 7 7 6 7 4 
Changes in demand for the product or the facility over 
concession period 
4 1 4 6 4 8 7 6 6 7 8 6 7 4 
Change in economic policies  5 1 4 7 5 6 8 8 7 7 5 6 6 5 
Error in forecasting demands for service 5 3 4 8 5 8 8 6 7 5 7 4 7 3 
Lack of experience 5 1 4 6 5 4 8 6 8 9 3 8 8 7 
Lack of expertise 5 1 4 4 5 4 8 6 8 9 3 8 8 7 
Lack of independent management 3 1 4 2 3 2 6 4 5 9 3 8 6 8 
Changes in project specifications 3 1 5 2 3 2 6 4 5 6 6 5 6 6 
Expensive and long tendering process                                          2 3 4 3 2 7 5 9 6 4 7 3 8 6 
Lack of integrity in the (tendering process)             3 2 4 4 3 8 6 6 5 5 8 4 9 4 
Excessive development cost 7 4 4 6 7 8 4 6 9 8 7 7 8 8 
Delays in design approval 5 5 3 7 5 2 8 4 7 8 5 7 7 8 
Use of technology that may be proving economically or 
structurally non-viable 
4 7 5 5 4 4 7 6 6 7 4 6 7 4 
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Performance level  Marsa Allam R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Changes in design during construction 4 4 6 6 4 4 7 6 6 8 4 7 7 7 
Cost-overrun risks  5 5 6 7 5 5 8 7 7 8 5 7 8 6 
Performance related risk 4 4 6 6 4 2 8 4 6 7 4 6 8 6 
Unavailability of power supply 4 1 6 8 4 6 8 8 6 7 4 6 7 9 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 4 3 6 2 4 4 8 6 6 5 4 4 8 6 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the facility 6 2 8 8 6 5 9 7 8 8 6 7 8 8 
Inappropriate operating methods 5 2 9 9 5 4 8 6 7 6 5 5 8 8 
Table ‎7-3 Individual‟s‎Attributes‎Performance‎Level‎for‎Each‎Project‎Profile 
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Performance Level Sulaibiya Wastewater Treatment Plant 
R
1 
R
2 
R
3 
R
4 
R
5 
R
6 
R
7 
R
8 
R
9 
R 
10 
R 
11 
R 
12 
R 
13 
R 
14 
Government instability 2 2 3 4 3 5 4 6 6 5 5 7 6 8 
Government failure to provide permits necessary for construction, maintenance, and 
operation  
2 6 2 4 3 4 4 5 6 4 7 6 7 8 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system that enforces contracts  4 2 1 6 5 7 6 8 7 7 6 9 8 5 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) 4 2 4 6 6 5 6 6 7 2 8 4 6 7 
Changes in general legislation affecting the project 1 4 5 3 5 6 2 7 4 8 8 6 8 5 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts 1 6 5 3 4 5 2 6 4 3 9 5 6 8 
Failure to raise finance 1 5 5 3 3 4 5 5 3 6 3 8 8 2 
Undeveloped general business environment 1 6 6 5 3 4 5 5 3 5 9 7 7 2 
Failure to receive revenues from end user 1 9 6 5 4 5 5 6 4 7 5 9 6 2 
Changes in demand for the product or the facility over concession period  1 1 6 5 5 5 2 6 2 2 6 4 6 1 
Change in economic policies 5 1 7 8 6 7 7 8 8 5 6 7 8 2 
Error in forecasting demands for service 1 8 6 4 2 5 2 6 7 8 6 6 7 1 
Lack of experience 4 3 6 7 5 5 6 6 6 9 9 7 6 7 
Lack of expertise 4 1 6 7 5 5 6 6 7 9 9 7 6 7 
Lack of independent management 4 1 6 7 5 5 6 9 5 9 6 6 8 6 
Changes in project specifications 5 3 6 8 6 9 7 5 7 8 9 5 7 7 
Expensive and long tendering process 6 3 7 9 7 4 8 7 4 2 5 4 9 6 
Lack of integrity in the (tendering process) 2 1 8 7 3 1 4 8 3 8 6 6 9 4 
Excessive development cost 7 6 2 9 8 5 9 2 5 8 7 6 8 6 
Delays in design approval 4 5 6 6 5 5 9 3 8 8 4 5 8 6 
Use of technology that may be proving economically or structurally non-viable 7 9 7 9 8 6 8 8 5 9 7 7 7 4 
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Performance Level Sulaibiya Wastewater Treatment Plant 
R
1 
R
2 
R
3 
R
4 
R
5 
R
6 
R
7 
R
8 
R
9 
R 
10 
R 
11 
R 
12 
R 
13 
R 
14 
Changes in design during construction 7 3 6 9 8 4 6 6 5 8 7 5 8 5 
Cost-overrun risks 6 3 5 7 7 4 7 7 8 8 6 6 8 3 
Performance related risk 8 2 4 6 9 7 6 9 7 5 8 7 6 4 
Unavailability of power supply 8 1 3 5 9 4 6 2 7 5 8 3 8 9 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 9 3 2 7 8 5 7 3 8 2 9 5 8 6 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the facility 7 6 4 9 8 6 9 9 3 8 7 6 8 6 
Inappropriate operating methods 7 2 6 6 9 4 9 7 2 7 7 9 9 6 
Table ‎7-4 Individual‟s‎Attributes‎Performance‎Level‎for‎Each‎Project‎Profile 
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  R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Government instability 11.11 11.11 44.44 11.11 44.44 55.56 44.44 77.78 33.33 66.67 77.78 55.56 66.67 55.56 
Government failure to provide permits 44.44 22.22 66.67 44.44 77.78 66.67 77.78 88.89 66.67 55.56 66.67 44.44 55.56 66.67 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system 22.22 22.22 77.78 22.22 55.56 55.56 55.56 77.78 55.56 77.78 55.56 66.67 88.89 66.67 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) 11.11 55.56 88.89 11.11 44.44 55.56 44.44 33.33 33.33 33.33 77.78 22.22 77.78 100.00 
Changes in general legislation affecting the project 11.11 44.44 33.33 11.11 66.67 55.56 44.44 33.33 33.33 55.56 66.67 33.33 100.00 66.67 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts 11.11 33.33 44.44 11.11 77.78 77.78 44.44 55.56 22.22 33.33 100.00 22.22 66.67 55.56 
Failure to raise finance 11.11 22.22 44.44 11.11 44.44 44.44 44.44 66.67 44.44 22.22 88.89 11.11 88.89 66.67 
Undeveloped general business environment 11.11 33.33 77.78 11.11 33.33 44.44 44.44 66.67 55.56 55.56 66.67 33.33 66.67 33.33 
Failure to receive revenues from principal (end user) 11.11 33.33 33.33 11.11 22.22 66.67 44.44 88.89 66.67 77.78 55.56 66.67 77.78 44.44 
Changes in demand of the facility over concession period 44.44 11.11 22.22 44.44 77.78 44.44 77.78 22.22 66.67 55.56 55.56 44.44 77.78 22.22 
Change in economic policies 33.33 11.11 44.44 33.33 66.67 22.22 66.67 44.44 55.56 66.67 55.56 55.56 77.78 44.44 
Error in forecasting demands for service 33.33 33.33 55.56 33.33 66.67 22.22 66.67 44.44 55.56 88.89 66.67 77.78 100.00 11.11 
Lack of experience 88.89 11.11 77.78 88.89 55.56 55.56 55.56 77.78 66.67 100.00 88.89 88.89 100.00 88.89 
Lack of expertise 88.89 11.11 66.67 88.89 55.56 77.78 55.56 55.56 100.00 100.00 88.89 88.89 88.89 88.89 
Lack of independent management 88.89 11.11 88.89 88.89 55.56 88.89 55.56 66.67 66.67 100.00 88.89 88.89 66.67 88.89 
Changes in project specifications 77.78 44.44 22.22 77.78 44.44 55.56 44.44 88.89 55.56 55.56 66.67 44.44 66.67 77.78 
Expensive and long tendering process 44.44 44.44 33.33 55.56 88.89 22.22 88.89 66.67 77.78 33.33 55.56 22.22 100.00 66.67 
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Table ‎7-5 Individual‟s‎Attributes‎worth‎Values‎Vi‎(Xi)‎for‎Channel‎Tunnel‎Profile‎Using‎„P2‎=100‎Approach‟ 
  
Lack of integrity in the (tendering process) 11.11 22.22 44.44 11.11 44.44 55.56 44.44 88.89 33.33 77.78 55.56 66.67 88.89 55.56 
Excessive development cost 77.78 44.44 22.22 77.78 44.44 22.22 33.33 44.44 100.00 88.89 77.78 77.78 77.78 88.89 
Delays in design approval 33.33 44.44 44.44 88.89 55.56 44.44 55.56 66.67 66.67 88.89 88.89 77.78 88.89 88.89 
Use of technology 33.33 88.89 66.67 33.33 77.78 44.44 66.67 22.22 55.56 55.56 33.33 44.44 77.78 66.67 
Changes in design during construction 33.33 44.44 66.67 33.33 77.78 44.44 66.67 88.89 55.56 88.89 33.33 66.67 77.78 88.89 
Cost-overrun risks 100.00 33.33 66.67 100.0 66.67 44.44 66.67 100.0 77.78 88.89 100.00 66.67 88.89 77.78 
Performance related risk 77.78 22.22 66.67 77.78 44.44 66.67 44.44 33.33 100.00 66.67 77.78 55.56 77.78 77.78 
Unavailability of power supply 77.78 11.11 66.67 77.78 44.44 22.22 44.44 55.56 22.22 66.67 77.78 55.56 77.78 100.00 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 55.56 22.22 77.78 55.56 88.89 55.56 88.89 88.89 33.33 44.44 55.56 33.33 100.0 88.89 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the facility 66.67 22.22 77.78 66.67 100.00 55.56 100.00 77.78 44.44 88.89 66.67 77.78 77.78 100.00 
Inappropriate operating methods 55.56 22.22 77.78 55.56 55.56 55.56 88.89 66.67 77.78 55.56 55.56 44.44 100.0 100.00 
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R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) 
Government instability 22,222 22,222 33,33 44,444 22,222 55,556 44,444 66,667 66,66 55,556 55,556 77,778 55,556 88,889 
Government failure to provide permits 22,222 66,667 22,22 44,444 22,222 44,444 44,444 55,556 66,66 44,444 77,778 66,667 44,444 88,889 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system 44,444 22,222 11,11 66,667 44,444 77,778 66,667 88,889 77,77 77,778 66,667 100,00 77,778 55,556 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) 44,444 22,222 44,44 66,667 44,444 55,556 66,667 66,667 77,77 22,222 88,889 44,444 22,222 77,778 
Changes in general legislation affecting the project 11,111 44,444 55,55 33,333 11,111 66,667 22,222 77,778 44,44 88,889 88,889 66,667 88,889 55,556 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts 11,111 66,667 55,55 33,333 11,111 55,556 22,222 66,667 44,44 33,333 100,000 55,556 33,333 88,889 
Failure to raise finance 11,111 55,556 55,55 33,333 11,111 44,444 55,556 55,556 33,33 66,667 33,333 88,889 66,667 22,222 
Undeveloped general business environment 11,111 66,667 66,66 55,556 11,111 44,444 55,556 55,556 33,33 55,556 100,00 77,778 55,556 22,222 
Failure to receive revenues from principal (end user) 11,111 100,00 66,66 55,556 11,111 55,556 55,556 66,667 44,44 77,778 55,556 100,00 77,778 22,222 
Changes in demand for the facility over concession 
period 11,111 11,111 66,66 55,556 11,111 55,556 22,222 66,667 22,22 22,222 66,667 44,444 22,222 11,111 
Change in economic policies 55,556 11,111 77,77 88,889 55,556 77,778 77,778 88,889 88,88 55,556 66,667 77,778 55,556 22,222 
Error in forecasting demands for service 11,111 88,889 66,66 44,444 11,111 55,556 22,222 66,667 77,77 88,889 66,667 66,667 88,889 11,111 
Lack of experience 44,444 33,333 66,66 77,778 44,444 55,556 66,667 66,667 66,66 100,00 100,00 77,778 100,00 77,778 
Lack of expertise 44,444 11,111 66,66 77,778 44,444 55,556 66,667 66,667 77,78 100,00 100,00 77,778 100,00 77,778 
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R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) 
Lack of independent management 44,444 11,111 66,66 88,889 44,444 55,556 66,667 100,00 55,55 100,00 66,667 66,667 100,00 66,667 
Changes in project specifications 55,556 33,333 66,66 100,00 55,556 100,00 77,778 55,556 77,77 88,889 100,00 55,556 88,889 77,778 
Expensive and long tendering process 66,667 33,333 77,77 77,778 66,667 44,444 88,889 77,778 44,44 22,222 55,556 44,444 22,222 66,667 
Lack of integrity in the (tendering process) 22,222 11,111 88,88 100,00 22,222 11,111 44,444 88,889 33,33 88,889 66,667 66,667 88,889 44,444 
Excessive development cost 77,778 66,667 22,22 66,667 77,778 55,556 100,00 22,222 55,55 88,889 77,778 66,667 88,889 66,667 
Delays in design approval 44,444 55,556 66,66 100,00 44,444 55,556 100,00 33,333 88,88 88,889 44,444 55,556 88,889 66,667 
Use of technology 77,778 100,00 77,77 100,00 77,778 66,667 88,889 88,889 55,55 100,00 77,778 77,778 100,00 44,444 
Changes in design during construction 77,778 33,333 66,66 77,778 77,778 44,444 66,667 66,667 55,55 88,889 77,778 55,556 88,889 55,556 
Cost-overrun risks 66,667 33,333 55,55 66,667 66,667 44,444 77,778 77,778 88,88 88,889 66,667 66,667 88,889 33,333 
Performance related risk 88,889 22,222 44,44 55,556 88,889 77,778 66,667 100,00 77,77 55,556 88,889 77,778 55,556 44,444 
Unavailability of power supply 88,889 11,111 33,33 77,778 88,889 44,444 66,667 22,222 77,77 55,556 88,889 33,333 55,556 100,00 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 100,00 33,333 22,22 100,00 100,00 55,556 77,778 33,333 88,88 22,222 100,00 55,556 22,222 66,667 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the 
facility 77,778 66,667 44,44 100,00 77,778 66,667 100,00 100,00 33,33 88,889 77,778 66,667 88,889 66,667 
Inappropriate operating methods 77,778 22,222 66,66 66,667 77,778 44,444 100,00 77,778 22,22 77,778 77,778 100,00 77,778 66,667 
Table ‎7-6 Individual's Attributes Vi Xi for Salybia P2=100 approach 
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R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) 
Government instability 33.333 22.222 55.556 44.444 33.333 66.667 66.667 88.889 55.556 77.778 55.556 66.667 66.667 88.889 
Government failure to provide permits 22.222 33.333 66.667 33.333 22.222 33.333 55.556 55.556 44.444 66.667 77.778 55.556 88.889 77.778 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system 11.111 33.333 55.556 22.222 11.111 66.667 44.444 88.889 22.222 77.778 55.556 66.667 77.778 77.778 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) 11.111 22.222 100.000 22.222 11.111 55.556 44.444 77.778 22.222 44.444 88.889 33.333 66.667 88.889 
Changes in general legislation affecting the project 11.111 66.667 33.333 33.333 11.111 55.556 44.444 77.778 22.222 77.778 66.667 66.667 77.778 88.889 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts 22.222 33.333 55.556 44.444 22.222 33.333 55.556 55.556 44.444 33.333 66.667 22.222 77.778 77.778 
Failure to raise finance 33.333 22.222 66.667 55.556 33.333 44.444 66.667 66.667 55.556 77.778 33.333 66.667 88.889 66.667 
Undeveloped general business environment 22.222 11.111 55.556 66.667 22.222 88.889 55.556 66.667 44.444 55.556 55.556 44.444 77.778 55.556 
Failure to receive revenues from principal (end user) 33.333 33.333 44.444 77.778 33.333 33.333 66.667 55.556 55.556 77.778 77.778 66.667 77.778 44.444 
Changes in demand for the facility over concession period 44.444 11.111 44.444 66.667 44.444 88.889 77.778 66.667 66.667 77.778 88.889 66.667 77.778 44.444 
Change in economic policies 55.556 11.111 44.444 77.778 55.556 66.667 88.889 88.889 77.778 77.778 55.556 66.667 66.667 55.556 
Error in forecasting demands for service 55.556 33.333 44.444 88.889 55.556 88.889 88.889 66.667 77.778 55.556 77.778 44.444 77.778 33.333 
Lack of experience 55.556 11.111 44.444 66.667 55.556 44.444 88.889 66.667 88.889 100.000 33.333 88.889 88.889 77.778 
Lack of expertise 55.556 11.111 44.444 44.444 55.556 44.444 88.889 66.667 88.889 100.000 33.333 88.889 88.889 77.778 
Lack of independent management 33.333 11.111 44.444 22.222 33.333 22.222 66.667 44.444 55.556 100.000 33.333 88.889 66.667 88.889 
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R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) Vi(xi) 
Changes in project specifications 33.333 11.111 55.556 22.222 33.333 22.222 66.667 44.444 55.556 66.667 66.667 55.556 66.667 66.667 
Expensive and long tendering process 22.222 33.333 44.444 33.333 22.222 77.778 55.556 100.000 66.667 44.444 77.778 33.333 88.889 66.667 
Lack of integrity in the (tendering process) 33.333 22.222 44.444 44.444 33.333 88.889 66.667 66.667 55.556 55.556 88.889 44.444 100.000 44.444 
Excessive development cost 77.778 44.444 44.444 66.667 77.778 88.889 44.444 66.667 100.000 88.889 77.778 77.778 88.889 88.889 
Delays in design approval 55.556 55.556 33.333 77.778 55.556 22.222 88.889 44.444 77.778 88.889 55.556 77.778 77.778 88.889 
Use of technology 44.444 77.778 55.556 55.556 44.444 44.444 77.778 66.667 66.667 77.778 44.444 66.667 77.778 44.444 
Changes in design during construction 44.444 44.444 66.667 66.667 44.444 44.444 77.778 66.667 66.667 88.889 44.444 77.778 77.778 77.778 
Cost-overrun risks 55.556 55.556 66.667 77.778 55.556 55.556 88.889 77.778 77.778 88.889 55.556 77.778 88.889 66.667 
Performance related risk 44.444 44.444 66.667 66.667 44.444 22.222 88.889 44.444 66.667 77.778 44.444 66.667 88.889 66.667 
Unavailability of power supply 44.444 11.111 66.667 88.889 44.444 66.667 88.889 88.889 66.667 77.778 44.444 66.667 77.778 100.000 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 44.444 33.333 66.667 22.222 44.444 44.444 88.889 66.667 66.667 55.556 44.444 44.444 88.889 66.667 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the 
facility 
66.667 22.222 88.889 88.889 66.667 55.556 100.000 77.778 88.889 88.889 66.667 77.778 88.889 88.889 
Inappropriate operating methods 55.556 22.222 100.000 100.000 55.556 44.444 88.889 66.667 77.778 66.667 55.556 55.556 88.889 88.889 
Table ‎7-7 Individual‟s‎Attributes‎worth‎Values‎Vi‎(Xi)‎for‎Marsa‎Allam‎Profile‎Using‎„P2‎=100‎Approach‟ 
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Participation Towards Risks (1-10)  Channel Tunnel 
Risk Factors R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Government instability 5 1 4 8 6 4 7 4 8 8 5 8 9 5 
Government failure to provide permits necessary for 
construction, maintenance, and operation of the project  
9 2 4 8 7 7 10 7 10 9 9 9 7 7 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system that 
enforces contracts and provides a framework to resolve 
disputes 
9 2 4 8 7 5 10 5 10 7 9 7 8 10 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) 4 5 5 5 2 7 6 7 7 5 4 5 7 7 
Changes on general legislation affects the project                 7 4 5 8 5 5 9 5 9 7 7 7 7 6 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts 7 3 4 8 5 7 9 7 9 7 7 7 7 6 
Failure to raise finance  6 2 7 7 4 4 8 4 9 5 6 5 6 7 
Undeveloped general business environment   6 3 7 7 4 4 8 4 9 7 6 7 8 4 
Failure to receive revenues from end user 7 3 3 8 5 6 9 6 9 7 7 7 7 3 
Changes in demand of the product or the facility over 
concession period due to economic downturns competing 
facilities. 
10 1 10 9 8 6 8 6 7 8 10 8 9 5 
Change in economic policies  9 1 10 10 7 2 10 2 6 5 9 5 8 3 
Error in forecasting demands for service 9 3 9 8 7 2 10 2 6 8 9 8 7 4 
Lack of experience                                                              7 1 6 8 5 5 9 5 5 8 7 8 8 2 
Lack of expertise 7 1 3 9 5 7 9 7 5 9 7 9 8 8 
Lack of independent management 7 1 4 8 5 8 9 8 6 8 7 8 7 8 
Changes in project specifications 3 4 5 5 1 5 6 5 8 8 3 8 8 9 
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Participation Towards Risks (1-10)  Channel Tunnel 
Risk Factors R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Expensive and long tendering process                                          3 4 5 5 1 3 6 3 8 9 3 9 7 7 
Lack of integrity on the (tendering process)             7 2 6 9 5 10 9 10 7 6 7 6 7 8 
Excessive development cost 10 4 6 8 8 2 8 2 7 8 10 8 7 8 
Delays in design approval 10 4 8 9 8 7 8 7 5 7 10 7 8 6 
Use of technology that may be proving economically or 
structurally non-viable 
10 8 7 9 8 4 8 4 6 7 10 7 9 5 
Changes in design during construction 10 4 10 9 9 7 10 7 9 7 5 7 8 7 
Cost-overrun risks  10 3 10 9 9 4 10 4 9 7 4 7 8 7 
Performance related risk 7 2 7 8 5 6 9 6 7 8 6 8 6 9 
Unavailability of power supply 3 1 3 5 1 4 5 4 8 9 5 9 9 8 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 6 2 6 8 4 5 8 5 9 7 7 7 10 8 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the facility 7 2 7 6 5 6 9 6 4 8 5 8 10 7 
Inappropriate operating methods 8 2 8 8 6 10 10 10 7 7 5 7 8 9 
Sum 203 75 173 217 152 152 237 152 209 206 189 206 218 183 
Table  7-8 Participant‟s‎Value‎towards‎Risk‎for‎Channel‎Tunnel 
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Participation towards Risks (1-10) Sulaibiya wastewater plant (1-10) 
Risk Factors R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Government instability 10 2 3 8 9 8 7 8 5 8 7 8 6 8 
Government failure to provide permits necessary for 
construction, maintenance, and operation of the 
project  
5 6 4 3 9 4 6 4 7 9 6 9 5 5 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system that 
enforces contracts and provides a framework to 
resolve disputes 
9 2 4 7 5 7 10 7 6 7 8 7 7 7 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) 7 2 4 5 8 6 8 6 6 8 6 8 5 5 
Changes on general legislation affects the project                 8 4 5 8 6 6 9 6 10 8 7 8 6 8 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts 9 6 4 7 6 5 10 5 10 7 8 7 5 2 
Failure to raise finance  9 5 7 7 8 4 10 4 10 8 10 8 4 2 
Undeveloped general business environment   6 6 7 4 8 4 7 4 9 7 10 7 4 2 
Failure to receive revenues from end user 8 9 4 8 6 5 4 5 10 8 10 8 7 1 
Changes in demand of the product or the facility over 
concession period due to economic downturns 
competing facilities. 
3 1 8 2 5 7 7 7 6 8 7 8 5 8 
Change in economic policies  7 1 2 5 9 7 8 7 10 7 6 7 7 8 
Error in forecasting demands for service 8 8 8 9 6 5 9 5 9 9 7 9 6 8 
Lack of experience                                                              6 3 6 4 8 5 7 5 9 7 8 7 6 8 
Lack of expertise 6 1 6 4 8 5 7 5 9 9 5 9 5 7 
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Risk Factors R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
Lack of independent management 6 1 6 4 8 5 7 5 3 8 6 8 4 6 
Changes in project specifications 5 3 6 3 7 9 6 9 8 7 5 7 6 5 
Expensive and long tendering process                                          5 3 6 3 7 4 6 4 8 9 5 9 5 6 
Lack of integrity on the (tendering process)             8 1 6 4 5 3 4 3 6 5 8 5 6 8 
Excessive development cost 7 6 6 5 9 5 8 5 4 7 7 7 4 6 
Delays in design approval 7 5 6 5 9 7 8 7 4 9 7 9 5 6 
Use of technology that may be proving economically 
or structurally non-viable 
9 9 6 8 7 5 10 5 6 6 6 6 7 4 
Changes in design during construction 3 3 3 2 5 9 4 9 6 8 7 8 5 5 
Cost-overrun risks  3 3 3 2 5 4 4 4 6 7 8 7 10 3 
Performance related risk 9 2 9 10 7 7 10 7 7 8 6 8 10 4 
Unavailability of power supply 3 1 3 6 5 5 4 5 6 9 5 9 10 9 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 3 3 3 6 5 5 4 5 6 8 6 8 10 9 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the 
facility 
7 6 7 5 9 8 8 8 4 7 4 7 8 6 
Inappropriate operating methods 9 2 9 8 9 7 10 7 6 7 4 7 8 7 
               Sum 185 104 151 152 198 161 202 161 196 215 189 215 176 163 
Table  7-9 Participant‟s‎Value‎towards‎Risk‎for‎Sulaibiya‎Waste‎Water‎Treatment‎Plant‎in‎Kuwait  
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Participation towards Risks (1-10) Marsa Allam 
Risk Factors R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
               
Government instability 5 2 2 6 7 9 8 9 7 8 8 8 9 9 
Government failure to provide permits necessary for construction, 
maintenance, and operation of the project 
5 3 3 6 7 8 8 8 7 9 5 9 8 8 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system that enforces 
contracts and provides a framework to resolve disputes 
9 3 1 10 8 6 6 6 8 7 9 7 9 8 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) 6 2 4 7 8 5 9 5 8 7 6 7 7 10 
Changes on general legislation affects the project 9 6 6 10 8 5 6 5 7 8 9 8 7 8 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts 9 3 6 10 9 3 6 3 7 7 9 7 9 8 
Failure to raise finance 9 2 10 8 9 4 6 4 7 6 9 6 7 9 
Undeveloped general business environment 9 1 7 8 9 8 6 8 7 9 9 9 9 6 
Failure to receive revenues from end user 9 3 7 8 9 3 6 3 7 7 9 7 8 7 
Changes in demand of the product or the facility over concession 
period due to economic downturns competing facilities. 
9 1 7 8 9 9 6 9 7 8 9 8 9 7 
Change in economic policies 9 1 5 8 7 6 6 6 6 6 9 6 8 7 
Error in forecasting demands for service 9 3 5 8 7 8 6 8 7 7 9 7 8 8 
Lack of experience 6 1 5 7 8 4 9 4 8 9 6 9 8 9 
Lack of expertise 6 1 3 7 8 4 9 4 7 9 6 9 9 7 
Lack of independent management 6 1 4 7 8 3 9 3 7 8 6 8 8 8 
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Risk Factors R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
               
Changes in project specifications 6 1 5 7 6 2 9 2 8 9 6 9 9 8 
Expensive and long tendering process 7 3 5 8 9 7 4 7 9 9 7 9 7 8 
Lack of integrity on the (tendering process) 9 2 5 10 7 8 6 8 
8 
7 9 7 9 7 
Excessive development cost 4 4 5 5 6 8 7 8 
6 
9 4 9 6 5 
Delays in design approval 4 5 5 5 6 4 7 4 
6 
8 4 8 8 6 
Use of technology that may be proving economically or 
structurally non-viable 
4 7 5 5 6 4 7 4 
6 
7 4 7 8 7 
Changes in design during construction 5 4 5 6 7 6 8 6 
7 
9 5 9 7 6 
Cost-overrun risks 4 5 4 5 6 5 7 5 
6 
6 3 6 8 8 
Performance related risk 8 4 8 9 10 2 5 2 
7 
8 4 8 8 8 
Unavailability of power supply 5 1 5 6 7 8 8 8 
9 
9 5 9 8 9 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate 5 3 5 6 8 4 8 4 
9 
8 6 8 10 6 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the facility 7 2 7 8 9 7 4 7 
6 
9 6 9 9 7 
Inappropriate operating methods 7 2 7 7 9 7 4 7 
6 
9 6 9 8 8 
Sum 190 76 146 205 217 157 190 157 200 222 187 222 228 212 
Table  7-10 Participant‟s‎Value‎towards‎Risk‎for‎Marsa‎Allam‎Airport‎in‎Egypt 
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7.2 Risk framework decision factors evaluation results 
The proposed framework needs to be evaluated to demonstrate the usability of the 
framework to anyone who might consider employing it in their business practice.  As Adler 
and Winograd (1992) point out usability is the main consideration as to whether a particular 
design will be effective in use.  One of the most important stages in achieving the research 
objectives is the evaluation of the proposed framework.  The evaluation will also   
supersede previous frameworks that have been designed as explanatory or guidance 
frameworks and would therefore be difficult to implement.  The proposed framework will 
be evaluated to test its applicability and usability, and feedback provided. 
The attributes contribution to the project risk can now be found for each approach by 
multiplying their "Worth scores", (Tables 7-5, 7-6 and 7-7), by their composite weights, 
(Table 8-1), and the total project value (index) will be the result of the decomposed 
evaluations according to equation (4-11). 
The holistic evaluation is described below using respondent, R1, as an example: 
For Sulaibiya Waste Water Treatment Plant the holistic evaluation was "44.26", and this is 
how it is calculated: 
 
𝑊𝑖  =  
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 ′𝑠,𝑅1, 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑜𝑟 Government Instability
 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 ′𝑠,𝑅1, 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 
 
𝑊𝑖 =  
10
185
= 0.05406    [See Table 7-9] 
 
Next, Vi Xi , is calculated as a percentage from Table 7-4, Individual‟s‎ Attributes‎
Performance Level for Each Project Profile, for R1, the value for "Government Instability": 
 
𝑉𝑖  𝑋𝑖   =  
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 ′𝑠,𝑅1, 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑜𝑟 Government Instability
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑 ( =  9)
× 100 
 
𝑉𝑖  𝑋𝑖   =   
2
9
  ×  100 =   22.22% 
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Next,  Wi × Vi Xi is calculated,  
 
Wi × Vi Xi  =  0.05406  × 22.22  =  1.201 
Where:   
Wi  is the Weighting" for Government Instability risk Factor as a decimal of the total sum of 
all Risk Factors. 
Vi Xi  is the "weighting"  using the Individual‟s‎ Attributes‎ Performance‎ Level‎ for‎ Each‎
Project Profile from Table 7-4, calculated as a percentage. 
The above calculations were performed for each and every Risk Category/attritbute, (i.e. 
Government‎ failure‎ to‎ provide‎ permits….,‎ ‎ Non‎ existance‎ of‎ legal‎ and‎ regulatory‎
system….,‎etc).‎ 
Finally, for respondent, R1, all of the values for Wi × Vi Xi  are added together  for the 
holistic evaluation. 
 The individual holistic evaluations and the decomposed evaluation by EM of the P2 = 100 
approach for each project profile provided are shown in Tables:  7-11, 7-12 and 7-13.  The 
average results of the project profiles decomposed evaluations for each of the respondents 
were calculated for the P2 = 100 approach and plotted against the average holistic 
evaluation; the results are given in Figure 7-1. 
 
 The group results of the holistic and decomposed evaluations for each project profile were 
calculated by taking the averages of the individual evaluations and the results are shown in 
Table 7-14.  In order to validate the framework, the holistic and the decomposed evaluation 
were‎ compared‎ by‎ Pearson‟s‎ product‎ moment‎ correlation‎ coefficient, (r), which is a 
measure of the correlation, (linear dependence), between two variables x and y, giving a 
value‎between‎+1‎and‎−1‎inclusive. 
It is widely used as a measure of the strength of linear dependence between two variables. 
The correlation process compared the individual holistic evaluations and decomposed 
evaluations which were obtained from the model.  The results, as shown in Table 7-11, 7-12 
and 7-13, indicate that the framework correlates well with the holistic approach, (the 
correlations range between (0.71and 0.81). 
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Salybia R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
P2=100 33.68 53.53 56.59 53.86 69.53 55.88 56.99 68.64 44.36 70.40 76.68 66.36 83.44 56.01 
holistic 44.26 58.97 57.62 53.75 67.21 50.99 70.45 59.70 63.00 79.64 76.64 78.56 78.14 52.07 
Pearson Coefficient 0.77 
           
Table ‎7-11 Holistic and Decomposed Evaluations Performed By Individuals on the Project 
Profiles with Pearson Coefficient. 
Chanel Tunnel R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
P2=100 25.31 31.52 63.47 23.66 48.61 47.32 56.06 65.33 41.80 64.09 63.38 44.33 84.54 71.23 
holistic 49.85 20.30 53.09 53.03 53.03 45.41 65.95 54.05 67.39 76.34 70.21 62.28 96.82 73.69 
Pearson Coefficient 0.71 
           
Table ‎7-12 Holistic and Decomposed Evaluations Performed By Individuals on the Project 
Profiles with Pearson Coefficient. 
Marsa Alam R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 
P2=100 35.04 27.41 65.54 45.47 43.07 52.78 70.01 68.22 39.50 71.97 62.22 60.49 82.21 74.19 
holistic 39.34 16.70 46.85 62.10 46.19 51.47 73.93 60.48 66.85 89.01 61.68 75.68 99.76 82.52 
Pearson Coefficient 0.81 
           
Table ‎7-13 Holistic and Decomposed Evaluations Performed By Individuals on the Project 
Profiles with Pearson Coefficient. 
Project Holistic approach P2  =100 Approach 
Sulaibiya 
 
63.64 60.42 
Channel Tunnel 
 
60.10 52.19 
Marsa Allam 
 
62.33 57.01 
Table ‎7-14 Risk Average Indices for Project Profiles (Group Results) 
The above differences between the P2 approach and the holistic evaluation in Table 7-14, are 
compared in Fig 7.1.   The P2 = 100 approach curve is found to be very close to the holistic 
curve, which means that it analogous to the holistic approach.   
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Figure ‎7-1 Comparison between Average Holistic and Decomposed Evaluations Approaches 
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7.3 Using the Risk Framework in the Project Risk Study 
The‎ identified‎ results‎and‎ the‎participants‟ feedback were used to assess the current BOT 
risk management framework and to advise concerning the amendments that need to be 
made to the framework.  Feedback from the participants in the field study indicated that 
many aspects of the proposed framework would be a helpful aid to decision-makers in both 
the public and private sectors. 
The main reason for the development of the Risk Framework was to help the decision-
maker in evaluating the risk of their infrastructure project during the preliminary stages, 
before proceeding with the project.  In this way, both the private sector and the Government 
of Kuwait should have a fuller picture of the most important BOT risks that they will face 
when considering the initiation of BOT projects in Kuwait.  Having a more informed 
"picture" will facilitate the process of risk management, (risk allocation, mitigation and 
management), in the early stages of procurement of BOT projects. 
Using the Risk Management Framework involves the assignment of the Risk Factor 
weights and their performance, (quality), levels, developing Risk Factor value curves, 
(P2=100), and computing the project risk index.  When the risk Factor indexes, which form 
the total project risk index, have been determined, those Risk Factors that affect the total 
project risk, will be apparent and the decision-maker can then implement strategies to 
manage these risks and re-evaluate them, so that their effect on the project can be mitigated 
and/or minimized.    
For example, considering the use of the P2 approach in the Sulaibiya Waste Water 
Treatment Plant Project, the resulting value indices for the 28 risk Factors, as shown in 
Table 7- 15 indicate that‎ the‎ „Use of Technology", (UOT), Risk Factor is the highest 
weighed Risk Factor in the project with a value index of 3.30.  Whereas, "Inappropriate 
Operating Methods", (IOM), Risk Factor is the second highest weighted Risk Factor with a 
value index of 3.0. "Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the facility", had a 
weighted Risk Factor of 2.98, closely followed by "Performance Related Risk", (PRR), with 
a weighted Risk Factor with a value index of 2.95.  "Excessive Development Costs" has a 
weighted Risk Factor with a value index of 2.52.  Therefore, the decision-makers should 
pay more attention to the above Risk Factors than to the others, because their effect on 
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project risk/viability is more critical and risk management techniques are required in order 
to mitigate and/or minimize their effect by allocating the risks to a party which is capable of 
handling them.  
For the developed countries of France and UK and considering the P2 approach for the 
Channel Tunnel, the highest Risk Factor was "Cost Over runs" was with a value index of 
3.29, and this proved to be true as the cost over runs were in the region of £7.6 billion 
Sterling.  Next was "Delays in Design Approval", at  3.17, as this was one of the longest 
undersea tunnels in the world, engineers wanted to be sure that it was right first time.  
"Lack of Expertise", Risk Factor was next with a value index of 3.03, and not many tunnels 
of such length have been built, most in Hong Kong.  Closely following was the "Lack of 
Independent Management", at 2.95, where companies and sub-contractors were following 
their own instructions but not sufficiently cooperating/communicating with each other.  
"Excessive Development Cost" came fourth with a value index of 2.92, indicating that 
designers were concerned not only by the change in specification by the government but 
also due to factors outside their control, i.e. geological issues.  "Inappropriate Operating 
Methods", at 2.79 indicating that even after underwater surveys were carried out, engineers 
were never 100 % sure about the rock structure to be drilled.   
In developing Egypt, the Marsa Allam Airport Project, posed completely different 
significant Risk Factors:  First was the "Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate 
the facility" at 2.95, which for an airport was a considerable problem.  The next four Risk 
Factors were closely grouped together and next was "Inappropriate Operating Methods" at 
2.70, relating to the unavailability of trained personnel, i.e. whoever was operating the 
airport, would they do it right?  And this posed major concerns regarding safety. There was 
also a significant concern about the "Lack of Experience", at 2.67, during the Promoting 
and Procurement stage, i.e. will the project get off the ground?  The "Unavailability of 
Power Supply" at 2.66, would slow the construction down and if there was a power failure 
during operation then the results could be catastrophic.  Finally, the Risk Factor, "Error in 
Forecasting Demand for Service" at 2.57, has proved, so far, to be to be false, with over 
800,000 people using the Airport in 2010. 
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Risk Factors (Attribute) 
 P2 =100 
Value 
Index 
Government instability GI 2.03 
Government failure to provide permits GFP 1.85 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system NLS 2.46 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) OH 1.93 
Changes in general legislation affecting the project CGL 2.20 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts LCCC 1.85 
Failure to raise finance FRF 1.87 
Undeveloped general business environment UGBE 2.01 
Failure to receive revenues from principal (end user) FRRFP 2.50 
Changes in demand for the facility over concession period CIDP 1.41 
Change in economic policies CIEP 2.49 
Error in forecasting demands for service EIFDS 2.50 
Lack of experience LOE 2.48 
Lack of expertise LE 2.43 
Lack of independent management LIM 2.10 
Changes in project specifications CIPS 2.52 
Expensive and long tendering process ELTP 1.96 
Lack of integrity in the (tendering process) LOI 1.65 
Excessive development costs EDC 2.52 
Delays in design approval DIDA 2.46 
Use of technology UOT 3.30 
Changes in design during construction CIDDC 2.06 
Cost-overrun risks COR 1.96 
Performance related risk PRR 2.95 
Unavailability of power supply UOPS 2.06 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate EIO 2.11 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the facility UPO 2.98 
Inappropriate operating methods IOM 3.00 
Table ‎7-15 Risk index value for the Sulaibiya Wastewater Treatment plant project in Kuwait. 
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Risk Factors (Attribute) 
 P2 =100 
Value 
Index 
Government instability GI 1.36 
Government failure to provide permits GFP 2.45 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system NLS 2.13 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) OH 1.33 
Changes in general legislation affecting the project CGL 1.45 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts LCCC 1.51 
Failure to raise finance FRF 1.27 
Undeveloped general business environment UGBE 1.42 
Failure to receive revenues from principal (end user) 
FRRF
P 1.71 
Changes in demand for the facility over concession period CIDP 2.15 
Change in economic policies CIEP 1.72 
Error in forecasting demands for service EIFDS 2.15 
Lack of experience LOE 2.70 
Lack of expertise LE 3.03 
Lack of independent management LIM 2.95 
Changes in project specifications CIPS 1.62 
Expensive and long tendering process ELTP 1.30 
Lack of integrity in the (tendering process) LOI 1.87 
Excessive development costs EDC 2.92 
Delays in design approval DIDA 3.17 
Use of technology UOT 2.25 
Changes in design during construction CIDDC 2.49 
Cost-overrun risks COR 3.29 
Performance related risk PRR 2.46 
Unavailability of power supply UOPS 1.70 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate EIO 2.18 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the facility UPO 2.72 
Inappropriate operating methods IOM 2.79 
Table ‎7-16 Risk index value for the Channel Tunnel project in UK and France. 
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Risk Factors (Attribute) 
 P2 =100 
Value 
Index 
Government instability GI 2.39 
Government failure to provide permits GFP 1.98 
Non-existence of the legal and regulatory system NLS 1.91 
Outbreak of hostilities (wars, riots, and terrorism) OH 1.71 
Changes in general legislation affecting the project CGL 2.00 
Lack of commitment to concession contracts LCCC 1.69 
Failure to raise finance FRF 2.00 
Undeveloped general business environment UGBE 2.18 
Failure to receive revenues from principal (end user) 
FRRF
P 2.01 
Changes in demand for the facility over concession period CIDP 2.70 
Change in economic policies CIEP 2.25 
Error in forecasting demands for service EIFDS 2.57 
Lack of experience LOE 2.67 
Lack of expertise LE 2.50 
Lack of independent management LIM 1.95 
Changes in project specifications CIPS 1.82 
Expensive and long tendering process ELTP 2.11 
Lack of integrity in the (tendering process) LOI 2.35 
Excessive development costs EDC 2.51 
Delays in design approval DIDA 2.12 
Use of technology UOT 1.97 
Changes in design during construction CIDDC 2.24 
Cost-overrun risks COR 2.16 
Performance related risk PRR 2.24 
Unavailability of power supply UOPS 2.66 
Error in operation and maintenance cost estimate EIO 1.98 
Unavailability and quality of personnel to operate the facility UPO 2.95 
Inappropriate operating methods IOM 2.70 
Table ‎7-17 Risk index value for the Marsa Allam Airport project in Egypt 
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Figure ‎7-2 Risk index value for the Sulaibiya Wastewater Treatment Plant project in Kuwait, Marsa Allam Airport project in Egypt and Channel 
Tunnel project in UK and France. 
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Figure ‎7-3 Risk Management Framework for the Sulaibiya Wastewater Treatment plant 
project in Kuwait. 
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Risk Management Framework 
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Figure ‎7-4 Risk Management Framework for the Channel Tunnel project in UK and France. 
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Risk Management Framework 
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Figure ‎7-5 Risk Management Framework for the Marsa Allam Airport project in Egypt. 
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With reference to the four figures above, fig7.2, 7-3, 7-4 and 7-5, bar chart comparing Risk 
Factors between the three case studies; and the three Risk Management Frameworks 
generated from the "P2 = 100" approach for the same case studies, respectively, it can be seen 
that each case study has different salient Risk Factors.  
Risk Category 
Sulaibiya Waste Water 
Treatment Plant 
Channel Tunnel, UK 
& France 
Marsa Allam Airport 
Egypt 
Construction and 
Operating 
Performance Related 
Risk Factor 
Cost Overrun Risk 
Factor 
Unavailability of 
Power Supply risk 
Factor 
Development Use of Technology Risk 
Factor  
Delays in Design 
Approval Risk Factor 
 
Promoting and 
Procurement 
Change in Project 
specification Risk Factor 
Lack of Independent 
Management Risk 
Factor 
Lack of Expertise Risk 
Factor 
Lack of Integrity Risk 
Factor 
Financial and 
Revenue 
Failure to Receive 
Revenue Risk Factor  
 Changes in Demand 
Risk Factor 
Country Risk   Government Instability 
Risk Factor 
Table 7-18 Comparison of Risk Factors between the case studies. 
The first four most salient Risk Factors for each case study can be seen in the above table and 
are completely different from each other.  Considering these first four most important Risk 
Factors for the three case studies the results indicated: Risk Factors within the "Construction 
and Operating" Risk Category were all different for the three case studies.  For the Sulaibiya 
Waste Water Treatment Plant in Kuwait, it was the "Performance Risk Factor" indicating that 
there is a perception that the monitoring of the BOT infrastructure facility during the 
concession period is not carried out correctly by the host government.  Proper monitoring of 
performance during the concession period is essential, not only for the success of the project 
and its' continued operation after the concession period, but to ensure that the consumer is 
getting "value for money".Whilst in the Channel Tunnel, UK and France the Risk Factor was 
the "Cost Overrun" Risk Factor which turned out to be very real as the project cost over runs 
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are presently at approximately £7.5 billion Sterling, (2012).  And in Marsa Allam Airport in 
Egypt the Risk Factor was "Unavailability of Power Supply" as the airport was built on a 
"greenfield" site, in the middle of the desert but near the sea.  Not only did the equipment 
used in the construction needed to be brought to the site, but the whole site itself had to be 
self-supporting and ancillary services had to be in place first in order to support the 
construction, (i.e. provide electric power), and later the Airport itself. 
Next, Risk Factors for the "Development" Risk Category were considered.  For the 
Sulaibiya Waste Water Treatment Plant in Kuwait it was the "Use of Technology" Risk 
Factor indicating that there was public concern that the water, (collected from sewage), was 
not being treated correctly, nor thoroughly enough, to be acceptable as drinking water.  The 
second part to this was that the equipment used in the filtering and cleaning processes was 
not up to date and not operated correctly.  For the Channel Tunnel the Risk Factors were 
"Delays in Design and Approval" which are understandable as the Channel Tunnel is one of 
the longest undersea tunnels in the world and improper design could have been catastrophic 
in terms of human life as well as costs.  For Marsa Allam Airport the most important risk 
Factor was "Changes in Design" during construction but this Risk Factor was not in the top 
four as listed in Table 7-18, above.   
The "Promoting and Procurement" Risk Category also highlighted differences in Risk 
importance between the three case studies.  For the Sulaibiya Waste Water Treatment Plant 
in Kuwait it was the "Change in Project Specification" Risk Factor, -a Risk Factor taken 
very seriously by the private sector but not so seriously by the public sector, (-as Fig. 6.2 
demonstrates where the "group composite weights" of the importance of this Risk Factor 
were completely opposite to each other depending on the respondent place of work, i.e. 
Private company and very important; or Public Sector and not so important).  For the 
Channel Tunnel, two Risk Factors shared equal importance in this Risk Category.  Firstly, a 
Lack of Independent Management" to oversee the whole project and the many contractors 
and sub-contractors working on it.  Secondly, a Lack of Expertise in constructing such a 
long undersea tunnel as these are very large BOT infrastructure projects, of which very few 
have been built and not many long tunnels.  Whilst in Marsa Allam Airport, the most 
important Risk Factor was the "Lack of Integrity", - a suspicion that there was wrong doing 
going on between suppliers, construction firms and government officials.  
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For the Finance and Revenue, Risk Category, the private sector in Kuwait listed this one as 
most significant.  It is common practice in Kuwait not to pay utility bills as the prevailing 
public attitude is: "As Kuwait is such a rich country, then the government can afford to 
pay".  There have been various efforts by past governments to make people pay their utility 
bills, including discounts, and even amnesties to make a fresh start, but nothing has worked 
so far.  The present government has recently taken a tougher stance in that: if a cit izen of 
Kuwait has an outstanding utility bill then they are not allowed to leave the country without 
paying the utility bill first, -and the government has opened offices in Airports and border 
crossings to enable citizens to pay their utility bills before being allowed to leave the 
country.  The Channel Tunnel did not have any Risk Factors in this Risk Category that were 
ranked in the top four.  For Marsa Allam, it was a different story.  Marsa Allam Airport 
being built in the desert did not have a "captive audience" of nearby potential customers, so 
private investors were most concerned about being paid a return on their investments.  As it 
has turned out, Marsa Allam Airport is a popular Airport and the area of Marsa Allam has 
become a thriving holiday resort, popular with Europeans.  
For the Country Risk, surprisingly only the Marsa Allam Airport listed this as a Risk Factor 
in the top four.  Even Kuwait with its' political upheaval and regular change in government 
did not register Country Risk in the top four, however, it is a significant Risk Factor for the 
respondents with respect to Egypt as the Egyptian people were not content with their own 
government at the time of the project build.     
The index value listing of the Risk Factors, determined by the Kuwaiti respondents, may have  
been due to their perception of, and attitude to, risk based on experience gained mainly in 
Kuwait.  Furthermore, the questionnaire was answered after all of the respective BOT 
infrastructure projects had been completed and "hindsight" may have played a significant part 
in their evaluation of the risks; "Experience is something one gains a second after it is 
needed".  Although the Risk Management Frameworks were constructed after the completion 
of each case study, they do still provide a valuable insight into the potential risk areas of each 
case study within their respective countries. 
"It should be noted that each and every BOT infrastructure project will have its' own 
characteristics of risk depending on the type of project and the location". 
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7.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the results provided by the respondents who participated in this study 
and also an analysis of the P2 = 100 approach model.  It also presents the assessment of the 
three‎ existing‎ case‎ study‎ projects:‎ the‎ „Channel‎ Tunnel‟,‎ the‎ „Sulaibiya‎ Waste‎ Water‎
Treatment‎Plant‟‎ and‎ the‎ „Marsa‎Allam Airport‟‎ by‎ using‎ the‎ adopted‎Risk Management 
Framework.  The outcomes, after the analysis of the data collected from the two 
questionnaires in this chapter, are as follows:- 
1. The Risk Management Framework using the P2 = 100 decomposed evaluations 
approach is very close to the experts holistic evaluations for BOT infrastructure 
projects. 
2. The Risk Management Framework, via the Expert Choice 2000 software, clearly 
identifies the complex inter-relationships between different decision factors. 
3. The Risk Management Framework is more sensitive to a single Risk Factor, 
(quality), than the Risk Factor importance weighting. 
4. The outcomes of the analysis in this chapter can increase the ability of decision-
makers to:- 
5. Break down the project into well structured and clear managerial related decision 
factors. 
6. Determine the decision Risk factors which will have the greatest impact on the 
project. 
7. Understand their project well and to determine the viability of the project. 
8. Compare‎ the‎ individual‟s‎ decisions‎ and‎ make‎ an‎ appropriate‎ and‎ realistic‎ group‎
decision concerning the project. 
9. Investigate and perform strategies which will clarify the risk(s) magnitude and 
extent and increase their contributions towards minimizing these risk(s). 
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10. Prepare all tendering and negotiation documents necessary when dealing with the 
other participants in the project with respect to risk allocation, so that all parties 
involved are aware of their responsibilities and duties towards these risks. 
11. Compare the project risk with similar ones already in existence. 
12. Gain a comprehensive database for future reference. 
 259 
 
Chapter 8 Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains a summary of the research, followed by a description of the way in 
which it adds to the existing body of knowledge.  The limitations of the research are 
outlined, followed by the conclusions of the thesis.  Finally, the author gives suggestions 
and recommendations for further work and future investigation. 
8.2 Research Summary 
The Build, Operate and Transfer, (BOT), scheme has now become established worldwide, 
and particularly in developing countries.  This new contractual system of building is 
particularly suited to the construction of large-scale infrastructure facilities.  It has become 
increasingly popular due to its' many advantages and successful application.  It provides 
Governments with an ideal solution for the development of infrastructure without 
increasing‎ the‎Government‟s‎ financial‎ and‎managerial‎ burdens.‎ ‎ ‎Whilst‎ this‎ scheme‎ has‎
been welcomed by the private sector, as it provides new potential markets and a good 
source of potential revenue, unfortunately, many of the BOT infrastructure projects have 
not been developed due to a lack of feasibility studies in the particular project.  One reason 
for this is that host governments now expect the private promoters to conduct a feasibility 
study which could be drawn out and very expensive, (sometimes in the order of millions of 
dollars, US).  However, the host Government and private promoters very often have 
different objectives.  The host Government‟s‎aim‎is‎to‎have‎the‎private promoter provide all 
the finance and bear all the risks, as well as improving the quality and efficiency of the 
infrastructure, shortening the concession period and then minimizing their return on 
investments, after which, they expect the facility transferred back to them in a good 
working order.  In contrast to this, the private promoters need to recover their investment 
costs and would like to maximize their profits as quickly as possible.  The private 
companies prefer that the risk be shared with the host Government from whom they would 
also like proof of political and financial stability, the provision of appropriate documents 
that would guarantee a reasonable return on their investments, and to ensure that no other 
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project(s), which would compete with theirs, is/are considered during the concession 
period. 
The increasing economic growth in Kuwait, and other developing countries, has created a 
need for basic infrastructure such as power plants, transportation, and telecommunication 
networks.  In order to meet these needs, the Government of Kuwait has adopted the BOT 
approach and so it is very important that appropriate and effective risk identification and 
assessment techniques are used to ascertain the particular risks associated with the various 
different activities throughout the life of the project.  It is particularly important also, when 
implementing the BOT projects, to ensure that the project objectives are met, including 
cost, on-time, quality, safety and environmental sustainability. 
At the beginning of any BOT project, the promoters need to ensure that all risks are 
controlled, including the political, legal, social, environmental, economical and financial 
risks.  It is essential, for both the host Government and private promoters, to carry out a 
project risk study to ensure that there are benefits for both parties and share the work 
needed, and the costs required, for completion.  A list of recommendations is given below:- 
1. The private promoters need to produce an accurate and effective project risk study, 
without the possibility of large financial losses, or even bankruptcy, particularly if 
the same private promoters do not win the bid; meaning that companies which have 
a substantial financial stability and backing are the only ones with a chance of being 
awarded the contract for the project. 
2. Both parties need to have an in-depth understanding of the project characteristics 
and criteria. 
3. The time and costs of negotiations of the contract should be reduced as far as is 
practicable.  Project risks mitigation and management should be handled 
proficiently. 
4. Both parties should be encouraged to build a professional relationship between them 
but one that does not create suspicions of wrong doing. 
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Although, host Governments usually wish to transfer all the project risks to the private 
promoter, experience has proved that this often leads to disruption or failure of the project.  
It is important therefore, that host Governments are prepared to share those risks for which 
they have access to suitable mitigation techniques.  For example, the political and 
regulatory development risks, (i.e. country related), would be best allocated to the host 
Government as it is the best suited to manage or mitigate them.  It is also true that, when a 
host Government agrees to share some of the economic and financial risks associated with 
the project, (e.g. foreign exchange fluctuation, inflation, interest rate and changes in 
economic policies) this‎increases‎the‎project‟s‎viability.‎‎The‎risk study lists the major Risk 
Categories and the various Risk Factors which have a detrimental impact on BOT 
infrastructure projects at different levels.  The risks that have the most significant 
consequences are suggested to be the financial, revenue, political, and operating risks.  The 
areas which have a lower level of consequence on the projects are "force majeure" and 
"physical" and "development" risks.  Risk Factors were also assigned to each project type 
and found to have a different priority depending on the type of project and location.  
This research aim is to develop a framework that will enable decision makers in the private 
and public sectors decide how to deal with the risks that affects BOT infrastructure projects 
in Kuwait and allow decision makers to investigate ways to decrease or prevent them.  
The research objectives were developed to provide meaningful detail to the research aim and 
also more focus to the investigation. The research objectives were achieved within this thesis 
as follow:   
1. To develop a better understanding of the basic and essential concepts involved in the 
BOT infrastructure projects and the characteristics of the risks involved, (Chapter 2).  
2. To identify the most important risk factors involved when implementing BOT 
infrastructure projects in Kuwait, (Chapter 2and 3). 
3. To categorize and group the various risk factors facing the implementation of BOT 
infrastructure projects in Kuwait, (Chapter 5).  
4. Using expert opinion, to list each risk factor/group according to its' significance 
within the BOT infrastructure project, (Chapter 6). 
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5. To consider and propose a risk-management framework for BOT projects having 
evaluated, validated and justified the results so that decision-makers and consultants 
are more easily able to overcome, or at least minimize, the impact of risk factors on 
BOT infrastructure projects in Kuwait, (Chapter 6and7). 
8.3 BOT Project Risk Factors and their Inter-relationships 
This research has identified 28 major risk decision factors in BOT infrastructure projects 
and these have then been classified under their main relative categories, ("Financial & 
Revenue Risks", "Country Risks", "Construction & Operating Risks", "Development Risks" 
and "Promotion & Procurement Risks"), in order to determine their inter-relationships and 
their effect on the project.   
The project risk decision factors were individually evaluated by means of the first 
questionnaire given to expert participants and once the results collected, the Risk Factors 
were evaluated collectively to form an initial Risk Management Framework. 
Each Risk Category is taken to be of equal significance with respect to the others whilst the 
Risk Factors were "graded" in descending order of importance within their Risk Category.  
The expert participants were asked to complete a second questionnaire, using pairwise 
comparisons and the importance of the decision factors were "weighted" by means of 
„Expert‎ Choice‟‎ software,‎ which‎ is‎ based‎ on‎ the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
technique developed by Saaty (1980).   
The results indicated, (Table 6.2), that the "Financial & Revenue" category was the most 
important, (31.10%), followed by "Country Risks", (23.40%), and then "Construction & 
Operation", (17.10%), next in importance was "Development", (17.00%), and finally, 
"Promoting & Procurement", (11.40%).   From these results, it can be deduced that the 
project viability is mainly dependent on the management of the financial and the 
commercial risk decision factors.  It is important that, during the project risk study stage, 
the crucial sensitive risk factors are taken into consideration and evaluated.   In an effort to 
determine the contributions of the decision factors to the project risk index, the 
decomposed, "P2 = 100", approach was applied to three case study projects, ("Channel 
Tunnel Project" linking the UK with France, the "Sulaibiya Wastewater Treatment Plant" in 
Kuwait and the "Marsa Allam Airport Project" in Egypt).  The outcomes were correlated to 
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the direct holistic evaluation of the three project profiles and the indications are that the 
outcomes of the "P2 = 100" approach are very close to the holistic evaluations, (the Pearson 
coefficient lies between 0.71 and 0.81, which indicates strong correlation, Tables 7-8/9/10).    
The use of the Risk Management Framework in clarifying the risk decision factor 
contributions and potential Risk Factors offers a tool to make informed and sensible 
decisions to minimize the risks or even preferably, eliminate them all together. 
The four most important Risk Factors concerning the three case studies were discussed in 
detail and it must be acknowledged that hindsight and a "Kuwaiti perspective" may have 
played a part in the relation of each Risk Factor with respect to the others. 
It must be noted that in the first questionnaire there were originally eighty Risk Factors.  
These eighty Risk Factors were identified from previous studies, as mentioned in chapter 
four). The eighty Risk Factors were streamlined to twenty-eight and the remainder made 
redundant but as each project is different with its' own characteristics, any of the redundant 
Risk Factors can be re-employed. 
Strategies that could be useful for managing the performance of these Risk Factors are 
given below:- 
1. The development of an accurate and reliable risk study. 
2. Decreasing‎ the‎ Government‟s‎ involvement‎ in‎ the‎ design‎ and‎ construction‎
processes. 
3. Introducing new construction technologies and methods which would decrease 
the construction time and cost and be appropriate to the stage of the project. 
4. Improving the present legislation for BOT procurement in Kuwait to the benefit 
of both the government and private promoters. 
5. Increasing the involvement of the community by explaining the benefits of the 
project on the local environment. 
Preparing all the necessary resources, whilst ensuring, as far as is possible, that the use of 
local resources is maximized and the costs and length of procedures for the imported 
resources for the project are minimized. 
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8.4 Contribution of the thesis to the body of knowledge 
After reviewing relevant literature, it became clear that there is an apparent lack of 
published studies on the subject of risk management for BOT Infrastructure projects in 
Kuwait. Once the Government has decided to adopt the BOT method of delivering future 
infrastructure projects, knowledge will be needed regarding the major and most important 
risks and challenges involved in such projects and it will be necessary to have an 
understanding of how best these risks and challenges can be managed.  The contribution to 
the current state of risk study analysis of BOT infrastructure projects are provided by this 
research is presented below in terms of the following points: 
1. This study makes a contribution to the literature about BOT projects in the 
context of Kuwait, as it is one of the very few studies regarding Kuwait that 
have been conducted in this area. 
2. The research provides a comprehensive account of the environment in which the 
Kuwait BOT Infrastructure projects are carried out and also notes the risks 
involved.  This study will assist foreign investors, contractors, lenders, sponsors 
and insurance companies when considering BOT Infrastructure Projects in 
Kuwait.   
3. The study will be of help to private sector companies who have insufficient 
knowledge concerning the environment involving BOT Infrastructure Projects 
within the country and it will also benefit the public sector which has limited 
experience of partnerships with the private sector. 
4. This study provides a list identifying the most important qualitative decision 
factors involving risk, which have been carefully identified, selected and then 
screened by a group of experts from Kuwait. 
5. This study provides a Risk Management Framework which can be used to assess 
the risk of qualitative Risk Factors for large-scale BOT infrastructure projects in 
Kuwait. 
6. This research will assist decision makers in investigations regarding the options 
available regarding risks and then to determine which of these options present 
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more risk and which present less risk.  And provides an appropriate decision 
support tool which should help the decision maker to determine those decisions 
which would prove most effective in minimizing and/or prevent any project risk 
and also put forward strategies to decrease the risk factors. 
7. This study provides criteria which would help in the preparation and evaluation 
of BOT Infrastructure Risk Management depending on the circumstances at the 
time of the Project which would be of benefit during tendering process. 
8. The study provides a flexible means to evaluate Risks at the beginning of a 
project or at any time during the project depending on the (new), prevailing 
circumstances. 
9. The‎ “P2=100”‎ approach‎ provides‎ in‎ depth‎ analysis‎ of‎ the‎ qualitative‎ decision‎
factors that were commonly evaluated arbitrarily. This could change the typical 
concerns of decision makers from both parties‟ government and private sector 
who only concentrate on the project quantitative decision factors. 
8.5 Limitations of the research 
During the research, several limitations were discovered.  It is important that the decision 
maker is aware of these limitations when using the Risk Management Framework and these 
are given below:- 
1. Although the Risk Factors were chosen from various different types of existing 
infrastructure projects and generalizations made, it is important that, for a particular 
project in a specific country, other additional project-related Risk Factors should be 
taken into account. 
2. Expert Choice uses an Analytical Hierarchal Analysis (AHP) process. An approach 
which uses pairwise comparisons and has the disadvantage that the number of 
pairwise comparisons to be made may become very large and so a lengthy task, 
indicating that the AHP process has its' limitations.  The consequences of these 
limitations are such that only five "Risk Categories" and a maximum of six "Risk 
Factors" were used for the Risk Management Framework.  If more than six Risk 
Factors are used within their respective Risk Category, then the "pairwise' 
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comparisons become complicated and inconsistent results may be obtained.  
Another important disadvantage of the AHP method is the use of the 9 point scale.  
Sometimes the decision maker may have difficulty in distinguishing between Pairs 
of Risk Factors, i.e. whether one Risk Factor is 5 or 6 or 7 times more significant 
than another.   
3. There is a shortage of published data concerning Risk Management for BOT 
Infrastructure projects and for the construction industry in Kuwait. 
4. Each BOT infrastructure project has a different risk structure, since there are many 
different ways to finance, design procure and build the project.  Therefore, the 
knowledge and expertise obtained from BOT infrastructure projects in other 
countries, is not always appropriate for BOT projects in Kuwait.   
 
8.6 Recommendations for future research 
The purpose of this study is to begin a process of objectively categorizing the project Risk 
Factors affecting BOT Infrastructure projects and to construct an effective Risk 
Management Framework to show the significance of each Risk Factor in a BOT 
infrastructure project.    
This study is the beginning of the investigation of the evaluation of Risk Factors in a BOT 
infrastructure projects.  Further dedicated and extensive research is required in order to 
obtain a deeper understanding of both qualitative and quantitative risk factors involved.   
Researchers should track relevant Risk Factors throughout the whole life of various BOT 
infrastructure projects.  Appropriate computer software should be employed in order to 
process large combinations of Risk Factors.  After processing these Risk Factors, their 
relationships to each other can be analyzed from appropriate and easily understood data 
sheets, (including graphs and tables).  The analysis of the Risk Factors would be a great 
help to decision makers in order to facilitate more efficient project management of BOT 
infrastructure projects and services, providing a saving on time and costs.  
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8.7 Concluding remarks 
The concept behind this thesis was to develop a clear and implementable Risk Management 
Framework which could be used by the private sector and public sector for BOT 
infrastructure projects whenever they want to evaluate risks in BOT infrastructure projects.  
The target that the author tried to accomplish was to represent holistic and decomposing 
methods in the Framework that could make the picture clearer behind any decision which 
carries risk.   The private sector and public sector of BOT infrastructure projects are 
cautious and fearful of risks when making a decision because in most cases, the risk is their 
responsibility and generally, they cannot afford failure.  These concerns were important to 
the author during the period of this research.  Such a Risk Management Framework could 
be‎useful‎ in‎offering‎“stepping-stone”‎knowledge‎to‎build‎ support‎tools,‎such‎knowledge-
based systems or expert systems, (or extend the data base in software such as "Expert 
Choice").  The Risk Management Framework can be used as a support tool alongside 
project management of the BOT.  When new stages of the project are about to begin, with 
the aid of the Risk Management Framework, potential Risk areas will be identified.  The 
decision makers, armed with this knowledge, can now allocate resources to relevant areas in 
order to minimize these risks. The proposed Risk Management Framework, in its current 
form, offers a positive example of how the private sector and public sector engaged in BOT 
infrastructure projects can evaluate alternatives and make favorable decisions to minimize 
risk.  This assistance will not be a magic recipe for success, but would, however, be a 
practical tool to evaluate influential risk factors in order to increase the probability of 
making the right decisions using the right procedures. 
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